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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Licensing Boards-Police Power
Limitation Thereon
In 1938 North Carolina's Supreme Court in State v. Lawrence held
the photographers licensing act to be a constitutional exercise of the
police power of the State.1 Although it discussed the fire hazard, pos1

State v. Lawrence, 213 N. C. 674, 197 S. E. 586 (1938).
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sibility of fraud, use of photographs in court, and the actual degree of
skill involved, the court gave the key to its real reason when it stated
that it is largely within the legislature's discretion whether or not a
business is subject to licensing under the police power. 2 The dissenting
justices thought the act essentially class legislation to protect a particular group of tradesmen, and beyond the legitimate limits of the exercise of the police power.
Following the decision an article appeared in this REVIEW which
criticized both the needless diversities in the provisions of North Carolina licensing' statutes, and the fact that no consistent policy was apparent to explain why some occupations were subjected to licensing and
others not.3 But in a later case4 the Supreme Court said the record
precluded reconsideration of the decision in State v. Lawrence. Then,
without distinguishing between photographers and dry cleaners, the
court in State v. Harris5 declared the dry cleaners licensing statute
violative of the Constitution of North Carolina, Article I, Sections 1, 17
and 31. 6 The court thought the use of the police power to exclude
persons from ordinary callings collectivistic and contrary to the basic
concept of freedom of initiative. It also thought that, because of the
growing public dislike of licensing agencies, it should critically consider
the regulation of everyday callings ;7 and using arguments which would
have invalidated the photographers statute if applied to that act, it
struck down regulation of a trade which affects the public health and
welfare much more than does the trade of a photographer.
Although the North Carolina Court was not ready to confess that
it had changed its view," every other court, except that of Florida, which
2Id. at 679, 197 S. E. at 589.
Hanft and Hamrick, Haphazard Regimentation Under Licensing Statutes, 17
N. C. L. Rzv. 1 (1938).
' State v. Lueders, 214 N. C. 558, 200 S. E. 22 (1938) (the purpose of the
appeal was frankly avowed to be such reconsideration) ; cf. State-v. Nichols, 215
N. C. 80, 200 S. E. 926 (1938) (court declined to consider constitutionality of dry
cleaners statute since the special verdict below had been "not guilty") ; State v.
Muse, 219 N. C. 226, 13 S. E. 2d 229 (1941) (the Supreme Court said it would

not render an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of the plumbers licensing
statute where there was no jury verdict in the court below).
State v. Harris, 216 N. C. 746, 6 S. E. 2d 854 (1939) (7 to 0 decision).

'N. C. CONsT. Art. I, §1: "That we hold it to be self-evident that all men

are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable

rights; that among these are life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their

own labor, and the pursuit of happiness"; §17: "No person ought to be taken,
imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed or
exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law
of the land"; §31: ". . . monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free State

and ought not to be allowed." The court also said the statute was an unwarranted
delegation of legislative functions but this point does not affect the issue of
whether dry cleaners can be licensed.

"State v. Harris, supra at 752, 6 S. E. 2d at 858 ("The stage of internal protest has been reached.").
8Id. at 764, 6 S. E. 2d at 866 ("In its factual setting the case departs completely from those in which this court has approved regulation of this kind.").
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has since considered the constitutionality of the photographers statute
says that State v. Harrisis a complete recession from the viewpoint in
State v. Lawrence, and indicates a greater reluctance on the part of the
court to defer to legislative determination that a business is subject to
licensing provisions under the police power of the State. Every one of
these states, including Florida, declared its photographers statute unconstitutional, and left State v. Lawrence the sole decision supporting
such a statute.
Since 1938 the General Assembly of the State of North Carolina
has also evidenced a tendency to defeat bills designed to increase licensing regulation of everyday trades and businesses, although no uniform
policy to that effect appears. In 1939 there were four bills introduced
to repeal various licensing acts, 10 but none of these were enacted though
the Senate did pass the two dispensing with regulation of tile contractors
and dry cleaners. On the other hand, four bills were introduced to set
up new Boards of Examiners, two being tabled in the Senate l and the
other two receiving unfavorable reports in the House, 12 although the
bill to license funeral directors passed the Senate. The House of Representatives was the stumbling block of the opponents of the licensing
boards, as it killed thirteen bills introduced to lessen control by these
boards,13 most of them by unfavorable committee reports; but both
Buehman v. Bechtel, 57 Ariz. 363, 114 P. 2d 227 (1941) (the court said the
dissenting opinion in North Carolina's photography case had become law in the
dry cleaners case) ; Sullivan v. DeCerb, 156 Fla. 496, 23 So. 2d 571 (1945) ; State
v. Cromwell, 72 N. D. 565, 9 N. W. 2d 914 (1943) ; Moore v. Sutton, 185 Va.
481, 39 S. E. 2d 348 (1946) (the court gave a complete discussion of the prior
cases and North Carolina's new viewpoint; it adhered to "the philosophy that that
state is best governed which is least governed"). Georgia had followed the dissent in the Lawrence case and cited the earlier cases of Territory v. Kraft, 33
Hawaii 397 (1935) (holding that photography has no real tendency to injure
public safety, health or morals) and Wright v. Wiles, 173 Tenn. 334, 117 S. E.
2d 736 (1938) (dictum to same effect) in Bramley v. State, 187 Ga. 826, 2 S. E.
2d 647 (1939).
"0Sen. Bill No. 55 (1939) (tile contractors); H. R. Bill No. 268 (1939) (dry
cleaners, dyers, and pressers); Sen. Bill No. 141 (1939) (unfavorable committee
report on photographers board dissolution) ; Sen. Bill No. 173 (1939) (dry cleaners, dyers, and pressers).
" Sen. Bill No. 196 (1939) (State Board of Examiners of Warm Air, Sheet
Metal and Roofing Contractors); Sen. Bill No. 336 (1939) (State Board of
Naturopathic Examiners).
12H. R. Bill No. 138 (1939) (State Board of Painters, Paper Hangers and
Decorators) ; Sen. Bill No. 236 (1939) (State Board of Embalmers and Funeral
Directors).
(would have admitted to the practice of law grad13 Sen. Bill No. 103 (1939)
uates of Wake Forest, Duke, and University of North Carolina Schools of Law
who had attended 4 years, had received the LL.B. degree, and had worked in the
office of a practicing attorney for 6 months) ; H. R. Bill No. 311 (1939) (would
have permitted pharmacist applicant to retake practical part of the examination
when he had failed only that part); H. R. Bill No. 322 (1939) (would have
broadened exemptions from the photographers statute); Sen. 'Bill No. 149 (1939)
(would have allowed issuance of a license without examination to land surveyers
in Buncombe County with 35 years' experience) ; Sen. Bill No. 165 (1939) (would
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houses passed three other bills restricting the boards. Whereas before
this time the policy of the legislature toward these established boards
had been a liberal one, the legislature brought the licensing agencies
under some measure of control by setting up a uniform procedure for
the revocation of licenses to eliminate discrimination by some of the
boards.1 4 The other two bills exempted certain activities from the photographers' 5 and plumbers' 6 acts. Another bill, to stiffen requirements
17
for cosmetologists, was given an unfavorable report in the Senate.
In 1941 the legislature seemed willing to make minor changes which
would extend restrictions in the licensing statutes,' 8 but would not make
major changes to extend the provisions of the photography statute to
cities with less than 2,500 population,' 9 nor would it set up a State
Board of Real Estate Examiners, 20 although the Supreme Court had
earlier indicated that this field of endeavor is a proper one for regulation.21 However, only one22 out of five bills to lessen restrictions by the
individual boards 23 or to give the unlicensed tradesmen a greater voice
have allowed schools of beauty culture to charge for work done by advanced stu-

dents); H. R. Bill No. 446 (1939) (same as H. R. Bill No. 322); H. R. Bill No.
566 (1939) (would have licensed as registered pharmacists without examination all
registered assistant pharmacists with 5 years' experience under a registered pharmacist) ; H. R. Bill No. 590 (1939) (would have granted licenses to veterinarians in
Sampson County who had practiced at least 30 years) ; H. R. Bill No. 609 (1939)
(would have exempted Alamance County from the dry cleaners statute); Sen.
Bill No. 266 (1939) (would have transferred the powers of the State Board of
Barber Examiners, the Board of Cosmetic Art Examiners and the Dry Cleaners

Commission to the State Board of Health); H. R. Bill No. 881 (1939)

(would

have allowed applicant who had been working for 10 years under a registered
optometrist to take the examination without complying with certain sections of
the statute) ; H. R. Bill No. 889 (1939) (would have exempted Forsyth County

from the dry cleaners statute) ; Sen. Bill No. 450 (1939)

(would have exempted

Alamance County from the dry cleaners statute); and Sen. Bill No. 463 (1939)
(would have granted licenses to those plumbing and heating contractors with 10
years' service).

"N.
C. Pub. Laws 1939, c. 218.
'0 N. C. Pub. Laws 1939, c. 224.
'

Sen. Bill No. 56 (1939)

's

N. C. Pub. Laws 1939, c. 280.

(also would have opened the records to the public).

Passed: Sen. Bill No. 77 (1941) (requires a licensed tile contractor to be
present and in charge of work of a firm) ; Sen. Bill No. 83 (1941) (defines "practice of law" to include the preparation of certain forms and reports) ; H. R. Bill
No. 244 (1941) (amends law relating to general contractors to classify contractors

as unlimited, intermediate, or limited and restrict the latter two classes to projects
not exceeding in value $300,000 and $75,000 respectively).
'"H. R. Bill No. 869 (1941); and it would not allow the Board of Pharmacy

to set a different fee for granting a license without an examination to a pharmacist

licensed by other pharmacy boards from that charged other candidates for a
license, H. R. Bill No. 920 (1941).
20 H. R. Bill No. 552 (1941).

"' State v. Dixon, 215 N. C. 161, 1 S.E. 2d 521 (1939).

22 N. C. Pub. Laws 1941, c. 369 (excepting from the architects licensing statute
persons who furnish plans for construction of a value not exceeding $15,000, and
limiting the act to apply only to persons planning construction for pay).
23 H. R. Bill No. 100 (1941)
(to remove Morehead City from the plumbing

and heating contractors licensing act) ; Sen. Bill No. 189 (1941) (to lower annual
renewal fee for plumbing and heating contractors from $50 to $25); H. R. Bill
No. 945 (1941) (to require that persons who have served on the examining board
be granted a plumbing and heating contractors license without examination).
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in their administration 24 was passed. But where the public health was
dearly concerned, 25 the legislators showed no hesitation in passing regulatory measures; and of course, they provided for the liquidation of
the dry cleaners commission - in accordance with the decision in State
v. Harris.
A strict attitude toward certain licensing boards was manifested by
the legislature in 1943 as it enacted bills to bring the State Board of
28
Barber Examiners2 7 and the State Board of Cosmetic Art Examiners
under the Director of the Budget.

A third bill, 2 9 which passed the

House of Representatives, would have authorized a full-scale investigation of the books and records of the State Board of Cosmetic Art
Examiners. With the exception of two bills, 0 one of which became
law, all proposed bills during that session of the General Assembly
pointed in the direction of less legislative regulation of ordinary
vocations.31
Interest in the activities of the licensing boards diminished during
the 1945 session of the General Assembly, probably because the war was
still in progress. Still, opposition existed toward the boards, and the
legislative body refused to set up a State Board of Opticians3 2 and a
State Board of Shorthand Reports, 3 3 and refused to tighten the requirements of the cosmetologists statute ;34 yet where the public health was
vitally affected, the legislature passed the bill to license dental hygienists without unnecessary delay 3 5 A notable exception to the general
2 H. R. Bill No. 118 (1941)
(to require the Governor to appoint one journeyman barber to the State Board of Barber Examiners).
" N. C. Pub. Laws 1941, c. 163 (the inclusion of radiology in the practice of
medicine).
2 N. C. Pub. Laws 1941, c. 127 (this decision brought to the attention of the
legislature the new view of the court).
27 N. C. Sess. L. 1943, c. 53.
2'8 N. C. Sess. L. 1943, c. 354.
H. R. Res. 768 (1943).
2N N. C. Sess. L. 1943, c. 25 (preventing issuance of coupons redeemable for
photographic products unless $2,000 bond is placed with the clerk of the Superior
Court of each county in which such issuance takes place) ; Sen. Bill No. 95 (1943)
(attempting to create a State Board of Naturopathic Examiners).
2 H.
R. Bill No. 70 (1943) ; H. R. Bill No. 379 (1943) (to permit a licensed
cosmetologist to hire assistants who are not licensed apprentices) ; Sen. Bill No.
86 (1943) (to enable a retired cosmetologist to get back into practice merely by
paying the annual fee) ; Sen. Bill No. 166 (1943) (to dissolve the State Board of
Cosmetic Art Examiners and put cosmetologists under the State Board of Health).
The noticeable lack of bills to repeal acts setting up licensing boards may possibly
be due to the absence from the General Assembly of Senator Cogburn who led
the opposition to these boards in 1939 and 1941.
2 Sen. Bill No. 186 (1945) (the North Carolina Supreme Court has recently
declared that an optician cannot be regulated under an optometrists statute, Palmer
v. Smith, 229 N. C. 612, 51 S. E. 2d 8 (1948)).
3 Sen. Bill No. 339 (1945)
(passed the Senate only).
24 H. R. Bill No. 278 (1945)
(unfavorable committee report. in the House).
N. C. Sess. L. 1945, c. 639 (replacing N. C. GEN. STAT., §90-49 (1943)).
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inclination of the legislature to restrict the licensing boards is the protection by the legislature of the "practice of law."3 6
In 1947 the legislature refused to create a board of examiners for
funeral directors8 7 or a board to regulate practical nurses,3 8 although it
did add two practical nurses to the Board of Nurse Examiners and
plac6 practical nurses under that board.3 9 The frequently recurring
critical attitude of the legislature toward licensing boards reached
fruition in an enactment plainly indicating doubt that these boards were
fulfilling adequately their public purposes, and suspicion that they might
be serving other ends. A resolution was passed calling upon the governor to appoint a five man commission of members of the legislature
to study and investigate the examining boards of the state.40 The legislative attitude is shown by some of the objectives specified for the investigators: 4. Determine if the powers of the board have been used to
suppress competition, and, if so, in what manner and to what extent.
5. Determine to what extent the authority is actually exercised in the
public interest. 6. Determine to what extent the practices of the boards
are not in the public interest. 7. Determine to what extent the members
of the boards use their official powers for promotion of their private
enterprises. The legislature obviously doubted whether some of the
boards should be retained, because the commission was directed to
recommend legislation with the view of "amending the existing laws
with respect thereto or to the abolishment of such board or boards should
it be found that the continuation of such board or boards is not in the
public interest. '41 The report of that commission has now been made
" N. C. Sess. L. 1945, c. 468 (extending the "practice of law" to include "aiding in the preparation of" deeds, mortgages, wills, and trust instruments) ; H. R.
Bill No. 813 (1943) (bill to repeal law extending the "practice!' to the preparation
of certain forms and reports was defeated) ; N. C. Pub. Laws 1941, c. 177.
"ISen. Bill No. 73 (1947) (passed Senate only).
* H. R. Bill No. 379 (1947).
11N. C. Gsx. STAT. §§90-171.1 et seq. (1947 Cum. Supp.). The General
Assembly either tabled or received unfavorable committee reports on bills to investigate the State Board of Barber Examiners (H. R. Res. 185 (1947)), to make
the general contractors licensing statute inapplicable where the proposed construction is less in value than $30,000 (Sen. Bill No. 423 (1947)), and to repeal
various sections of the barbers statute (H. R. Bills Nos. 877, 878, 936 (1947)).
"' N. C. Sess. L. 1947, House Resolution 31, p. 1698. For a thorough criticism
of our licensing boards as to their similarity to the old guild system, Davis, Our
21 "Little Legislatures," Journal and Sentinel (Winston-Salem, N. C.), Dec. 5,
1948, §3, p. 1; as to their unregulated handling of funds, Davis, Carolina'sChaotic
Licensing, Journal and Sentinel (Winston-Salem, N. C.), Dec. 12, 1948, §3, p. 1;
as to their exclusion of newcomers and their varied regulations, Davis, How Business Self-Regulation Leads to Monopoly, journal and Sentinel (Winston-Salem,
N. C.), Dec. 19, 1948, §3, p. 1; and for a discussion of the photographers statute
as to the constitutionality, before the latest Supreme Court decision, and of the report of the Commission, Davis, N. C. Licensing Boards Skate oin Thin Legal Ice,
Journal and Sentinel (Winston-Salem, N. C), Dec. 26, 1948, §3, p. 1.
"' Other objectives specifically assigned the Commission were: Make a detailed
examination of the books and records to determine the number of applicants, num-
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after detailed study' of the years 1944 through 1946. Its recommendations, thirteen in number, are based upon the premise that regulation
by the professions and trades themselves does not protect the public
interest sufficiently.42 The commission recommends the establishment
of a North Carolina General Licensing Board, with power to control
the funds of the individual boards, and to approve examinations and
prescribe their time and place. Also, the commission recommends
granting to such Board power to issue all licenses upon certification by
the regular boards (or upon review of an adverse decision of the regular
board where the applicant failed to pass the examination), to suspend
4
or revoke all licenses, and to review any action of a lesser board. 3 It
is submitted that placing such power in the hands of the general board
would sacrifice much of the advantage of the specialized knowledge of
particular'boards: The general board would not be expert in all the
diverse fields in which particular boards operate.
The commission also stated that the public "is entitled to a voice
in . . . administration" 44 of the various boards. In order to give the
public such a voice a bill was introduced in the 1949 Senate authorizing
the Governor to appoint one additional member from the State at large
4
to serve on each of 21 licensing boards, but the bill died in the Senate. 1
This year the legislature finally acceded to the pressure behind the
funeral directors licensing fight, and after ten years of denial it has
now put funeral directors under the State Board of Embalmers and
Funeral Directors. 46 Of the other bills introduced to decrease the number of persons and trades subject to licensing regulation only one was
47
enacted.
ber passing the examinations, collections and disbursements; investigate the revocations of licenses and causes therefor; determine extent of time it takes to grant
licenses after the examination; make any other inquiry with respect to the activities
of the boards which the Commission may deem pertinent.
P"REPORT OF COMMISSION

TO STUDY

AND

INVESTIGATE

CERTAIN

EXAMINING

BOARDS IN THE STATE, October, 1948, p. 1.
'Id. at 3, 4. For an earlier editorial to the effect that what North Carolina
needs is one State Board to regulate all the trades and professions, see News and
Observer (Raleigh, N. C.), March 4, 1939, p. 4, col. 2.
"'REPORT

OF COMMISSION

TO STUDY

AND

INVESTIGATE

CERTAIN

EXAMINING

BOARDs IN THIS STATE, October, 1948, p. 2.
"5Sen. Bill No. 116 (1949) (after amendment to exclude the boards regulating
professions directly affecting public health and law).
"oH. R. Bill No. 661 (1949) (the bill, as amended and passed, limits regulation to matters of sanitation) ; Sen. Bill No. 73 (1947) ; Sen. Bill No. 236 (1939).
'¢H. R. Bill No. 393 (1949) (would provide that the State Board of Accountancy shall have right to regulate only Certified Public Accountants-unreported) ;
H. R. Bill No. 407 (1949) (would exempt certain practices from the regulatory
power of the State Board of Accountancy, add one public member to that Board,
and allow procurement of necessary technical assistance, the latter provision to
cover administering of the examinations prepared by the American Institute of
Accountants-tabled in Senate after passing House); H. R. Bill No. 684 (1949)
(would grant licenses without examination to pharmacists in North Carolina who
have practiced for 25 years' under a registered pharmacist-unfavorable House
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The stricter attitude toward licensing of ordinary occupations reached
its culmination when, in a well reasoned opinion, 48 the North Carolina
Supreme Court flatly reversed the decision in State v. Lawrence and
declared that the statute setting up the State Board of Photographic
Examiners violates Article I, Sections 1, 17, and 31 of the Constitution
of the State of North Carolina. 49 This decision removes the incon5°
sistency in our law brought about by the departure in State v. Harris
from the attitude taken in the Lawrence case, and makes it plain that
engaging in ordinary occupations having no special connection with the
objectives of the police power may not be restricted by the enactment
of licensing statutes. The earlier haphazard enactment of licensing
statutes and uncritical judicial approval of them appears during the
eleven years since the Lawrence case to have given way to a legislative
attitude requiring that these enactments be justified by a bona fide public
purpose, and to a judicial policy of close scrutiny of such enactments
to ascertain whether they genuinely protect the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare and thus bear an actual relationship rather
than a theoretical one to these objectives of the police power.
ROBERT LEE HINEs.

Civil Procedure-Less Than Unanimous Jury Verdicts
A recent discussion1 in a Senate Committee of the 1949 state legislature concerned the feasibility of introducing a bill to provide for less
than unanimous verdicts in civil cases. Although no action was taken
in the matter, it would seem timely to consider briefly herein the arguments for and against a modification of our current requirement of
unanimity.
At common law a jury verdict meant a unanimous verdict. 2 ThereCommittee report) ; H. R. Bill No. 713 (1949)

(would repeal Art. 2 of Chapter

87 of the General Statutes which set up the State Board of Examiners for Plumbing and Heating Contractors-unfavorable House committee report) ; H. R. Bill
No. 906 (1949) (would remove persons furnishing or erecting industrial equipment, power plant equipment, or radial brick chimneys from the general contractors
licensing act-enacted) ; H. R. Bill No. 1233 (1949) (would authorize issuance of
"limited licenses" for practice of law in certain districts-unfavorable House committee report).
' State v. Ballance, 229 N. C. 764, 51 S. E. 2d 731 (1949).
"' See note 6 supra.
o State v. Harris, 216 N. C. 746, 6 S. E. 2d 854 (1939).
News and Observer, Jan. 20, 1949, p. 16, col. 7.
2 3 BL. Comma. *379 ("The trial by jury ever has been, and I trust ever will be,
looked upon as the glory of the English law. . . . it is the most transcendent
privilege which any subject can enjoy . . . that he cannot be affected either in his
property, his liberty, or his person, but by the unanimous consent of twelve of
his neighbors and equals."); 1 COOLEY'S CONST. LIm. 677 (8th ed., Carrington,
1927) ; SEDGWICK, CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CoNsT. LAw 493 n. (2nd ed.
1874).
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fore, when the American states used the expression, "trial by jury,"
in their constitutions, it has been uniformly held that this meant a verdict to which all of the jurors assented 3 and that any legislation providing for majority verdicts where jury trial is a matter of right would
be unconstitutional in the absence of an express constitutional provision
authorizing such a change. 4
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution requires
that trials by jury shall be according to the course of the common law,
but it has been established that this requirement is not applicable to the
states, 5 for the provisions of the Seventh Amendment apply only to the
federal government." And the great weight of authority is to the effect
that the due process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution does not even require a jury trial in a state
court. 7 Hence it is not a violation of the federal constitution for a state
to authorize a verdict by less than the full number of jurors.8
Our North Carolina Constitution guarantees the right of trial by
jury in civil cases9 saying that ". . . the ancient mode of trial by jury
is one of the best securities of the rights of the people and ought to
remain sacred and inviolable." That this means a unanimous verdict
This would indicate beyond doubt that any atis well established.'
tempt to change the law of North Carolina would have to be by a constitutional amendment.
There are two types of constitutional provisions that have been
Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276 (1929) ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Green,
37 F. Supp. 949 (W. D. Ky. 1941); Minnequa Cooperage Co. v. Hendricks, 130
Ark. 264, 197 S. W. 280 (1917) ; (dissent said that the phrase "the right of trial
by jury shall remain inviolate" in the constitution does not specify how a verdict
shall be rendered, and the silence of the constitution means that the legislature is
to control the matter; that the constitution is a declaration of principles and not
details; and that other states merely follow each other blindly on this question.).
'Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Harvey, 209 Ind. 262, 198 N. E. 782 (1935);
Franklin v. St. Louis & M. R. R., 188 Mo. 533, 87 S. W. 930 (1905); In re
Opinon of Justices, 41 N. H. 550 (1860).
St. Louis & S. F. R. R. v. Brown, 241 U. S. 223 (1915).
Even in an action in state courts under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
the provisions of the Seventh Amendment are not applicable and state courts can
give effect to a local practice permitting a less than unanimous verdict: Minneapolis & S. L. R. R. v. Bombolis, 241 U. S. 211 (1915); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v.
Shaw, 168 Ky. 537, 182 S. W. 653 (1916) ; aff'd, 243 U. S. 626 (1916).
ISouthern Ry. v. Durham, 266 U. S. 178 (1924) ; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v.
Cole, 251 U. S. 54 (1919).
'Fay v. N. Y., 332 U. S. 261, 288 (1946) ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319,
324 (1937) ; Synder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97 (1933) ; Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U. S. 510, 534 (1926) ; Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210 (1916).
'Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581 (1900); Weaver v. Cuff, 52 S. D. 51, 216
N. W.
600 (1927).
9
N. C. Co Nsr. Art. I, §19; Hershey Corp. v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 207 N. C.
122, 176 S. E. 265 (1934).
"lit re Sugg's Will, 194 N. C. 638, 140 S. E. 604 (1927) ; 2 N. C. L. Rzv. 45
(1924).
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used to authorize majority verdicts-self-executing" and non-self
executing.' 2 In the former there is no need for further legislative action
while in the latter the provisions for less than unanimous verdicts are
effectuated only by legislative enactments.
In discussing the jury system, some writers have urged a limited
use only of civil juries' 3 while others have advocated abolishing the jury
in civil cases. 4 Still others feel that the civil jury is not likely to be
done away with; hence the jury system should be reformed by permitting the use of majority verdicts.:5
The arguments advanced are that the unanimous verdict is kept only
because of traditional reluctance to change from the status quo ;16 that
many lawyers are opposed for purely selfish reasons ;17 that the present
unanimity is apparent and not real;1s that with the unanimity requirement, strong jurors coerce weak jurors-;9 that unanimity gives one
recalcitrant or dishonest juror the power to hold up the whole judicial
process ;20 that the use of majority verdicts is now widespread ;21 that
our democratic form of government is based on the rule of the majority;22 that jurors come from varied backgrounds and expecting twelve
"E.g.,
CALIF. CONST. Art. I, §7.
2
" E.g., WASH. CONST. Art. I, §21; WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. §358 (1932).

Clark & Shulman, Jury Trial in- Civil Cases-A Study in Judicial Adininistration, 43 YALE L. Q. 867, 885 (1934).
" Peterson, Reform in Civil Jury Frocedue, 5 N. C. L. RaV. 89 (1927);
Duane, Civil Jury Should Be Abolished, 12 J.Am. JuD. Soc'y 137 (1929); McLemore, An Argument Against Jury Trial in Civil Cases, 20 VA. L. REv. 708
(1934).
"Winters, Majority Verdicts in the United States, 26 3. Am. Jun. Soc'y 87
(1942); Weinstein, Trial by Jury and Unanimus Verdicts, 69 U. S. L. REv. 513
(1935).
" Linn, Changes in Trial by Jury, 3 TEMP. L. Q. 3, 13 (1928).
'"
Lindsey, The Unanimity of Jury Verdicts, 5 VA. L. REG. 133 (1899) ("defendant" lawyers, men who are corporation or business counsel, are likely to be
opposed for the hope of success for a particular case may often depend upon convincing a minority rather than the majority).
"sLESSER,HISTORY OF THE JURY SYSTEM 187 (1894) ; 10 ST. JoHN's L. REv.
373 (1936) ("Where the verdict is clearly against the weight of the evidence, the
trial judge is given the discretion to set aside and grant a new trial, which brings
about the same results as if the jury had been unable to come to an agreement.
However, where the case is not quite so clear, these forced compromises are not
set aside, but are allowed to decide the matter.").
" Miner, The Jury Problem, 4 ILL. L. REV. 183 (1946) ("Coercion, is not a
symbol of justice.") ; Barnett, The Jury's Agreement-Ideal and Real, 20 ORE. L.
REV. 189 (1941); Bailey, Improvement of Trial by Jury, 17 MAss. L. Q. 11
(1932) (in olden days various methods were used to bring about agreement of all
jurors-food, drink and heat withheld; if court was on circuit, judge might have
jury put in carts and taken along to the next place where court was to be held.).
"oMarantz, Shall We End the Unanimity Rule for Verdicts in- Civil Cases?,
70 N. J. L. J.269 (1947).
21 Winters, supra note 15, at 89.
..2 Marantz, supra note 20 (United States Supreme Court and state appellate
courts render decisions by majority rule) ; Wilkin, The Jury: Reformation, Not
Abolition, 13 J.AMt. JUD. Soc'y 154 (1930) ; Linn, supra note 16, at 11; Winters,
supra note 15, at 88; Weinstein, supra note 15, at 523; Lindsey, supra note 17, at
142 (United States Senate may impeach the President by majority of one vote,
Court of Claims determines property rights involving millions with judges trying
fact and finding law).
'"
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such people to agree, especially on complicated factual situations, is
ridiculous ;23 that there are too many hung juries ;24 that the change
would deal a serious blow to the practice of tampering with and fixing
a jury ;25 that court calendars would be cleared up because of fewer
retrials;26 that the nominal verdicts so often rendered by unanimous
juries are most often unjust ;27 that if there is a real danger from hasty
majority verdicts, the state could specify a time within which the verdict must be unanimous ;2s and that the reluctance of people to sit on
juries under the present system because of the time consumed in trying
to get a unanimous verdict would no longer be present. 29
Advocates of the requirement of unanimity reply that the unanimous
verdict should be retained as it is an old and cherished feature of the
American plan for the administration of justice;30 that litigants have
more confidence in it ;31 that the hung jury is typically American in
that it dignifies the rights of the minority ;32 that a change would result
in the bringing of a greater number of doubtful suits and would result
in unduly large assessments of damages by a majority in a hurry to
render a verdict-3s that rash decisions by a weak majority would follow ;34 that alleged prejudicial jurors which cause hung juries are
eliminated by the prior examination of jurors by competent counsel ;3r
that unanimity is required to offset the advantages which the plaintiff
receives from the order of procedure ;36 that after all, hung juries are
relatively few and retrial often proves that the views of dissenting
jurors were right ;37 that the change to a majority verdict would bring
on confusion from more motions for retrial for misconduct of jurors,
more new trials being granted, and more appeals based on adverse rularantz, supra note 20.
supra note 20; Wilkin, supra note 22, at 155; Note, 34 ILL. L.
REv. 240 (1940) ; Winters, supra note 15.
2 Note, 22 CORNELL L. Q. 415 (1937); Linn, supra note 16; Barnett, supra
note 19, at 205.
28 Marantz, supra note 20; Linn, supra note 16.
Bouchelle, Requirement of Consent of Three-fourths of Jury to Verdicts in
Cizil Actions, Abolishing Law of Unanimous Consent, 48 W. VA. L. Q. 149
(1942) ; Note, 22 CORNELL L. Q. 415 (1937) ; Winters, supra note 15, at 88 (too
often one juror holds out and you get a verdict in accordance with his views;
especial danger that where liability is established, minority opinion will control
amount of damages.).
"8Weinstein, supra note 15, at 523.
' Linn, supra note 16, at 14.
2- 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 318 (3rd ed. 1922).
2137 COL. L. REV. 1235 (1937).
22
Majority Verdicts Debated it Texas, 26 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y 184 (1943).
32 Weinstein, supra note 15, at 523.
24
Note, 34 ILL. L. REV. 236 (1939).
2 Weinstein, supra note 15, at 523.
28
Ibid. (Plaintiff in most cases has advantage of opening and closing the arguments, and in most negligence cases, plaintiff has the further advantage of sympathy as against a rich defendant or insurance company.).
" Boone & Potts, Majority Verdicts for Texas, 6 TEx B. J. 118 (1943).
-

24Mardntz,
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ings on the motions for retrial .38 and that the end result of it all would
be more expense in labor and delay than caused now by the unanimity
requirement.3 9
An extra consideration to be noted is the problem presented in any
state using special verdicts 40 and permitting majority verdicts as to
whether or not the same majority of the jurors should agree on all the
issues of the case. The Wisconsin courts have held that since the intent
of the less than unanimous provisions are merely to reduce the required
number of jurors that need assent to a valid verdict, the agreement
of the same jurors is necessary on all the essential questions. 41 Washington reaches the opposite result.4 2 It has been argued that the Wisconsin result is the more logical since the questions of the special verdict
express the steps that would be necessary to find a general verdict and
disagreement in the answering of any one of these questions should
have the same effect as such a disagreement would have in the finding
on that fact if the jury was to return a general verdict. 43 The Washington position has been supported as the better one 44 on the ground
that "the change from unanimous verdicts recognizes that juries are
engaged not in finding the 'truth' but are venturing opinions which as
such establish probabilities of fact sufficient in the judgment of the
legislature to warrant a verdict. Consequently an agreement of the
stipulated majority on any question presented is an adequate indication
of probability to conform to the legislative requirement and therefore
should be sufficient." In connection with this problem, it should be
noted that many states which have permitted less than unanimous verdicts require all the jurors assenting to the verdict to sign it 45 so as to
prevent litigation on the question of which of the jurors assented to
particular issues and also whether the required number acquiesced.
The widespread use today of majority verdicts is shown by the fact
that fourteen states permit a verdict by three-fourths of the jurors ;46
"Majority Verdicts Debated in Texas, 26 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 184 (1943);
Boone & Potts, supra note 37, at 137.
"Boone & Potts, supra note 37, at 138.
'oNorth Carolina does: N. C. GEN. STAT. §§1-201, 202 (1943).
41 Christensen v. Petersen, 198 Wis. 222, 223 N. W. 839 (1929);
Larson v.
Koller, 198 Wis. 160, 223 N. W. 426 (1929) ; 25 MIcH. L. REv. 563 (1927) ; 40
HARV. L. REv. 916 (1927).
"Bullock v. Yakima Valley Transp. Co., 118 Wash. 413, 184 Pac. 641 (1919).
"7 Wis. L. REv. 111 (1932).
"37 COL. L. REV. 1235 (1937).
"E.g., Kentucky, New Mexico, Oklahoma.
"'ARIz. CoxsT. Art. II, §23; ARIZ. CODE ANN. §21-1003 (1939); ARK. CoNST.
AMEND. XVI; CALIF. CONST. Art. I, §7; CONN. CONST. Art. I, §21; CONN. GEN.
STAT. §7971 (1949) ; IDAHO CoNsT. Art. I, §7; IDAHO LAWS ANN. §2-104 (1943) ;

CONST. §248; Ky. REv. STAT. §§29.330, 29.340 (1946) ; LA. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§1958 (1939) ; LA. CODE PRAc. ANN. art. 527 (1942) ; MISS. CON sT. Art. III, §31;
MIsS. CODE ANN. §1801 (1942); Mo. CoNsT. Art. II, §28; Mo. REv. STAT. ANN.
§719 (1939) ; NEV. CoNsT. Art. I, §3; OHIo CoxsT. Art. I, §5; OHio GEN. CODE
ANN. §11420-9 (1938); OKLA. CoNsT. Art. II, §19; ORE. CoNsT. Art. VII, §18;
KY.

UTAH COXST.

Art. I, §10.
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six states permit a verdict by five-sixths of the jurors ;47 Nebraska
allows a five-sixths verdict after six hours deliberation;48 Minnesota
allows a five-sixths verdict after twelve hours deliberation ;40 Montana
and Virginia allow a two-thirds verdict ;50 Iowa permits a valid verdict
by a bare majority if the parties stipulate it ;1 Colorado permits the
parties to stipulate any majority;52 and the Texas Constitution would
permit a less than unanimous verdict,5 3 but by statute 4 the constitutional
provision for three-fourths verdicts is limited to situations where one
or more jurors is disabled from sitting. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 5 provide that the parties may stipulate that a verdict or
finding of a stated majority of the jurors would be valid as the verdict
or finding of the jury.
It is submitted that the people of North Carolina should give consideration to the question of whether or not the requirement of unanimity is outmoded and should be abolished. If it should be decided to
abolish it, attention should be given in the drafting of the necessary
constitutional amendment and the ensuing legislation, if any is required,
to the advisability of making definite provision therein for the agreement
to be required in connection with the separate issues submitted to the
jury and for a signing of the verdict.
JoHNr M. Simms.
Constitutional Law-Denial of Due Process.-Insuifficient
Time to Prepare Defense
A person accused of crime is guaranteed the right to be represented
by counsel.' This right to representation necessarily includes an oppor"N. J. CoNST. Art. I, §9 (new 1947 constitution permits legislature to provide
for five-sixths verdicts); N. M. CONST. Art. II, §12; N. M. STAT. ANN. §§19-101,
(48) (b) (1941) ; N. Y. CONST. Art. I, §2; N. Y. Cxv. PRAc. AcT §463-a; S. D.
CONsT. Art. VI, §6; S.D. CODE §33.1333 (1939) (circuit courts), (justice courts:
three-fourths, S. D. CODE §33.1334 (1939)); WASH. CONST. Art. I, §21; WASH.
REv. STAT. ANN. §358 (1932); Wis. CoNsT. Art. I, §5; Wis. STAT. §270.25

(1947).

"NE.

CoNsT. Art. I, §6; NEB. REV. STAT. §25-1125 (1943).
CONST. Art. I, §4; MINN. STAT. §546.17 (Henderson 1945).
10 MONT. CoNsT. Art. III, §23; MONT. REv. CoDES ANN. §9358 (1935); VA.
CONST. Art. I, §11; VA. CODE ANN. §6012 (1942).
" IOWA CONST. Art. I, §9; IowA RULES Civ. PRoC. §203(a) (supersedes IOWA
"MINN.

CODE
5

54

§11483 (1939)).
COLO. CoNsT. Art. II, §23; CoLo.

STAT. ANN.
TEX. CoNsT. Art. V, §13.
TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2204 (1941).

rule 48 (1935).

SFED. R. Crv. P., 48.
'U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV; Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U. S. 485 (1944) ; Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U. S. 471 (1944); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444 (1939);

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S.44 (1932); Kelly v. Oregon, 273 U. S. 589 (1926);
Frank v. Mangum; 237 U. S.309 (1914) ; Felts v. Murphy, 201 U. S. 123 (1905).
N. C. Coxst. Art. I, §11 (the original constitution of North Carolina (1776) did
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tunity for counsel to have sufficient time in which to prepare a defense. 2
Neither the United States nor the North Carolina Constitution contains
any specific time requirements; nor are there any Federal or North CaroWhat factors will the courts consider in
lina statutes applicable.3
determining if the defendant has had sufficient time to prepare?
In North Carolina, a motion for continuance is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling will not be reversed
unless there is an abuse of discretion 4 Nevertheless, the refusal of a
motion for continuance is reviewable, the court adopting the view that
the lack of sufficient time may be a denial of due process, which should
be passed on as a question of law. 5
Such a question was recently raised in State v. Gibson6 where the
defendant was on trial for his life. Counsel for the accused was
appointed by the court on the morning of September 13, 1948, and
the trial was had at 2:00 P.M. the following afternoon. Counsel for
the accused moved for a continuance stating he had not had sufficient
time in which to prepare his case and further that he felt the accused
should be examined by a competent physician. 7 The motion was overruled and the defendant convicted. On appeal the Supreme Court
not contain the guarantee of counsel. It was provided for later by statute in
1777, N. C. Sess. Laws, c. 115 §85 (1777). This statute is still in force. N. C.
GEN. STAT. §15-4 (1943).
2
Hawk v. Olson, 326 U. S. 271 (1945); White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760
(1944) ; Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444 (1939) ; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S.
44 (1932); State v. Gibson, 229 N. C. 497, 50 S. E. 2d 520 (1948); State v.
Farrell, 223 N. C. 321, 26 S. E. 2d 322 (1943); State v. Whitfield, 206 N. C.
696, 175 S.E. 93 (1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 556 (1934).
' In some jurisdictions the accused is entitled to a specific number of days to
prepare for trial. 22 C. J. S.,

CRIMINAL

LAW §478.

' State v. Creech, 229 N. C. 662, 51 S. E. 2d 348 (1948) ; State v. Strickland,
229 N. C. 201, 49 S. E. 2d 469 (1948) ; State v. Culberson, 228 N. C. 615, 46 S. E.
2d 647 (1948) ; State v. Rising, 223 N. C. 747, 28 S. E. 2d 221 (1943) ; State v.
Utley, 223 N. C. 39, 25 S. E. 2d 195 (1943) ; State v. Henderson, 216 N. C. 99,
3 S. E. 2d 357 (1939) ; State v. Godwin, 216 N. C. 49, 3 S. E. 2d 347 (1939) ;
State v. Whitfield, 206 N. C. 696, 175 S. E. 93 (1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 556
(1934); State v. Banks, 204 N. C. 233, 167 S. E. 851 (1933) ; State v. Garner,
203 N. C. 361, 166 S. E. 180 (1932) ; State v. Lea, 203 N. C. 13, 164 S. E. 737
(1932); State v. Rhodes, 202 N. C. 101, 161 S. E. 722 (1931); State v. Sauls,
190 N. C. 810, 130 S.E. 848 (1925).
' State v. Farrell, 223 N. C. 321, 26 S. E. 2d 322 (1943); accord, State v.
Gibson, 229 N. C. 497, 50 S. E. 2d 520 (1948); State v. Rising, 223 N. C. 747,
28 S. E. 2d 221 (1943) ; State v. Utley, 223 N. C. 39, 25 S. E. 2d 195 (1943) ;
State v. Jones, 206 N. C. 812, 175 S. E. 188 (1934) ; State v. Whitfield, 206 N. C.
696, 175 S. E. 93 (1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 556 (1934) ; State v. Garner, 203
N. C_.361, 166 S. E. 180 (1932); State v. Ross, 193 N. C. 25, 136 S. E. 193
(1926) ; State v. Burnett, 184 N. C. 783, 115 S. E. 57 (1922). In State v. Sauls,
190 N. C. 810, 130 S. E. 848 (1925) the court treated this denial as rather an
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
0229 N. C. 497, 50 S. E. 2d 520 (1948). Gibson was on trial for rape upon
a female child under the age of twelve. He was found guilty and sentenced to die.
Counsel did not support his motion for continuance by affidavits as required
by N. C. GEN¢. STAT. §§1-175, 176 (1943).
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affirmed 8 saying, "The record fails to show that the requested continuance would have enabled the prisoner and his counsel to obtain
additional evidence or otherwise present a stronger defense."
This
appears to be in accord with previous North Carolina decisions. 10 However, in State v. Farrell,"'decided in 1943, the court said that the question (on a motion for continuance) was not whether the defendant
deserved to suffer for his crime, or the merits of the defense he might
be able to produce; but whether the defendant had an opportunity to
fairly prepare and present his case. The court did not look for prejudice, but this would appear to be out of line with the general holdings
in North Carolina where the defendant must show, not only insufficient
time in which to prepare, but further, that he was prejudiced thereby
before he can obtain a new trial.
The Supreme Court of Georgia in a recent case 12 sustained a different conclusion saying, "If it should be assumed that the defendant
is guilty of murder, without any mitigating facts or circumstances, he
is still entitled to have his appointed counsel given an opportunity to
sFollowing the affirmance of the conviction by the Supreme Court, the defendant petitioned the Governor for a commutation. On December 9, 1948, the Governor commuted the sentence to life in prison saying the defendant was mentally
incompetent. This commutation was based on two examinations conducted by
Dr. Young, Medical Director of the State Mental Institution, who found that the
defendant was suffering from sufficient psychiatric disturbances to lessen his responsibilities. It also appeared at this hearing that the defendant had been twice
discharged from the army for "primary mental deficiency."
' State v. Gibson, 229 N. C. 497, 502, 50 S. E. 2d 520, 524 (1948). The court
relied heavily on the recent case of Thompson v. Nierstheimer, 166 F. 2d 87
(C. C. A. 7th 1948). Here there was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the
defendant having been sentenced to life in prison and having served seventeen
years to date, upon the ground that the defendant was denied due process of law in
his conviction. He contended there was not sufficient time to prepare for trial.
It is interesting to note that he had counsel and had consulted him for at least
two days before the trial and that no motion for continuance was made. There
appeared to have been an agreement to the effect that if the defendant went ahead
with the trial that he would not get the death sentence and at the time the defendant consented and was anxious to get it over. The court on reviewing this
stressed that this speedy trial might have been the best defense available to the
defendant. It is probable that the court also was influenced by the great delay
of the defendant in bringing his writ of habeas corpus.
"0State v. Creech, 229 N. C. 662, 51 S. E. 2d 348 (1948) ; State v. Utley, 223
N. C. 39, 25 S. E. 2d 195 (1943); State v. Jones, 206 N. C. 812, 175 S. E. 188
(1934) ; State v. Whitfield, 206 N. C. 696, 175 S. E. 93 (1934), cert. denied, 293
U. S. 556 (1934) ; State v. Burnett, 184 N. C. 783, 115 S. E. 57 (1922).
223 N. C. 321, 26 S. E. 2d 322 (1943). The defendant was arrested on March
23, counsel appointed on March 27, arraigned and tried on April 1. Counsel
moved for a continuance, this was overruled and the defendant was convicted of
rape on his eight-year-old step daughter and sentenced to die by the trial court.
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed and granted a new trial saying that it was
impossible for counsel to interview witnesses and a psychiatrist and study the law
in three and a half days, excluding Sunday.
It should be noted that the court in the Gibson case alluded to the Farrell
case only for the inference that a constitutional right may be involved in denying
a motion for continuance based on denial of sufficient time to prepare for trial.
12 Edwards v. State, Ga. , 50 S. E. 10 (1948).
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This would appear to be in essence the view

taken by the Supreme Court of the United States. In Powell v. Alabanma 4 this court said (quoting from Commonwealth v. O'Keefe),' 5
"It is vain to give the accused a day in court, with no opportunity to
prepare for it, or to guarantee him cbunsel without giving the latter
any opportunity to acquaint himself with the facts ... to force a defendant, charged with a serious misdemeanor, to trial within five hours of
his arrest, is not due process of law, regardless of the merits of the
case."' 16 In a more recent decision in 1945, Hawk v. Olson,17 the court
said, "Continuance may or may not have been useful to the accused,
but -the importance of the assistance of counsel in a serious criminal
charge after arraignment is too large to speculate on its effect"'18
The difference in the view of the Supreme Court of the United
States in the Hawk case and the North Carolina court in the Gibson
case appears to be this: The United States Supreme Court holds that
if the defendant has not had sufficient opportunity to prepare, this is a
denial of a fundamental right and a new trial will be granted; the
North Carolina Supreme Court holds that if the defendant has not had
sufficient opportunity to prepare, this is error, but not reversible error
unless the defendant has been prejudiced by this lack of sufficient time,
9
The
the burden being on him to show this prejudice affirmatively.'
safeadditional
an
has
defendant
the
North Carolina court states that
guard in the right to make a motion for a new trial at the next term
"sIbid. at page 13.

59 (1932).
"287 U. S. 45, 173,
148 At. 73, 74 and 75 (1929).
15289 Pa. 169,

where the defendant
15 Cf. State v. Sauls, 190 N. C. 810, 130 S. E. 848 (1925)
was arrested at 9:30 A.M., indicted at 1 P.M., saw counsel at 4:30 P.M., and was
tried at 7:30 P.M. the same day. Counsel's motion for a continuance was overruled; the defendant was convicted of incestuous intercourse. The Supreme Court
of North Carolina affirmed the conviction saying there was no denial of due
process.
17326 U. S. 271, 278 (1945). Writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner alleges he
was arraigned and read the information charging him with murder in the first
degree, that he pleaded not guilty and orally moved for a continuance to consult
counsel and prepare his defense, etc. The court overruled this and the trial was
commenced. A Public Defender thereupon came up and conducted the petitioner's
defense without ever having consulted with him. The defendant was convicted.
The Supreme Court held that on these allegations the petitioner had stated a
cause of action, that he was denied due process of law.
" In an earlier case decided in 1940, Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444 (1939),
the court held that counsel for the accused had sufficient time to prepare his case
(three days). In so holding the court noted that there were few witnesses and
the plea of insanity had been withdrawn. The court further said the fact that
counsel for the accused had presented nothing to indicate that more could have
been accomplished if the continuance had been granted tended to illuminate the
conclusion they had reached. This looks in the direction of the North Carolina
rule but the court only mentioned this after having reached its conclusion.
Court said, "The
1" Referring to this prejudice the North Carolina Supreme
injury must be positive and tangible, and not merely theoretical." State v. Gibson, 229 N. C. 497, 500, 50 S. E. 2d 520, 523 (1948).
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of the trial court for newly discovered evidence (obtaining a stay of
execution from the governor in the meantime if necessary) .20 But here
again the burden would be on the defendant to show that he was prejudiced by not having been able to produce this newly discovered evidence
at the original trial.
Therefore, it would seem that, though North Carolina recognizes
the existence of this fundamental right which is guaranteed one accused
of a crime, the essence of the right is denied him unless he can prove
that he will be aided by the exercise thereof. Further it would appear
that this requirement placed upon the defendant is opposed to another
of our fundamental doctrines, that a person is presumed innocent until
proved guilty (the burden being on the state to prove him guilty). Possibly, under the North Carolina rule, a person could be proved guilty
because of a denial of adequate time for preparation and being thus
convicted, the burden would be shifted to him to introduce evidence
which would bear on his innocence at a new trial, i.e., show that the
denial of the motion was prejudicial.
The North Carolina rule is plainly an attempt to keep the wheels
of justice moving rapidly by avoiding useless new trials where the only
end to be accomplished is a delay in the conviction of the accused. The
Supreme Court, by taking the burden upon itself, endeavors to separate
the wheat from the chaff by deciding each case from its circumstances.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the Supreme Court of the United States
would sustain this North Carolina view as being a sufficient guarantee
21
of this fundamental right to the accused.
A. A. ZOLLICOFFER, JR.
Equity-Easement-Mandatory Injunction to Remove
Encroachment
Plaintiff power company acquired an easement over the defendants'
land by condemnation proceedings for the construction, inspection and
repair of its power lines. The defendants built a brick building across
the right-of-way and ten feet below the high-voltage lines. Held:three judges dissenting-the plaintiff was entitled to mandatory injunc22 State v. Gibson, 229 N. C. 497, 50 S. E. 2d 520 (1948) ; State v. Dunheen,
224 N. C. 738, 32 S. E. 2d 322 (1944); State v. Edwards, 205 N. C. 661, 172
S. E. 399 (1933) ; State v. Casey, 201 N. C. 620, 161 S. E. 81 (1931).
21 Certiorari was denied by the United State Supreme Court in State v. Whitfield, 206 N. C. 696, 175 S. E. 93 (1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 556 (1934).
There the defendant was indicted and convicted of rape. Counsel had two days
in which to prepare, his motion for a continuance having been overruled. The
facts were simple and there were only two witnesses, the defendant and the prosecutrix. Thus the case was reduced to a question of veracity between the two and
there was no plea of insanity.
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tion to compel the defendants to remove their building from the plaintiff's easement.'
It is well settled that where a right-of-way is substantially obstructed
the person offended may get a mandatory injunction to compel the removal of the obstruction.2 If the interference with the easement is in
violation of an interlocutory decree, mandatory injunction may be granted
before final hearing to compel the restoration of the easement to its
former condition. 3 Since easements are incorporeal interests in the land
'Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Bowman et al., 229 N. C. 682, 51 S. E. 2d
191 (1949).
2 Stallard v. Cushing, 76 Cal. 472, 18 Pac. 427 (1888)
(stairway placed in
alley through which plaintiff had right-of-way) ; Trueblood v. Pierce, 116 Colo.
221, 179 Pac. 2d. 671 (1947) (curb built in plaintiff's driveway); Carpenter v.
Capital Electric Co., 178 Ill. 29, 52 N. E. 973 (1899) (cross-arm and two wires
placed over plaintiff's at height of 14 feet) ; Lake Erie & W. R. v. Essington, 27
Ind. App. 291, 60 N. E. 457 (1901) (plaintiff's driveway obstructed-the sort of
obstruction does not appear); Aboud v. Bailen, 289 Ky. 536, 159 S. W. 2d 410
(1942) (heavy barrels, iron box and pipe placed on plaintiff's passway) ; Schaidt
v. Blaul, 66 Md. 141, 6 Atl. 669 (1886) (stone wall across plaintiff's right-ofway) ; St. Louis Deposit & Savings Bank v. Kennett Estate, 101 Mo. App. 370,
74 S. W. 474 (1903) (alley between plaintiff's and defendant's buildings obstructed
by projecting smokestack); Bailey v. Schnitzius, 53 N. J. Eq. 235, 32 Atl. 219
(1895) (right-of-way obstructed by overflowing it with water); Carolina and
Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Piedmont Wagon and Mfg. Co., 229 N. C. 695, 51 S. E.
2d 301 (1949) (fence and other obstructions upon plaintiff's right-of-way);
Broocks v. Muirhead, 223 N. C. 227, 25 S. E. 2d 889 (1943) (two brick walls,
fence, shrubbery and badminton court across alley-way) ; Davis v. Alexander, 202
N. C. 130, 162 S. E. 372 (1932) (defendant "closed" abandoned public highway) ;
Leaksville Woolen Mills v. Spray Water Power & Land Co., 183 N. C. 511,
112 S. E. 24 (1922) (seven-foot embankment placed across driveway); Wheeler
v. Charlotte Construction Co., 170 N. C. 427, 87 S. E. 221 (1915) (stables and
other obstructions placed upon street right-of-way); Moundsville Water Co. v.
Moundsville Sand-Co., 124 W. Va. 118, 19 S. E. 2d 217 (1942) (sand and gravel
placed on plaintiff's easement which plaintiff used for maintainence of its pipelines).
The following cases are based on facts similar to those of the principal case:
Collins v. Alabama Power Co., 214 Ala. 643, 108 So. 868 (1926) (five-room
house built fifteen feet over on right-of-way which plaintiff had acquired for the
maintenance of its power lines); Willingham v. Georgia Power Co., 193 Ga.
801, 20 S. E. 2d 83 (1942) (lumber stacked on land over which plaintiff had
easement to construct and maintain its power lines) ; Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co.
v. Cutrer, 30 So. 2d 864 (Court of Appeal of La., 1947) (frame house built over
plaintiff's high pressure gas line) ; cf. Babler v. Shell Pipe Line Corp., 34 F. Supp.
10 (E. D. Mo. 1940) (plaintiff was held to have right to maintain building over
defendant's pipe lines).
'Vicksburg S. & P. Ry. v. Webster Sand, Gravel & Construction Co., 132 La.
1051, 62 So. 140 (1913) (defendant ordered to replace plaintiff's rails and crossties); Leaksville Woolen Mills v. Spray Water Power & Land Co., 183 N. C.
511, 112 S. E. 24 (1922) (defendants ordered to remove embankment placed
across driveway). In Keys v. Alligood, 178 N. C. 16, 100 S. E. 113 (1919)
where the defendant was ordered to replace ditch banks of a road over which the
plaintiff had a right-of-way, the North Carolina Court expressly said that the
injunction was mandatory and repudiated the old form of stating a mandatory
order in prohibitory terms. For a decision allowing, in effect, a mandatory injunction but which, in so doing, followed the old form of words, see Westbrook
v. Comer, 197 Ga. 433, 29 S. E. 2d 574 (1944) (fence and shrubbery placed in
alley over which plaintiff had easement).
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of another 4 giving the grantee limited rights of user in the land for
certain purposes (or, in the case of negative easements, rights that the
owner of the fee refrain from using his own land in certain ways) a
particular use or obstruction by the grantor is not enjoinable unless it
seriously interferes with the easement. 5 If the obstruction is not substantial in character it may be that the owner of the easement has an
adequate remedy by way of self-help or damages. 6
When mandatory injunction is sought to compel the removal of a
trespassing encroachment from land it may be refused if other remedies
are found to be as adequate as injunction. 7 Having successfully passed
the adequacy test s injunctive relief may still be denied if the balance of
hardships 9 inclines in favor of the defendant. Such a suit puts a court
in this dilemma: If it refuses to grant the injunction and awards damages for the strip involved because the balance of hardships is in favor
of the defendant, it may be accused of exercising private eminent domain. 10 On the other hand, to grant injunction where the order for
' Korricks Dry Goods Co. v. Kendall, 83 Ariz. 325, 264 Pac. 692 (1928);
Transcontinental Oil Co. v. Emmerson, 298 Ill. 394, 131 N. E. 645 (1921); St.
Cecelia Soc. v. Universal Car and Service Co., 213 Mich. 569, 182 N. W. 161
(1921); Davis v. Robinson, 189 N. C. 589, 127 S. E. 697 (1925); GALE, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EASEMENTS 9 (Tenth Ed., W. J. Byrne, 1925).

6 Bitello v. Lipson, 80 Conn. 597, 69 Atl. 21 (1908); Farmers' Grain & Supply Co. of Warsaw v. Toledo, P. & W. R. R., 316 Ill. App. 116, 44 N. E. 2d 77
(1942) ; Cleveland, C., C. & St. Louis Ry. v. Central Illinois Public Service Co.,
380 Il. 130, 43 N. E. 2d 993 (1942); Hildebrand v. Southern Bell Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 219 N. C. 402, 14 S. E. 2d 252 (1941) (by implication); Raleigh
Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Vass, 184 N. C. 295, 114 S. E. 309 (1922); Fendall
v. Miller, 99 Ore. 610, 196 Pac. 381 (1921) ; Taylor v. Heffner, 359 Pa. 157, 58
A. 2d 450 (1948).
'RESTATEMENT, TORTS §950 (1939).
'Howell v. Township of Sewickley, 352 Pa. 552, 43 A. 2d 121 (1945) ; Smith
v. Holt, 174 Va. 213, 5 S. E. 2d 492 (1939).
'RESTATEMENT,
TORTS §933 (1939)
Special Note. "The availability of injunction against tort has usually been stated in terms of the inadequacy of the
remedy at law, inadequacy of damages, and irreparable injury. . . . Moreover,
the elliptical, shorthand expressions quoted are misleading. They imply that injunction will be refused unless other remedies are inadequate in the sense of being
wholly unservicable or worthless, . . . As applied by the courts, however, the
adequacy test has a relative meaning; it is founded upon the adequacy of injunction as the standard of comparison. When the courts have analyzed these adequacy

formulae, they have always concluded that other remedies are to be deemed
adequate if they are as efficient to the ends of justice as the injunction; otherwise,
they are to be deemed inadequate."
'Johnson v. Killian, 157 Fla. 754, 27 So. 2d 345 (1946); Coombs v. Lenox
Realty Co., 111 Me. 178, 88 Atl. 477 (1913); Triulzi v. Costa, 296 Mass. 24, 4
N. E. 2d 617 (1936) ; Methodist Episcopal Soc. v. Akers, 167 Mass. 560, 46 N. E.
381 (1897) ; Lynch v. Union Institution for Savings, 159 Mass. 306, 34 N. E. 364
(1893); Hunter v. Carroll, 64 N. H. 572, 15 At]. 17 (1888); Crocker v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 61 App. Div. 226, 70 N. Y. Supp. 492 (1901).
"0Bemmerly v. Lake County, 55 Cal. App. 2d 829, 132 P. 2d 249 (1942) (injunction granted because the court feared that to deny injunction upon balancing
the hardships would be private eminent domain) ; Lynch v. Union Institution of
Savings, 158 Mass. 384, 33 N. E. 603 (1893); Hark v. Mountain Fork Lumber
Co., 127 W. Va. 586, 34 S. E. 2d 348 (1945) (injunction granted, the court expressing fear that to balance the hardships and award damages in lieu would
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removal places a relatively large hardship upon the defendant and the
plaintiff has suffered only slight harm may make the cout a party to
11
extortion.
The problem is not present, however, where an easement is substantially obstructed as in the principal case. 2 It is one thing to place a
building a few inches over upon a person's land and quite another to
erect a building across his easement and just below high voltage wires.
In the former case the victim may be deprived of only a small strip of
land; in the latter he may be compelled to yield his entire interest (i.e.,
his right of user) since the presence of the building may make the
exercise of the easement dangerous or impossible.
The court does not, in the principal case, attempt to balance the
hardships. It is submitted that it properly refrains from so doing. The
plaintiff is seriously affected by the presence of the defendants' building
upon its easement. Projected, improvements would be interfered with
and repairs would be made difficult, with possible consequent decline in
the standard of service to the public. Should lightning strike or the
plaintiff's wires touch the building 3 the plaintiff might be subjected to
actions for personal injuries and wrongful death. These factors, coupled
with the expense and difficulty of acquiring new easements and adjusting equipment to them, make it apparent that the plaintiff will insist
upon the enforcement of the injunctive decree. The danger of the
injunction's being used as a tool of extortion reaches the vanishing
point here. To deny injunction and to award damages for an easement
upon the easement would be an intolerable adjustment. The public interest 14 in the prevention of interference with the service performed
amount to private eminent domain).
See Simpson, Fifty Years of Amierican
Equity, 50 HARY. L. REv. 171, 176 (1936) where, in speaking of denying injunction
in nuisance cases upon balancing the hardships, it is said that the use of the
technique "has sometimes verged uncomfortably close to a judicial grant of the
power of eminent domain to private persons for private purposes." For an effective
answer to such accusations, see RESTATEMENT, TORTS §941 (1939) comment d,
where it is stated that refusal of injunction because of balancing the hardships
is not private eminent domain, but "the result 'is incidental to a fair adjustment
of a largely unintended situation."
" RESTATEMENT, TORTS §941 (1939) comment c.
2 The plaintiff's right-of-way was 50 feet wide.
The defendants' building
covered 35 feet of this width for the entire length of the right-of-way; the roof
was 10 feet below the wires.
"- It appears from the report of the principal case that these dangers were
pointed out by an electrical engineer who testified for the defendants.
1" Public interest was made the basis for
refusing mandatory injunction in:
Wilkins v. Diven, 106 Kan. 283, 187 Pac. 665 (1920); Bell v. Louisville Water
Co., 29 Ky. L. 866, 96 S. W. 572 (1906) (encroaching structures part of water
system supplying Louisville, Ky.) ; Andrews v. Cohen, 163 App. Div. 580, 148
N. Y. Supp. 1028 (1914).
The following cases granted mandatory injunction
because of public interest: Welton v. 40 East Oak St. Building Corp., 70 F. 2d 377
(C. C. A. 7th 1934), 13 N. C. L. Riy. 233 (1935) (violation of zoning ordinance).
In Southern Ry. Co. v. Stricklin, 264 Fed. 546 (E. D. N. C. 1920) the court
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by a power company renders less important the distinction often drawn
in private tort cases between willfulness and negligence on the part of a
defendant 15 and the effect of possible laches or acquiescence on the part
of the plaintiff.' 6
The decision in the principal case is supported by the few decided
7
cases in this field.1
MAX OLIVER COGBURN.
Evidence-Confessions-Admissibility Thereof
Prior to 1942, when the famous McNabb decision' was banded down,
the law as to the admissibility of confessions had been that such an
2
instrument was admissible if voluntarily made and inadmissible if not.
said by way of dictum: "If this were a controversy respecting a private way I

would not hesitate to deny the mandatory injunction . . . but it is manifest that,
by reason of the relation which the complainant bears and its duty to the public,
a judgment for damages would be totally inadequate to meet the situation."
" Clough v. Healy & Co., 53 Cal. App. 397, 200 Pac. 378 (1921); Bauby v.
Krasow, 107 Conn. 109, 139 Atl. 508 (1927)'; Waterbury Trust Co. v. G. L. D.
Realty Co., 124 Conn. 191, 199 At. 106 (1938); Tucker v. Howard, 128 Mass.
361 (1880) ; Walter v. Danisch, 133 N. J. Eq. 127, 29 A. 2d 897 (1943).
1 In the following cases injunction was refused because of the plaintiff's
laches or acquiesence: Waterbury Trust Co. v. G. L. D. Realty Co,, supra note
15; Perry v. Hewitt, 314 Mass. 346, 50 N. E. 2d 48 (1943) (use of right-of-way
by defendant for about 44 years) ; Levi v. Worcester Consol. St. Ry., 193 Mass.
116, 78 N. E. 853 (1906) (facts not clear but plaintiff appears to have "unreasonably" delayed in protecting his rights); Starkie v. Richmond, 155 Mass. 188, 29
N. E. 770 (1892) ; Andrews v. Cohen, 163 App. Div. 580, 148 N. Y. Supp. 1028
(1914) (defendant told plaintiff that he intended to build passway over plaintiff's
easement and plaintiff made no objection then or during construction).
17 Collins v. Alabama Power Co., 214 Ala. 643, 108 So. 868 (1926)
(five-room
house built fifteen feet over on right-of-way which plaintiff had acquired for the
maintenance of its power lines, ordered removed) ; Willingham v. Georgia Power
Co., 193 Ga. 801, 20 S. E. 2d 83 (1942) (lumber packed on land over which plaintiff had easement to construct and maintain its power lines, ordered removed);
Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Cutrer, 30 So. 2d 864 (Court of Appeal of La.,
1947) (frame house built over plaintiff's high pressure gas line upon plaintiff's
easement, same result); Moundsville Water Co. v. Moundsville Sand Co., 124
W. Va. 118, 19 S. E. 2d 217 (1942) (sand and gravel placed upon easement
which plaintiff used for maintenance of its water pipe lines, same result) ; Norfolk
Southern Ry. Co. v. Stricklin, 264 Fed. 546 (E. D. N. C. 1920) (buildings,
fences and other structures were ordered removed from plaintiff railroad's easement) ; cf. Babler v. Shell Pipe Line Corp., 34 F. Supp. 10 (E. D. Mo. 1940)
(not a suit for injunction but plaintiff was held to have the right to maintain a
building over the defendant's pipe lines).
1318 U. S. 332 (1942).
'E.g., Lisenba v. United States, 314 U. S. 219 (1941) ; Wan v. United States,
266 U. S. 1 (1924); Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613 (1896); Sparf and
Hansen v. United States, 156 U. S. 51 (1895) ; State v. Thompson, 227 N. C. 19,
40 S. E. 2d 620 (1946); State v. Patrick, 48 N. C. 443 (1856) ; State v. Roberts,
12 N. C. 259 (1827); Rex. v. Warickshall, 1 Leach 263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234
(1783). That this had been the test in England even before 1775 see Rex v. Rudd,
1 Leach 115, 118, 168 Eng. Rep. 160, 161 (1775). "The instance has frequently
happened, of persons having made confessions under threats or promises: the consequence as frequently has been that such examinations and confessions have not
been made use of against them on their trial."
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The tests used in determining "voluntariness" varied,3 but the ultimate
fact of admissibility or inadmissibility was always decided by their end
result,4 the theory being that the voluntary confession warranted the
greatest credibility because it flowed "from the strongest sense of guilt," 5
while an admission involuntarily made was rendered untrustworthy as
evidence for lack of spontaneity.6 Moreover, quite apart from the
evidentiary requirement of trustworthiness, the involuntary confession
was invalidated by the mandate of fair play called for by the due process
7
provision in the federal constitution.
In the McNabb decision, however, the United States Supreme Court
took an abrupt departure from the above rule and supplemented it with
a new test of its own devising. In reversing a lower federal court conviction,8 that court found that illegal detention in violation of the prompt
arraignment statutes,9 when accompanied by long-continued questioning,
was enough to render inadmissible an apparently voluntary confession
obtained during the detention. Purposely sidestepping the constitutional
In fact, different tests could sometimes, be applied in the same case, depending on whether the voluntary nature of the confession was being attacked on
evidential or constitutional grounds. Lisenba v. United States, 314 U. S.219, 236
(1941). Generally, however, hope-of reward or fear of physical harm instilled in
the confessor by his captors were the controlling factors. Bonner v. State, 55
Ala. 245 (1876) ; State v. Thoml5son, 227 N. C. 19, 40 S. E. 2d 620 (1946) ; State
v. Patrick, 48 N. C. 443.(1856); Rex. v. Rudd, 1 Leach 115, 168 Eng. Rep. 160
(1775). See Lisenba v. United States, supra at 240; Wilson v. United States, 162
U. S.613, 623 (1896); State'v. Andrew, 61 N. C. 205, 206 (1867). But some
courts did not consider the absence of these factors conclusive proof of voluntariness. Wan v. United States, 266 U. S.1, 14 (1924). "In the Federal courts
the requisite of voluntariness is not satisfied by establishing merely that the confession was not induced by a promise or a threat. A confession is voluntary in
law if, and only if, it was, in fact, voluntarily made."
"See note 2 supra.
'Rex v. Warickshall, 1 Leach 263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (1783) ; State v.
Biggs, 224 N. C. 23, 27, 29 S.E. 2d 121, 123 (1944).

'E.g., 3 WIGMORE,

EVIDENCE

§822 (3d ed. 1940); Lisenba v. United States,

314 U. S.219 (1941) ; State v. Patrick, 48 N. C. 443 (1856) ; Rex v. Warickshall,
1 Leach 263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (1783).
"The aim of the requirement of due.process is not to exclude presumptively
false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence whether
true or false.... If, by fraud, collusion, trickery, and subornation of perjury
on the part of those representing the State, the trial of an accused person results
in his conviction, he has been denied due process of law. The case can stand no
better if, by the same devices, a confession is procured, and used in the trial."
Lisenba v. Unted States, 314 U. S.219, 236, 237 (1941); Chambers v. Florida,
309 U. S.227 (1939) ; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S.278 (1935).
' McNabb v. United States, 123 F. 2d 848 (C. C. A. 6th 1941).
' 28

STAT.

416 (1894), 18 U. S. C. §595 (1926).

"It shall be the duty of the

marshal, his deputy, or other officer, who may arrest a person charged with any
crime or offense, to take the defendant before the nearest United States commissioner or the nearest judicial officer having jurisdiction under existing laws for a
hearing, commitment, or taking bail for trial. . . ." [Repealed, 62 STAT. 992
(1948). See FED. R. CRimr. P., 4 and 5] ; 48 STAT. 1008, 5 U. S. C. 300a (1934)
".... the person arrested shall be immediately taken before a committing officer."
[Repealed, 62 STAT. 862 (1948).] North Carolina has the same statutory requirements. N. C. Gray. STAT. §§15-24, 46 (1943).
However, none of these statutes provide penalties in .case of non-compliance.
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issue, it based its opinion entirely upon its broad power to prescribe
rules of evidence for federal courts,' 0 and left undecided the question as
to whether the confession was, in fact, voluntary.
Clearly, then, a new rule to be applied by federal court judges in
determining competency of confessions had been formulated, but it
was not clear what that rule was." The court pointed out that the
"circumstances" of the case were such that a confession obtained thereunder would be inadmissible, 12 but with apparent purposefulness it limited itself to a recital of those circumstances, singling out none as the
hub around which its important new decision revolved.
Most lower courts thought that the Supreme Court had placed the
emphasis on the failure of the arresting officers to comply with the
arraignment statute, that such failure was the controlling circumstance,
and accordingly held that, under the McNabb case, any confession obtained prior to compliance with the statute would be inadmissible.'"
However, this interpretative position was soon made untenable by
the later case of United States v. Mitchell.'4 There, an early-acquired
confession, obtained spontaneously and within the reasonable time
awarded arresting officers before they are expected to arraign a suspect,
was held admissible despite a subsequent illegal detention, the court saying, "Here there was no disclosure induced by illegal detention, no evidence was obtained in violation of any legal rights .... 1
Cast again upon a sea of doubt, the lower courts could now swim
in but two directions. They could use the above quoted language from
10 McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 341 (1942).
11
Waite, Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence, 42 MIcH. L. Rav. 679
(1944) ; see Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting inUpshaw v.United States, 69 S. Ct.
170,12174 (1948).
McNabb v.United States, 318 U. S.332 (1942).
".

..

we are constrained to hold that the evidence elicited from the petitioners

inthe circumstances disclosed here must be excluded." At p.341.
"The circumstances inwhich the statements . . . were secured reveal a plain
disregard of the duty enjoined by Congress upon Federal law officers." At p.344.
"... the circumstances under which evidence was secured are not irrelevant
inascertaining itsadmissibility." At p.346.
. "We hold only that a decent regard for the duty of courts as agencies of justice and custodians of liberty forbids that men should be convicted upon evidence
secured under the circumstances revealed here." At p.347.
2' Mitchell v.United States, 138 F. 2d 426 (App.D. C. 1943) rev'd, 322 U. S.
65 (1943) ; Runnels v.United States, 138 F.2d 346 (C.C. A. 9th 1943) ; United
States v.Hoffman, 137 F. 2d 416 (C.C. A. 2d 1943) ; United States v.Haupt,
136 F. 2d 661 (C.C. A. 7th 1943); see United States v. Grote, 140 F. 2d 413
(C.C. A. 2d 1944); cf. Gros v. United States, 136 F. 2d 878 (C. C. A. 9th
1943); United States v.Keegan, 141 F. 2d 248 (C. C. A. 2d 1944). Contra:
United States v.Klee, 50 F. Supp. 679, 685 (E.D. Wash. 1943), "Ihave reached
the conclusion that the Supreme Court inthe McNabb case added to the various
tests to be taken into consideration by the trial judge a new one, that of whether
or not a man was promptly taken before the United States Commissioner."; see
Tooisgah v. United States, 137 F. 2d 713, 715 (C. C. A. 10th 1943).
"322 U. S.65 (1943).
15 Id. at 70.
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the Mitchell case as a guide post and hold that there had to be shown in
addition to illegal custody a "purpose of illegally extracting evidence
from an accused and the successful extraction of such inculpatory statements by continuous questioning for many hours under psychological
pressure" ;16 or, by reading the Mitchell case as a mere modification of
the McNabb rule as they had previously conceived it, they could arrive
at the alternative conclusion that a voluntary confession is admissible if
obtained prior to the time detention becomes illegal, but inadmissible,
regardless of attendant circumstances, if elicited after the period of permissive custody has expired.
While the former interpretation won almost unanimous support from
the lower federal courts,1 7 the recent decision of Upshaw v. United
States1 8 clearly indicates that a majority of the supreme tribunal take
the contrary view. Defendant, in that case, was arrested on suspicion
of theft and, without being taken before a committing magistrate, was
detained and questioned intermittently for thirty hours, at the end of
which time he confessed. The question periods never lasted for more
than a half hour and there was never more than one officer present.
The District Court thought the confession was admissible because
the "detention of petitioner 'was not unreasonable under the circumstances as a matter of law,'"19 and Upshaw was convicted on the
strength of it. This conviction was sustained by the Court of Appeals20
on the theory that while the detention may have been unreasonable,
"there was no disclosure induced by illegal detention" 2 1 i.e., there was
no "successful extraction of . . . inculpatory statements by continuous
10Id.

at 67. Obviously, this interpretation of the McNabb case, as explained

by the Mitchell decision, was very similar to the unique pre-Mitchell interpretation
by Judge Schwellenbach in United States v. Klee (see note 13, supra). It was a
swing back toward the notion that voluntariness is the only test of admissibility
and amounted to a holding that the McNabb case merely added illegal detention
for the purpose of securing a confession by psychological pressure as a consideration in determining the fact of voluntariness or involuntariness. Upshaw v. United
States, 168 F. 2d 167, 168 (App. D. C. 1948).
17E.g., Upshaw v. United States, 168 F. 2d 167 (App. D. C. 1948), rev'd, 69
S. Ct. 170 (1948) ; Alderman v. United States, 165 F. 2d 622 (App. D. C. 1947) ;
Boone v. United States, 164 F. 2d 102 (App. D. C. 1947); Brinegar v. United
States, 165 F. 2d 512 (C. C. A. 10th 1947) ; Hasson v. United States, 158 F. 2d
330 (App. D. C. 1946); Akowskey v. United States, 158 F. 2d 649 (App. D. C.
1946); Blood v. Hunter, 150 F. 2d 640 (C. C. A. 10th 1945); Ruhl v. United
States, 148 F. 2d 173 (C. C. A. 10th 1945) ; Paddy v. United States, 143 F. 2d
847 (C. C. A. 9th 1944) ; accord, Wright v. United States, 159 F. 2d 8 (C. C. A.
8th 1947). But before the Mitchell case was decided, one court, with some prescience, had chosen the other alternative as being the true McNabb rule. United
States v. Keegan. 141 F. 2d 248 (C. C. A. 2d 1944).
I869 S. Ct. 170 (1948).

'Old. at 171.
" Upshaw v. United States, 168 F. 2d 167 (App. D. C. 1948).
21Id. at 169.
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questioning for "zany hours under psychological pressnre."' 22 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 23 and reversed.
Stressing the mandates of the prompt commitment statute, the court
said, ". . . a confession is inadmissible if made during illegal detention
...whether or not the 'confession is the result of torture, physical or
psychological.' "24 Thus the second alternative rule outlined above was
expressly adopted and the effect of the McNabb decision on the law of
confessions was made certain: A confession may be voluntary and yet
be inadmissible-it is inadmissible if secured while the confessor is
being illegally detained, though illegal detention subsequent to a confession has no effect upon it.
The McNabb rule has now passed through three interpretative
stages.2 5 It has been much maligned all along the way, 20 and its desirability is, indeed, open to serious question. Though obviously intended
to encourage federal law enforcement officers to comply with the commitment statutes by depriving them of any "fruits of their wrongdoing," 2 7 it may well be doubted that it will have the desired effect. As
a practical matter, confessions, however illegally obtained, and however
inadmissible in court, often aid greatly in procuring evidence otherwise
undiscoverable. This evidence, despite the incompetency of its source,
has always been competent itself. 28 Therefore, if the Supreme Court
is not prepared to go the further step and declare such evidence likewise inadmissible, it probably has not substantially destroyed the incentive to violate the statutes.
Moreover, even if the judicially imposed sanction for violation of
the sanctionless legislative mandate is effective, the cure may be much
worse than the malady. The salutary effect of a remedy which will
partially paralyze the protective arm of law enforcement is questionable,29 even though that remedy may be a sure cure for the sniffles
2 United States v.Mitchell, 322 U. S.65, 67 (1943). Italics supplied.
23334 U. S.842 (1948).
2469 S.Ct. 170, 172 (1948).
-See notes 13, 17 and 18, and cases there cited.
2 United States v. Haupt, 136 F. 2d 661 (C. C. A. 7th 1943) ; Waite, Police
Regulation by Rides of Evidence, 42 MIcH. L. REV. 679 (1944) ; 56 HARv. L. REv.

1008 (1943); 40 ILL. L. Ray. 273 (1945); see Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting in
McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 347-349 (1942)

and in Upshaw v.

United States, 69 S.Ct. 170, 172-183 (1948).
Upshaw v. United States, 69 S.Ct. 170, 172 (1948).
2.7
United States v. Richard, 27 Fed. Cas. 798, No. 16, 154 (C. C. D. C.
1823) ; United States v. Hunter, 26 Fed. Cas. 436, No. 15,424 (C. C. D. C. 1806) ;
State v. Riddle, 205 N. C. 591, 172 S.E. 400 (1934) ; State v. Herring, 200 N. C.
306, 156 S.E. 537 (1931) ; see Note, 53 L. R. A. 403 (1901).
8E.g.,

29 Waite, Police Regulatioi by Rides of Evidence, 42 MIcH. L. Rav. 679, 690
(1944), quoting Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, "Modern criminals seldom operate alone

and this is particularly true with regard to the more serious violations. ...
Immediate arraignment of the first member of a criminal gang who is arrested,
with the resultant public record and publicity, would frustrate plans of enforce-
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of statutory non-compliance. All in all, it is difficult to see why direct
legislative action making violators of the statutes amenable to the criminal law would not be preferable to the indirect method of encouraging
compliance now being employed by the federal judiciary. It would seem
to be no answer to say that the effectiveness of such a legislative sanction
depends on the willingness of government attorneys to prosecute and
of juries to convict. To advance this argument is to admit that prosecutors willfully violate their solemn oaths of office-a crime in itself;
that juries do not honestly perform their functions as triers of fact;
and that the people, speaking through their elected representatives, are
helpless to prescribe an enforceable standard of conduct for their servants. If this be so, we should look to the very foundation of our
system of law enforcement and not undermine the structure still further
by turning avowed criminals loose to prey again upon society.
But whether desirable or undesirable, unless the McNabb rule finds
its way into the constitutional guarantee of due process, it does not
appear likely that the North Carolina Supreme Court will feel constrained to adopt it. This conclusion is supported not only by the fact
that since the McNabb case was decided our court has three times3 0

reaffirmed its previous stand that the sole test of admissibility is whether
the confession is voluntary and made without inducement, threat or
hope of reward, but also by a study of the closely analogous problem
of illegal search and seizure.
The federal rule has long been that evidence procured through illegal
search and seizure is inadmissible because obtained in violation of the
constitutional prohibitions of the fourth amendment. 31 However, North
Carolina has steadfastly refused to allow the fact of illegality in method
32
of procurement to have any effect on the competency of evidence.
In fact, our court,33 in the interest of preserving admissibility, has gone
34
a step further and laid a very strict construction upon a statute which
is almost a codification of the federal rule.
ment officers to apprehend the other individuals and conspirators involved ...
Expediency rather than immediacy should be a determining factor in deciding how
soon in the public interest an individual taken into custody should be arraigned."
Sce Upshaw v. United States, 69 S. Ct. 170, 182 (dissenting opinion), "Officers
charged with enforcement of the criminal law have objected for the reason that
fear of the application of its drastic penalties deterred officers from questioning
during reasonable delays in commitment."
" State v. Thompson, 227 N. C. 19, 40 S. E. 2d 620 (1946) ; State v. Biggs,
224 N. C. 23, 29 S. E. 2d 121 (1944) ; State v. Harris, 222 N. C. 157, 22 S. E.
2d 229 (1942).
"'Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
" State v. Shermer, 216 N. C. 719, 6 S. E. 2d 529 (1940); State v. McGee,
214 N. C. 184, 198 S. E. 616 (1938).
State v. McGee, 214 N. C. 184, 198 S. E. 616 (1938).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §15-27 (1943).
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It is to be hoped that these indications are true ones and that the
North Carolina Supreme Court will, in fact, persist in its refusal to
follow the federal example.
ROBERT PERRY, JR.

Federal Jurisdiction-Diversity of Citizenship-Realignment
of Parties in Corporate Derivative Suits
A New York stockholder in a New York corporation brought a
derivative suit against a citizen of Kentucky. The corporation was
joined as a defendant in accordance with the practice in derivative suits.
The complaint alleged that the officers in control of the New York Corporation had wrongfully transferred shares to the Kentucky defendant
in exchange for some worthless property. The Kentucky defendant
sought dismissal for lack of diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff
stockholder, a citizen of New York, and his New York corporation.
The plaintiff conceded the apparent absence of diversity but contended
that the court should sustain diversity jurisdiction by realigning the
New York corporation as a complainant, since the action was on behalf
of that corporation.
. The court ref used to realign on the ground that the complaint showed
that managing powers of the New York .corporation had fradulently
conspired with the other defendant, therefore the corporation was a
rightful and necessary party defendant and could not be regarded
otherwise.'
The problem of realignment is of particular significance in corporate
derivative suits, in view of the facts that jurisdiction in such cases is
usually based on diversity of citizenship, 2 the right sought to be enforced is a corporate right,3 and the corporation is an indispensable
party. 4 Logically, it would seem that the corporation should be aligned
1
Smallen v. Louisville Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 80 F. Supp. 279 (W. D. Ky.
1948).

' See Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518,
522 (1947) ("With possible rare exceptions, these actions involve only issues of
state law and . . . can get into federal courts only by reason of diversity of
citizenship of the parties.").
* Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., supra note 2 at 522
("The cause of action which such a plaintiff brings before the court is not his
own but the corporations's.") ; Greenberg v. Giannini, 140 F. 2d 550, 554 (C. C. A.
2d 1944); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS §163 (1936) ("the mere fact that the shareholder appears as plaintiff ... does not change the substantial nature of the right
to be enforced or the judgment to be collected. Both the right and the judgment
belong to the ... corporation.").
'Davenport v. Dows, 18 Wall. 626 (U. S. 1873); Hobbs v. Mitchell, 80 F.
2d 172 (C. C. A. 10th 1935) (held that it was collusive to leave out the corporation). See Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S.
518, 522 (1947).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

19491

as a complainant for purposes of testing diversity, 5 but the cases have
not followed that course.
One of the earliest federal decisions recognizing a stockholder's suit
to enforce a corporate right was Dodge v. Woolsey6 in which the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of injunctive relief to a Connecticut stockholder in his suit to prevent Ohio taxing officials from collecting a tax
from the Ohio corporation. Clearly there would have been no diversity
if the corporation had brought the suit. The taxing officials labeled the
case a contrivance to give jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court held that
the right of a citizen of Connecticut to sue a citizen of Ohio in federal
court could not be questioned.
The Dodge case was decided before the federal courts had statutory
authority to dismiss for collusion in manufacturing diversity of citizenship by getting a non-resident stockholder to bring a derivative suit, and
before the doctrine of realignment was recognized. It was not until
1880 that the Supreme Court abandoned the practice of testing diversity
by means of the position of the parties in the pleadings and construed
the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, 7 as empowering the federal courts
to realign the parties.8 Since that time it has become well settled that,
for purposes of testing the jurisdiction of a federal court on the basis
of diversity of citizenship, it is immaterial how the parties are arranged
in the pleadings. It is the duty of the court to align them according to
their real interest in the controversy ;9 that is, on the basis of their actual
legal interests and the apparent result to them if the object sought is
successful.10
Doctor v. HarringtonI" is probably the leading Supreme Court decision on the issue of realignment in stockholders' derivative suits. In
that case, as in the Dodge case, there would not have been the necessary
complete diversity if the corporation had been realigned. The court
recognized that the right was one which could properly be asserted by the
corporation but concluded that since "the corporation is controlled by
interests antagonistic to complainant12 . . . the defendant corporation is
not to be classed on the same side of the controversy as complainant
1 STREET, FEDERAL EQUITY PRACTICE 562 (1909) ("In as much as these suits
are always technically based on a right of action primarily vested in the corporation itself, it has been suggested that . . . the corporation ought always to be
treated as being in the same right with the actual plaintiff stockholder.").
18 How. 331 (U. S. 1856).
18 STAT. 470 (1875). See Pub. L. No. 773, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. §§1332,
1441, 1447 (June 25, 1948).
' Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457 (1879); Pacific Railroad v. Ketchum, 101
U. S. 289 (1880).
'Indianapolis v. Chase Nat. Bank, 314 U. S. 63 (1941); Thomson v. Butler,
136 1F. 2d 644 (C. C. A. 8th 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 761 (1943).
See Thomson v. Butler, supra note 9 at 647. "
11196 U. S. 579 (1905).

Italics supplied.
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stockholder for the purpose of determining the diversity of citizenship
on which the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court must rest."
Inconsistent language used in some of the subsequent decisions certainly justifies an observation that the cases are conflicting, particularly
if an attempt is made to state the rule applied in terms of the results
reached. 13 However, the decisions have substantially adhered to the
4
reasoning and the theory of Doctor v. Harrington.1
As in that case,
the federal courts have frequently refused to realign the corporate defendant to defeat' 5 diversity jurisdiction, while in others, like the instant
case, the courts have refused to realign the corporate defendant to sustain'6 diversity jurisdiction. There have also been cases in which the
court did realign to defeat diversity,' 7 and in one case the corporate
defendant was realigned to sustain diversity jurisdiction, when its answer
in effect joined in the complaint1s However, the cases are in agreement in that the presence or absence of an antagonistic attitude in the
persons controlling the corporation determined the question of realignment in each case.
3
" See BREWSTER, FEDERAL PROCEDURE §382 (1940)
("The decisions on this
point are in sharp conflict, some holding that defendant shall be deemed for all
jurisdictional purposes a real party plaintiff, and others refusing to conform to
this doctrine. . . ."); MONTGOMERY, MANUAL OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PRO-

CEDURE §67 (4th ed. 1942) ("the rule [of realignment] is not applied in the case
of stockholder's bills-for, otherwise, it would be impossible for a non-resident
stockholder to bring suit in the federal court. This being the situation, the corporation will not be realigned. . . .") ; 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §23.21 (2d ed.
1948) ("The majority of the federal courts have refused to do this [realign],
when to do so would defeat their jurisdiction."). But see RosE, JURISDICTION
AND PROCEDURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS §338 (2d ed. 1922) ; 1 STREET, FEDERAL
EQUITY PRACTICE §562 (1909).

" E.g., Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S.
518 (1947) ; Venner v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 209 U. S. 24 (1908) ; Hutchinson
Box Board & Paper Co. v. Van Horn, 299 Fed. 424 (C. C. A. 8th 1924) ; Laughner
v. Schell, 260 Fed. 396 (C. C. A. 3d 1919); Cutting v. Woodward, 255 Fed. 633
(C. C. A. 9th 1918) ; Lindauer v. Compania Palomas, 247 Fed. 428 (C. C. A. 8th
1918), cert. denied, 246 U. S. 670 (1918); Hyams v. Calumet & Hecla Mining
Co., 221 Fed. 529 (C. C. A. 6th 1915); Ashley v. Keith Oil Co., 73 F. Supp. 37
(D. Mass. 1947); Richardson v. Blue Grass Mining Co., 29 F. Supp. 658 (E. D.
Ky. 1939), af'd, 127 F. 2d 291 (C. C. A. 6th 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 639
(1942); Nagle v. Wyoga Gas & Oil Corp., 10 F. Supp. 905 (M. D. Pa. 1935);
Harris v. Brown, 6 F. 2d 922 (W. D. Ky. 1925) ; Whitaker v. Whitaker Iron Co.,
238 Fed. 980 (N. D. W. Va. 1916), aff'd, 249 Fed. 531 (C. C. A. 4th 1917), cert.
denied, 248 U. S. 564 (1918) ; Baillie v. Backus, 230 Fed. 711 (D. Or. 1916) ; Crawford v. Seattle R. & S. Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 920 (W. D. Wash. 1912); Howard v.
Nat. Tel. Co., 182 Fed. 215 (C. C. N. D. W. Va. 1910) ; Kelly v. Miss. River Coaling Co., 175 Fed. 482 (C. C. W. D. Pa. 1909); Gage v. Riverside Trust Co., 156
Fed. 1002 (C. C. S. D. Cal. 1906) ; Lucas v. Milliken, 139 Fed. 816 (C. C. D. S. C.
1905).
" Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty' Co., 330 U. S. 518
(1947); Venner v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 209 U. S. 24 (1908).
" Nagle v. Wyoga Gas & Oil Corp., 10 F. Supp. 905 (M. D. Pa. 1935);
Crawford v. Seattle R. & S. Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 920 (W. D. Wash. 1912).
"*Laughner v. Schell, 260 Fed. 396 (C. C. A. 3d 1919) ; Gage v. Riverside Trust
Co., 156 Fed. 1002 (C. C. S. D. Cal. 1906) ; accord, Lindauer v. Compania Palomas,
247 Fed. 428 (C. C. A. 8th 1918).
" Lucas v. Milliken, 139 Fed. 816 (C. C. D. S. C. 1905).
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The practice of collusively obtaining federal diversity jurisdiction
by means of the corporate derivative suit, which developed soon after
the decision in the Dodge case, led the Supreme Court, in Hawes v.
Oakland,'0 to restrict the doctrine of the Dodge case by placing the burden on the plaintiff stockholder to show that he had a proper case for
a derivative suit and that there was no collusion with the corporation to
manufacture federal diversity jurisdiction. 20 The doctrine of that case
was subsequently codified 2' and now is substantially embodied in federal rule 23 (b) 22
The purpose of the requirements set out in rule 23 (b) was to determine the question of the authority of the plaintiff to maintain a
derivative suit and not to raise questions of realignment and diversity
jurisdiction, 23 but compliance with 23 (b) indirectly affects these questions by showing that the persons in control of the corporation are
antagonistic to the stockholder's interests. 24 By the application of general equitable principles, upon which rule 23 (b) is based, a stockholder
has no authority to institute a derivative suit unless the persons in con25
trol of the corporation have wrongfully refused to bring the suit.
Thus, whenever a stockholder has the proper standing to bring a derivative suit, the corporation is controlled by interests antagonistic to
the stockholder, and the federal court will not realign the corporate
defendant either to sustain or defeat diversity jurisdiction. 26 Of course,
2- 104

U. S. 450 (1882).

" Hawes v. Oakland, supra note 19 at 461, 462.
Equity Rule 94, 104 U. S. IX (1882).

2

22 FED. R. Civ. P., 23(b) (In a derivative suit, the complaint must aver "that
the action is not a collusive one to confer on a court of the United States jurisdiction of any action of which it would not otherwise have jurisdiction. The
complaint shall also set forth with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff to
secure from the managing directors or trustees and, if necessary, from the shareholders such action as he desires, and the reasons for his failire to obtain such
action or the reasons for not making such effort.").
22 See Venner v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 209 U. S. 24, 34 (1908) ; 13 CycLoiPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE

§6876 (2d ed. 1944).

"Gage v. Riverside Trust Co., 156 Fed. 1002, 1007 (C. C. S. D. Cal. 1906)
(". .. the failure to comply with equity rule 94 not only affects the merits, but
determines the proper alignment of the parties and thus indirectly goes to the
question of federal jurisdiction."); Groel v. United Electric Co., 132 Fed. 252
(C. C. D. N. 1. 1904).
2' STEVENS, CORPORATI o S §162 (1936) ("The minority shareholder has no
standing to institute an action in the right of the corporate group, overriding a
decision honestly arrived at by the directors or majority stockholders"). When
the persons controlling the corporation are shown to be antagonistic to the stockholder's interests, and yet rule 23(b) has not been complied with, the court will
not realign. Though such action may sustain diversity jurisdiction, the complaint
is subject to demurrer for failure to show a right in equity to sue. Venner v.
Great Northern Ry. Co., 153 Fed. 408 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1907), aff'd, 209 U. S. 24

(1908).

2" When the court refuses to realign the corporation, it would seem that diversity jurisdiction would always be defeated by the conclusive presumption that a
corporation is composed of citizens of the state of incorporation. Marshall v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 16 How. 314 (U. S. 1853). That possibility was re-
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if the corporation is not controlled by antagonistic interests, the corporation may be realigned to sustain or defeat diversity jurisdiction, 27 but
even if jurisdiction is sustained by the realignment, the stockholder has
no standing to maintain the suit.
The courts have sought to bring the rule applied in derivative suits
within the doctrine of realignment by stating it in terms of the antagonistic control of the corporation; however, the ultimate result amounts
to a variation in the realignment doctrine which not only violates the
basic theory of derivative suits28 but cannot be reconciled with the practice of treating the corporation as a plaintiff for other jurisdictional
purposes 2 and for the purpose of determining the district in which the
suit may be brought.30
LIVINGSTON VERNON.

Labor Law-Unfair Labor Practice-Discriminatory Denial of
Use of Company Hall for Union Organization
An employer, motivated by anti-union bias, refused to allow union
organizers to hold a meeting of employees in an employer-owned hall,
not connected with the plant, in a North Carolina mill village. The hall
had been used for other community activities in the past without objection. The only other public buildings in the mill village were also owned
or controlled by the employer and unavailable to the organizers. Because of these circumstances the National Labor Relations Board found
that the employer had discriminated against the union in violation of
Section 8(1) of the National Labor Relations Act,1 and ordered that
jected in Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U. S. 579 (1905), when Justice McKenna
explained that the fiction was created to give federal courts diversity jurisdiction
over corporations and could not be extended. See generally McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction, Corporationsin the Diverse Citizenship Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts, 56 HARv. L. REV. 853 (1943).
27 Laughner v. Schell, 260 Fed. 396 (C. C. A. 3d 1919)
(Requirements of rule
23(b) were not complied with.

The court realigned to defeat jurisdiction and

dismissed the bill for failure to comply with th6 rule.).
2" See note 3 supra.
"See Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S.
518, 523 (1947) ; Hutchinson Box Board & Paper Co. v. Van Horn, 299 Fed. 424,
428 (C. C. A. 8th 1924) ("The amount in controversy is the value of the corporate right sought to be enforced and not the value of . . . [stockholder's]
interest.").
3028 U. S. C. §1401 (Supp. 1948) ("Any civil action by a stockholder on
behalf of his corporation may be prosecuted in any judicial district where the
corporation might have sued the same defendents.").
149 STAT. 452 (1935),
29 U. S. C. §158(1) (1946), subsequently amended by
National Labor Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. -,
29 U. S. C. §158(a) (1)
(Supp. 1947) : "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in Section 7." Section 7 provides, "Employees shall have the right to self organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
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it cease and desist from withholding permission to use the hall for
organizational meetings. 2 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals refused
to enforce the order on the ground that the Board had -exceeded its
statutory power as limited by the constitutional provision prohibiting
deprivation of property without due process. 3 In National Labor Relations Board v. Stowe Spinning Co. the Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the order as modified and restricted should be enforced because it
was based on a finding of discrimination not unjustified by the facts and
background.4 Two dissenting justices agreed with the lower court that
the Board's extension of the concept of unfair labor practice infringed
upon the employer's constitutional property rights. Justice Jackson concurred in the result but disagreed with the majority as to what conduct
constituted the unfair practice.
In the previous development of the law relating to the respective
rights of employers and employees 5 in the use of the employer's property, the cases have for the most part been concentrated in thre general
classifications: (1) those dealing with municipal ordinances which indirectly restricted freedom of speech or of the press by providing governmental machinery for the enforcement of conflicting property rights of
employers;6 (2) those dealing with employees' right to .solicit union
members or to distribute union literature during their leisure time on
company property ;7 (3) those dealing with the right of union representshall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such -activities except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in
a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section
8(a) (3)."
'Stowe Spinning Mills, 70 N.L.R.B. 614 (1946).
'National Labor Relations Board v. Stowe Spinning Co., 165 F. 2d 609
(C. C. A. 4th 1947).
U. S. -, 69 S. Ct. 541 (1948).
'See generally: Union Activity on the Employer's Property, 5 LAW. GUILD
REv. 253 (1945).
Such ordinances have been held unconstitutional as inconsistent with the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. These amendments inhibit the power of governments to make laws abridging freedom of speech and of the press; they do not
apply to private individuals. It is not yet clear how far the courts will go in
indirectly depriving owners of property rights by depriving them of remedies by
which such rights may be enforced. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 (1946)
(Jehovah's Witness distributing religious literature on streets of privately owned
town, remained after having been warned by the owner to leave, thereby violating
a municipal ordinance. Ordinance held unconstitutional; the court said it constituted governmental interference with freedom of speech and of the press under
these circumstances [company town]); Tucker v. Texas, 326 U. S. 517 (1946)
(similar except that town was owned by federal government in its proprietary
function). Compare Shelley v. Kraemer, 332 U. S. 1 (1948), 27 N. C. L. Rv.
224 (1949), with the above two cases.
' This right was well established by the companion cases, Republic Aviation
Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 324 U. S.793 (1945), afflrming 142 F.
2d 193 (C. C. A. 2nd 1944), and National Labor Relations Board v. Le Tourneau
Co. of Georgia, 324 U. S. 793 (1945), reversing 143 F. 2d 67 (C. C. A. 5th 1945).
See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. American Pearl Button Co., 149 F.
2d 258 (C. C. A. 8th 1945) (discusses the extension of the law from earlier cases
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atives to have access to employees who spend their full time on the
employer's premises (e.g., a ship or lumber camp). s
The Stowe case differs from most of the previous decisions in that
it deals with the right of outside union representatives to come on an
employer's production premises against his wishes and engage in organizational activities, rather than with the right of employees themselves
to engage in union activities during their spare time on company production premises. 9 The Supreme Court upheld their right to do so, as
limited to the particular circumstances present here.
One of the controlling factors in the instant case seems to be the
absence of any other meeting place. It is difficult to formulate general
rules specifying what weight will be given to any relative degree of
isolation of company property and employees who work on it, but
there are definite indications in the cases which may be pointed out.' 0
In the more extreme cases where employees live and work on the employer's premises, it seems clear that union representatives would have
a right to use the employer's property for organizational purposes subject only to such restrictions as are necessary for maintenance of effiwhich considered a rule prohibiting distribution of literature or solicitation in the
plant valid unless arbitrarily enforced); National Labor .Relations Board v. Illinois Tool Works, 153 F. 2d 811 (C. C. A. 7th 1946) (such a rule would be valid
even under the Republic case if the employer showed special circumstances which
made it necessary in order to maintain discipline in the plant or to assure efficient
production) ; May Department Stores v. National Labor Relations Board, 326
U. S. 376 (1945), affirming 146 F. 2d 66 (C. C. A. 8th 1944) (special circumstances justified such a rule as applied to selling floor of a department store, because customers might be affected even though the employees were using their
spare time).
' It is clear that certified representatives may have access to employees to
carry on necessary functions, but whether or not this access may be used for
solicitation of members is a matter on-which the circuit courts do not agree and
the Supreme Court has not spoken directly. It has long been the law that an
employer may not prevent organizers from visiting employees in their companyowned homes. National Labor Relations Board v. West Kentucky Coal Co., 116
F. 2d 816 (C. C. A. 6th 1940). But where the employees live and work on the
same premises, some circuit courts have held that although certified representatives
may come on the property to collect dues, distribute the union newspaper, etc., to
members, they may not use that access to solicit members. Richfield Oil Corp v.
National Labor Relations Board (C. C. A. 9th 1944); National Labor Relations
Board v. Cities Service Oil Co., 122 F. 2d 149 (C. C. A. 2nd 1941). The most
recent decision, however, requires that union representatives be given access to
employees who live and work on the same premises for solicitation purposes as
well as for other union functions. National Labor Relations Board v. Lake
Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F. 2d 147 (C. C. A. 6th 1948).
"ee 9 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 37 (1944), and 12 N.L.R.B. ANN. Rr. 25 (1948),
for a brief r~sum of the previous decisions by the National Labor Relations
Board on this subject.
10 2 TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 788 (1940).
" See note 8, supra. But in Republic Aviation Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 324 U. S. 793 (1945), the court seemed to approve of the holding in
the Lake Superior case: "Neither of these is like a mining or lumber camp where
the employees pass their rest as well as their work time on the employer's premises, so that union organization must proceed upon the employer's premises or be
seriously handicapped."
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cient production." In the intermediate situation, where it is practicable
to contact the employees in other ways 12 but not to hold a meeting unless
it can be held on company property, the instant case seems to say that
outsiders have no absolute right to use company property for organizational meetings, but may not be discriminated against as was done in the
Stowe case.' 3 In cases at the other extreme, where there are no circumstances making it impracticable to carry on organizational activities
elsewhere than on company premises, it would seem that the right of
outsiders to use the employer's property for such purposes is very
14
doubtful.
Apparently the strongest factor in the Stowe decision is the existence of anti-union bias. That the employer was motivated by opposition
to the unionization of his employees is not contested.' 5 The National
Labor Relations Board is entitled to consider the manner in which a
company's labor policy is promulgated, and the purpose for which it is
invoked, in determining whether or not an unfair labor practice has been
committed.' 6 Thus the simple fact of refusal to let union organizers
use the hall, motivated by a hope of discouraging or preventing organization of his employees, might be considered in itself a violation of the
Act where the circumstances make such a denial a reasonably effective
means of accomplishing that prohibited objective1 7 Coupled with the
2
"See note 20 infra.
" National Labor Relations Board v. Stowe Spinning Co., U. S. - , 69
S. Ct. 541, 544 (1948) (". . . the refusal by these respondents was unreasonable
because the ball had been given freely to others, and because no other halls were
available for organization. . . . We must require explicit language making it

clear that the mere denial of facilities will not subject respondents to punishment

for contempt.").
"Id. at 543 ("We cannot equate a company-dominated North Carolina mill

town with the vast metropolitan centers where a number of halls are available
within easy reach of prospective union members."); 2 TELLER, LABOR DIsuT-as
AND COLLECIVE BARGAINING 821 (1940)
(discusses cases which hold that use of

company facilities by a union is evidence of domination by the employer in violation of §8(2) of the Act. That section declares that it is an unfair labor practice
for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it. . . ." 49

452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. 158(2) (1946), as amended by National Labor
Management
Relations
29 U. S. C. 158(a) (2) (Supp. 1947).
15Id.
at 543, n. 7. Act, 61 STAT. -,
"Carter Carbureter Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 140 F. 2d 714,
717 (C. C. A. 8th 1944) ("The vice is not necessarily in the rule itself but in the
manner in which and the purpose for which it was promulgated and employed.").
See, e.g., United Aircraft Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. 594 (1946) (company refused passes
STAT.

to union organizers, although it granted them to tradespeople and vendors, to
enter a street which had been closed for security reasons during the war; held,
an unfair labor practice); Brown Shipbuilding Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1047 (1946)
(company refused outsiders permission to distribute union literature on companyowned parking lot; held, not an unfair practice in absence of a finding that permission had been asked or refused to distribute it at the gate where other literature was distributed).
"'Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 258, 266 (1941)

("

. .

constitutes

an unfair labor practice inasmuch as it is based on hostility to the right of employees to organize ...").
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fact that on this particular occasion the employer took affirmative action
to prevent use of the hall for organizational purposes, although its custom was to allow a fraternal order, which met in the hall, to handle all
requests to use it, the case is much stronger.1 8 Justice Jackson thought
that had the employer retained direct control over the disposition of the
hall there would have been no unfair practice here, but that having let
the fraternal order dispose of it without interference on previous occasions, the employer could not now depart from its custom without violating Section 8(1).19
As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out, a serious question of constitutional law is involved in the instant case.20 Assuming that
the Congress has power to restrict the property rights of employers
21
when they come into conflict with the rights of employees to organize,
there remains the question whether it has exercised that power to the
extent enforced by the Stowe decision. Although the discretion of the
Board is very broad, it must be exercised within the limits of a statutory
standard. 22 The standard here involved states that it shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce" 28
his employees in the exercise of their right to organize and bargain collectively. If the Board's orders were unreasonable and arbitrary in view
of that standard, enforcement would deprive the employer of his property without due process of law.24 On the other hand, if in the light
of the particular circumstances of this case it could not properly be said
8 The hall had been built by the company partly as a meeting place for a
fraternal order, Patriotic Order Sons of America, composed of employees and
others. Although the employer had told the Order in letting them use the hall
that it was not to be rented for other purposes, it had been used on numerous
occasions for social and welfare activities, and so far as appears the Order had
passed on all previous requests without interference by the employer). National
Labor Relations Board v. Stowe Spinning Co., U. S. -,
69 S. Ct. 541,
547, n. 1 (1948).
"Old. at 545.
20 National Labor Relations Board v. Stowe Spinning Co., 165 F. 2d 609, 614
(C. C. A. 4th 1947) ("In the pending case there was no evidence of any interference with or restriction upon the men in their communications on labor matters
either with each other or with agents of the union, in the homes of the men or
on the streets of the town, or for that matter in the company's plant itself; and
we think that the Board had no authority to compel the company to surrender their
other property against their will for uses of which they did not approve, since the
Board's power in this direction is limited by a constitutional provision of great
importance under our form of government.").
2 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U. S. 1
(1937). See generally: Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86
U. OF
PA. L. Ray. 691 (1938).
2 STASON, THE LAW OF ADMINISTRATIvE TRIBUNALS 76 (1947).
2349 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §158(1) (1946), as amended by National
Labor Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. , 29 U. S. C. §158(a) (1) (Supp.
1947), quoted in full supra note 1.
24 Phelps-Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U. S. 177, 194
(1941) ; Wallace Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 323 U. S.248 (1944).
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as a matter of law that the refusal was not an unfair practice, 25 the
Board is entitled to the benefit of a presumption that its experienced
26
judgment is correct.
Whatever be the merits of the very close question of due process,
the Supreme Court's opinion in the Stowe case is in line with its liberal
policy in construing the National Labor Relations Act. The holding
is restricted to circumstances where two conditions concurrently exist:
(1) physical necessity for holding the meeting, if at all, in the employer's hall; (2) use of the hall, with the employer's assent, by the public
for other purposes. Thus understood, the decision is of limited significance. It remains for the future to disclose where the court will
draw the ultimate line in balancing the conflicting claims of employers
to control property and of union representatives to use it for organizational purposes.
ELIZABETH OSBORNE ROLLINS.

Municipal Corporations-Legislative AuthorityLimitation Thereon
The power of municipalities to legislate on specifically enumerated
subjects is usually supplemented by a general delegation of authority
to pass ordinances for the general welfare of the city. In North Carolina this general enabling act is N. C. GEN. STAT. §160-52 (1943), which

provides that "The board of commissioners shall have power to make
ordinances, rules and regulations for the better government of the town,
not inconsistent with this chapter and the law of the land, as they may
deem necessary."
"[Police ordinances and regulations] must not be inconsistent with
the general laws of the state, including the common law, equity and
public policy."' This principle is frequently relied upon in litigation
involving the validity of a local regulation, and many ordinances are
attacked and overthrown as in conflict with the general law. Therefore,
it is important to attorneys and to local legislative bodies to know what
constitutes such an inconsistency as is contemplated by the statute. How
("Ownership does not always
"' Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501, 509 (1946)
mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his
property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.") ; National
Labor Relations Board v. Cities Service Oil Co., 122 F. 2d 149 (C. C. A. 2nd
1941) ("It is not every interference with properVy rights that is within the Fifth
Inconvenience, and even some dislocation of property rights,
Amendment ....
may be necessary in order to safeguard the right to collective bargaining."). This
statement was cited and quoted in the Republic case, 324 U. S. 793,. 803 (1945).
"E.g., Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943), enforcement granted.
142 F. 2d 1009 (C. C. A. 5th 1944).
'3 McQun.LiN, MU NICiPAL CoRPORtATIoNs §953 (2nd ed. 1939).
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may municipal regulations best be drawn to avoid a conflict? When will
the court look for some state law or policy on the same subject in order
to invalidate an ordinance and when will it endeavor to find them
consistent ?
As will be seen, some ordinances are so worded that they cannot be
reconciled with the state law. In that case the latter must, of course,
prevail. 2 But when the state and local regulations merely overlap to a
certain extent the question is as to their comparative effectiveness. This
depends on whether the matter to be regulated is one of more particular
interest to the people as members of municipalities or as citizens of the
state. Does it involve acts more injurious and more apt to occur in
congested areas than elsewhere? Do local differences make uniform
legislation impractical, or would varying degrees of regulation from
place to place impede enforcement? These factors are seldom discussed
in the written opinions, the courts talking only in terms of conflict or
of the authority of the municipality. However, the courts should and
apparently do in most cases give some consideration to the purpose
behind the general law. Then if it is thought that some degree of
municipal control will aid in the accomplishment of that purpose, the
ordinance will be upheld whenever possible; if not, it is apt to be found
inconsistent, or the state said to have "preempted" the field. Only on
this basis can the decisions be reconciled.
DIRECT CONFLICT BETWEEN STATUTE AND ORDINANCE

It is settled everywhere that an ordinance cannot "prohibit an act
which the state permits, or permit an act which the state prohibits." 8
In the words of the North Carolina Supreme Court, a town "cannot by
ordinance make an act illegal which is legal under our statutes."'4 As
for permitting what the state prohibits, our court has held that a city
might not pay a debt incurred "in aid of the rebellion," the state having
since declared all such debts to be unlawful and expressly forbidden
that they be paid." 5 Also, where cities are allowed by statute to tax

id. §683 n. 68.
'See Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 86, 167 N. E. 158, 160
(1929) ; Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 268, 140 N. E. 519, 521
(1923).
'2

Prohibiting what state permits. Shelton v. City of Shelton, 111 Conn. 433,
150 AtI. 811 (1930); National Amusement Co. v. Johnson, 270 Mich. 613, 259
N. W. 342 (1935) ; Collins v. Hatch, 18 Ohio 523, 51 Am. Dec. 465 (1849) ; Craig
v. Gallatin; 168 Tenn. 413, 79 S. W. 2d 553 (1935); Brewer v. State, 113 Tex.
Crim. 522, 24 S. W. 2d 409 (1930).
Permitting what state prohibits. I re Ridenbaugh, 5 Idaho 371, 49 Pac. 12
(1897) ; Commonwealth v. Surridge, 265 Mass. 425, 164 N. E. 480 (1929) ; Armi.
tage v. Camden, 5 N. J. Misc. Rep. 129, 135 Atl. 661 (1927) ; Zucarro v. State,
82 Tex. Cr. Rep. 1, 197 S. W. 982 (1917).
' State v. Eubanks, 154 N. C. 628, 632, 70 S. E. 466, 467 (1911).
'Weith v. City of Wilmington, 68 N. C. 24 (1873).
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motion picture theatres on a population basis, a city may not levy a
higher tax than is permitted for cities in its population bracket, according to the official census.6 A more recent example is Eldridge v. Mangum. 7 There a statute required the vote of three-fourths of a municipal
legislative body in order to amend a zoning plan over the protest of the
property owners involved. An ordinance requiring only a majority vote
of the city's three commissioners in such a situation was held void.
IDENTICAL PROVISIONS IN STATUTE AND ORDINANCE

It is well settled in North Carolina that an ordinance which duplicates a statute cannot stand. Thus where an ordinance provides that
its violators shall be arrested, the provision for arrest, at least, is void,
since the power to arrest is given by statute which makes the violation
of any town ordinance a misdemeanor.8 However, if the remainder of
the ordinance is not a duplication of or repugnant to the state law it
may be upheld as a distinct and independent part of the ordinance. 9
And it has been held that one cannot be convicted for violating an
ordinance which prohibits gambling in almost the identical words of a
statute declaring the same acts to be a mislemeanor.' 0 It was said that
the ordinance conferred no jurisdiction of the offense since it was in
"conflict" with the general law. It made no difference that the ordinance was passed first and had been valid until duplicated and superseded by the statute."
STATUTE AND ORDINANCE PUNISHING THE SAME ACT

Even when the language of statute and ordinance are not identical,
it is sometimes said that under a general grant of power a city may
not penalize an act punishable by statute,' 2 but there is considerable
authority to the contrary.' 3 In North Carolina "it is settled that a town
ordinance that undertakes to make that which constitutes a criminal
offense under the general law of the state an offense against the town,
punishable by fine or otherwise, is inoperative and void."'14 California
takes the same view,' 5 subject to the careful distinction that "We only
' State v. Prevo, 178 N. C. 740, 101 S. E. 370 (1919).
7216 N. C. 532, 5 S. E. 2d 721 (1939).
' State v. Earnhardt, 107 N. C. 789, 12 S. E. 426 (1890). The court points
out that a fine imposed by a by-law is only a debt arising ex contract6, so to arrest
one merely to collect the fine would be imprisonment for debt prohibited by N. C.
CoNsT. Art. I, §16.
'Ibid.; cf. Chapman v. Selover, 172 App. Div. 858, 159 N. Y. Supp. 632 (4th
Dep't. 1916), rev'd, 225 N. Y. 417, 122 N. E. 206 (1919).
1" State v. McCoy, 116 N. C. 1059, 21 S. E. 690 (1895) ; Contra: City of
Seattle v. MacDonald, 47 Wash. 298, 91 Pac. 952 (1907).
"'See 2 McQuILLIN, op. cit. supra §683 n. 75.
122 DILLON, MUNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS §632; 3 McQuiLLn,

op. cit. supra

§924.
1
' See Note, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 63 et eq.
"' State v. Keith. 94 N. C. 933, 934 (1886) (resisting an officer).
" See Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 645, 192 Pac. 442, 447 (1929).
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hold that there is a conflict where the ordinance and the general law
punish. precisely the same acts. We do not wish to be understood as
holding that the sections of the ordinance which make criminal other
acts not punishable under the general law are void because the legislature has seen fit to legislate upon the subject."'10 The Supreme Court
of Washington, however, while recognizing an adverse weight of authority, has held. that under a general grant of authority a city may enact
ordinances for the ,punishment of offenses already made punishable by
state laws.17.
The reasons for not allowing an ordinance and a statute punishing
the same 9,A.ense to stand together are brought out in the opinion in
Town of Washington v. Hammond.'8 The defendant had been convicted for violating an ordinance which provided for a fine of not more
than twenty dollars, or imprisonment for not more than one month for
injuring public property. Damaging public buildings was also made a
misdemeanor by statute. In reversing the conviction the court said that
since the superior courts have no original jurisdiction when punishments
are limited .as in the ordinance, to allow it to stand would be to strip
those courts of. their original jurisdiction of the offense. 19 As an alternative objection is was said that the offender could not be tried and
punished under both laws. But in State v. Taylor2 0 the defendant was
tried by both municipal and state courts for the same act. He was
indicted for assault and pleaded a former conviction under an ordinance
against disturbing the peace by fighting. The court said "It is well
settled that a town ordinance cannot make criminal or prescribe a pun21
ishment for acts which are indictable at common law or by statute,"
but held the ordinance valid and the former conviction no bar to prosecution by the state. The court found no double jeopardy in this
situation on the theory that the two actions were for different offenses,
different in that one might fight in such a way as to violate the ordinance
without being guilty of an assault. This illustrates the length to which
the court will go to uphold an ordinance which is thought to be well
adapted to carry out the legislative policy of the state. This can be
" In re Sic, 73 Cal. 142, 149, 14 Pac. 405, 408 (1887).
"City of Seattle v..MacDonald, 47 Wash. 298, 91 Pac. 952 (1907).
1876 N. C. 33 (1877).
19 Texas allows municipal punishment of state offenses provided only that the
punishment be identical with that prescribed by the statute. See Neuvar v. State,
72 Tex. Crim. App. 410, 163 S.W. 58, 60 (1914). Kentucky only requires that
the minimtrm punishment be the same. Burden v. Hendrix, 205 Ky. 167, 265 S.W.
493 (1924). In neither state may one be punished under both statute and ordinance. 3 McQuinLTi, op. cit. supra §§929, 932.
20 133 N. C. 755, 46 S.E. 5 (1903) ; cf. State v. Stevens, 114 N. C. 873, 19
S. E. 861 (1894) ; State v. Tucker, 137 Wash. 162, 242 Pac. 363 (1926) ; Mahew
v. Eugene, 56 Ore. 102, 104 Pac. 727 (1909).

"' State v. Taylor, supra note 20 at 758, 46 S.E. at 6.
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done only if the words of the ordinance do not render it necessarily coextensive with the general law on the subject.
Indeed, though the indiscriminate use of the words "act" and
"offense" in the opinions often tends to cloud the issue, the majority
22
of jurisdictions will allow state and local prosecutions for the same act.
The double jeopardy argument is sometimes met by holding that recovery of a penalty by the city is a civil action for debt and not a criminal
prosecution.23 More frequently, however, it is on the ground that the
prohibited act constitutes two distinct offenses against different governing
bodies.

24

O1INANCES SUPPLEMENTING STATUTORY REGULATIONS
It is usually said that an ordinance may supplement a statute,25 and
a municipal government may make "new, further, and more definite
27
regulations" 26 in addition to those provided for by the general law.
Mr. Justice Connor in the Taylor case quoted Chief Justice Bleckley,
formerly of the Georgia Supreme Court, as follows: "Many transactions
which are made penal by the general law of the state may at the same time
afford material for a proper police ordinance. The state may deal only
with the central element of the transaction, which is fringed all around
with adjuncts that ought to be prohibited by ordinances as highly mischievous to the quiet of municipal society." 28 The reason for allowing
additional local legislation in most fields is that many acts are more
injurious and more apt to occur in congested areas than throughout the
29
state as a whole, and so are more efficiently regulated by municipalities.
In order to meet the more acute needs of city life, ordinances have been
upheld which prescribe higher standards than a statute requires,30 or
fix a more severe penalty, 31 or both.3 2 In some jurisdictions a general
" 3 McQuiLLiN, op. cit. mpra §934.
"Levy v. State, 6 Ind. 281 (1855); cf. State v. Earnhardt, 107 N. C. 789,
12 S. E. 426 (1890).
24 See generally on this subject Kneier, Prosecution Under State Law and
Municipal Ordinance as Double Jeopardy, 16 CoRN. L. Q. 201 (1931) ; 2 DILLON,
op. cit. supra §633.
213 McQuILLIN, op. cit. supra §924, n. 25.
262 DILLON, op. cit. supra §632.
2 Standard Chemical Oil Co. v. Troy, 201 Ala. 89, 77 So. 383 (1917)
(privilege tax) ; Dorsa v. Board of Supervisors of Santa Clara County, 23 Cal. App.
2d 217, 72 Pac. 2d 912 (1937) (hours for retailing meat); Lamar & Smith v.
Stroud, 5 S. W. 2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (street crossings); Brittingham
& Hixon Lumber Co. v. Sparta, 157 Wis. 345, 147 N. W. 635 (1914) (weighing
coal).
28 McRea v. The Mayor, 59 Ga. 168, 170, 27 Am. Rep. 390 (1877),
263 McQuLLIN, op. cit. supra §924, n. 20; Town of Neola v. Reichart, 131
Iowa 492, 498, 109 N. W. 5, 7 (1906).
"6Ex parte Yong Shin, 98 Cal. 681, 33 Pac. 799 (1893) ; Spitler v. Town of
Munster, 214 Ind. 75, 14 N. E. 2d 579 (1935); Olson v. City of Platteville, 213
Wis. 344, 251 N. W. 245 (1933).
"1See Polinsky v. People, 73 N. Y. 65, 71 (1878).
62 Kansas City v. Henre, 96 Kan. 794, 153 Pac. 548 (1915).
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grant of power is even held to be sufficient authority to permit cities
to prohibit entirely within their borders acts and occupations which are
regulated or licensed by the state. 33 North Carolina will not go this
far.34 However, North Carolina towns may prohibit lesser degrees of
offenses punished by the state, such as acts of disorderly conduct which
from the evidence do not amount to an indictable assault" or nuisance. 0
Also the city and state may act upon different persons in order to
achieve the same end. Thus an ordinance forbidding an unmarried
minor to enter a barroom has been held valid as properly supplementing
37
a state law which prohibited the sale of intoxicants to such minor.
ORDINANCES PURPORTING TO OPERATE IN A FIELD PREEMPTED
BY THE STATE

Not all ordinances which attempt to supplement the state law are
upheld. If the court feels that a given field will be better regulated if
left in the exclusive control of the state, an ordinance on the subject
will be held void, though it may be less extensive than or go beyond
existing statutory regulation. Before the days of prohibition the sale
of liquor was considered to be such a field in North Carolina. In State
v. Langstonas the court considered an ordinance forbidding any person,
"having license," to sell spiritous liquors on the Sabbath, and a statute
making it a misdemeanor to sell intoxicating liquors on Sunday. The
ordinance was held to be beyond the authority conferred by a general
grant of power to make by-laws. "This statute, more comprehensive
in its scope than the ordinance, embracing as well those who have not
as those who have, license to sell, . .. must supersede the latter."3 9
In State v. Dannenberg0 it was the ordinance which had the broader
scope. It prohibited the sale of malt liquors containing one-half of one
per cent alcohol or more; the state prohibited the sale of all intoxicating
liquors in the same county. The defendant was convicted under the
ordinance for selling a malt drink containing over one-half of one per
cent of alcohol, but admitted not to be intoxicating. This ordinance
was held void and the judgment reversed. In answer to the contention
" Mitchell v.City of Birmingham, 222 Ala. 389, 133 So. 13 (1931) (fortune
telling) ; Elsner Bros. v. Hawkins, 113 Va. 47, 73 S. E. 479 (1912) (sale of
deadly weapons inpawn shops); Fox v.City of Racine, 225 Wis. 542, 275 N. W.
513 (1937) (walkathons).
.' State v.Brittain, 89 N. C.574 (1883) : accord, National Amusement Co. v.
Johnson, 270 Mich. 613, 259 N. W. 342 (1935).
asState v.Taylor, 133 N. C.755, 46 S.E.5 (1903).
SoState v.Sherrard, 117 N. C.717, 23 S.E. 157 (1895).
"TState v.Austin, 114 N. C.855, 19 S.E. 919 (1894).

3888 N.C.692 (1883).
"Id. at 693. Itcan hardly be imagined that by prohibiting sales by one "having license" itwas intended to authorize sales without a license. Therefore, the
ordinance was probably meant to be equally as comprehensive as the statute.
"0150 N. C. 799, 63 S. E. 946 (1909).
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of the attorney-general that this drink fell within a "twilight zone" outside the statutory prohibition the court said "We are of opinion that
the entire zone has been preempted by the statutes of the state and that
there is no territory open to entry. '41 California has also applied this
"preempting the field" doctrine. In a case very similar on its factsthe ordinance was aimed at liquor with one-third of one per cent alcohol
content; the statutory standard was one-half-the court pointed out the
difficulty of enforcing liquor prohibition laws if liability is made to depend on whether a particular liquor is intoxicating. Therefore it. was
thought that the state might sometime see fit to prohibit beverages which
were near-intoxicants and so intended to occupy that entire domain of
prohibitory legislation.

42

It is sometimes said that whether the state intends to occupy an
entire field depends on whether the matter legislated upon is essentially
criminal in its nature or merely regulatory, and if the latter it is subject
to additional local regulation. 43 North Carolina, apparently, makes no
such distinction. Thus, where a statute requires one approaching any
intersection in an automobile to reduce his speed to not more than ten
miles per hour-not an "essentially criminal" matter-a city cannot
require him to stop altogether at certain named intersections. 4 4 A better
explanation would seem to be that the state is held to have preempted a
field in which local regulation might tend to impede enforcement of a
related state law.
ORDINANCES CONFLICTING WITH A COMMON RIGHT OR POLICY

When a particular ordinance is thought to be improper or ill-advised
and there is no statute on the same subject, it may be attacked and invalidated as in conflict with the common law, 45 or as contravening a
common right, 46 or as inconsistent with the state legislative policy.4 7
Thus in North Carolina it has been held that under the general grant of
authority of N. C. GEN. STAT. §160-52 (1943) a city could not legally
pass an ordinance forbidding an owner to remain in his barroom between ten o'clock P.M. and four o'clock A.M.', since it contravened the
"4
Id. at 802, 63 S. E. at 948.
"2 Ex parte Simmons, 71 Cal. App. 522, 235 Pac. 1029 (1925). This case is
an example of the interesting and apparently unique practice in California of
refusing to discharge a petitioner in habeas corpus, notwithstanding the invalidity
of the ordinance under which conviction was had, if the complaint, purporting to
charge a violation of the void ordinance, in fact charges an offense under the
state law.
2 DiU.ox, op. cit. supra §632; 15 CALiF. L. Ray. 345 (1926).
* State v. Stallings, 189 N. C. 104, 126 S.E. 187 (1924).
' See State v. Black, 150 N. C. 866, 867, 64 S. E. 778 (1909).
"2 DiLLox, op. cit. supra §§596, 597. Mr. Dillon leaves the point in some
doubt by saying "An ordinance cannot legally be made which contravenes a common right .... But there is, however, no common right to do that which, by a
valid law or ordinance is prohibited."
""2 id. §§601, 602; 2 MCQUILLIN, op. cit.. supra §685.
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common right of everyone to remain in his own house, whether dwelling
4
" the policy argument was
or place of business. 48 In State v. Darnell
used to invalidate an ordinance making it unlawful for Negroes to occupy
houses on streets dominantly white and vice versa. The court drew
an analogy to the "Irish Pale" and the "Russian Ghettoes," each resulting in the exodus of an oppressed people, and indulged in the far-fetched
reasoning that since this ordinance would tend to have the same effect
it was contrary to North Carolina policy as embodied in an old law requiring those who transported Negroes from the state to pay a license
fee. It is obvious that if the court had wished to uphold the ordinance
it could have gotten a truer picture of the North Carolina legislative
policy from public school and public vehicle segregation laws.
That infringement upon a common right is more a tool used to overthrow undesirable local regulations than an insurmountable obstacle to
their validity appears from the decisions which hold ordinances valid
without discussing this possible objection.50 Many such decisions would
pass unnoticed except for a dissenting opinion which relies on the common right argument. For example, a zoning ordinance prohibiting a
filling station within 150 feet of the graded school has been upheld, notwithstanding a dissenting opinion to the effect that it conflicted with
the principle that private property should not be taken for public purposes without adequate compensation, "a principle so grounded in natural
equity it has never been denied to be part of the law of North Carolina." 51 - In State v. Aulstin5 2 an ordinance excluding minors from barrooms was held valid and not inconsistent with the "law of the land,"
characterized as the statutory and common law of the state. Yet Mr.
Justice Avery, dissenting, contended that such ordinance was inconsistent with the common law since it abridged an infant's common law
right of unrestrained locomotion.
ORDINANCES EXCEEDING THE AUTHORITY OF THE MUNICIPALITY

The court sometimes preserves exclusive control of a subject in the
state by invalidating ordinances on the basis of a want of authority to
pass them in the local legislative body. This means may be adopted in
preference to straining to find an inconsistency with the general law."3
48 State v. Thomas, 118 N. C. 1221, 24 S. E. 535 (1896) ; accord, State v. Ray,
131 N. C. 814, 42 S. E. 960 (1902).
49 166 N. C. 300, 81 S. E. 338 (1914). Contra: Tyler v. Harmon, 158 La. 439,
104 So. 200 (1925).
" Lawrence v. Nissen, 173 N. C. 359, 91 S. E. 1036 (1917) (location of a
hospital) ; State v. Vanhook, 182 N. C. 831, 109 S. E. 65 (1921) (regulating dance
halls).
51
See Mr. Justice Clarkson, dissenting in Town of Ahoskie v. Moye, 200 N. C.

11, 15, 156 S.E.130, 132 (1930).

02114 N. C. 855, 19 S. E. 919 (1894).
" State v. Gulledge, 208 N. C. 204, 179 S. E. 883 (1935).

19491

NOTES AND COMMENTS

To support such a decision the court may rely upon Mr. Dillon's classification of the powers of a municipal corporation as only those expressly
granted, fairly implied, or essential to the declared purposes of the corporation.5 4 In these cases N. C. GEN. STAT. §160-52 (1943) is either
ignored 55 or declared not to confer the requisite authority,56 in the absence of an express grant. In other cases where it is sought to uphold
the ordinance, however, the enabling act may itself be considered an
57
express grant of authority to exercise the police power of the state.
It has been seen that the court adopts various arguments when it is
sought to overthrow a particular ordinance. However, when the local
legislation is thought to be well adapted to the accomplishment of a
desirable end, the same arguments will not be allowed to prevail against
its validity. An example is State v. Wilson.55 The ordinance in that
case prohibited any person from obstructing any water-way so that the
water should accumulate in any street of the city, even if the obstruction
be placed on the party's own property. The possibilities for the "common right" argument are apparent. Defendant, charged with a violation,
contended that the ordinance was void as creating an offense-public
nuisance-already punishable by the general laws of the state, relying
on Washington v. Hammond and State v. Langston. Indeed the warrant as originally drawn had expressly referred to the condition produced by defendant's act as a "nuisance." However, the Supreme Court
found the ordinance valid and within the legislative power of the city.
The court considered the purpose of the ordinance, to prevent nuisances
by going beyond and enlarging the protection ordinarily afforded by the
general law, consistent and complementary. On the other hand, not
even an express grant of power to makeregulations on a particular subject will save an ordinance if the court feels it would be a poor policy
to enlarge on the statutory requirements in that field. 9
The key to the problem of the validity of a particular municipal
regulation in North Carolina is the attitude which the Supreme Court
has taken toward other ordinances in the same field.
Zoning. This is a field apparently thought to be well suited to
municipal control. Zoning ordinances are frequently attacked as unreasonable, arbitrary, or discriminatory, 60 but the possibility of a conflict
" Id. at 207, 179 S. E. at 885; State v. Darnell, 166 N. C. 300, 301, 81 S. E.

338 (1914).

The cited section is 1 DILLON, op. cit. supra §237.

State v. Ray, 131 N. C. 814, 42 S. E. 960 (1902).
State v. Clay, 118 N. C. 1234, 24 S. E. 492 (1896); State v. Thomas, 118

N. C. 1221, 24 S. E. 535 (1896).

"See 131 N. C. 814, 819, 42 S. E. 960, 961 (1902).
B106 N. C. 718, 11 S. E. 254 (1890).
State v. Eubanks, 154 N. C. 628, 70 S. E. 466 (1911).
o Bizzell v. Board of Aldermen of the City of Goldsboro, 192 N. C. 348, 135
S. E. 50 (1926) ; State v. Tenant, 110 N. C. 609, 14 S. E. 387 (1892).
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with the general law is rarely considered.0 1
Disorderly conduct. North Carolina is definitely committed to the
view that acts of disorderly conduct are a proper subject for local regulation, though the same acts, if repeated, or in a greater degree, or in a
different place might amount to an indictable assault or nuisance under
the general law.62 Even an ordinance expressly declaring the prohibited
acts to be a nuisance has been upheld, nuisance at common law being
disinguished as necessarily involving a public place. The question of
conflict was not argued.

63

Sunday observance.64 Ordinances restricting hours of business generally are not condoned.P However, Sunday observance is apparently
considered a proper subject for municipal regulation in conjunction with
state action, since the ordinance renders the state policy againist pursuing ordinary business callings on Sunday more efficient. 06 An ordinance considered in State v. Medlin67 prohibited the keeping open of
any shop or store on Sunday except drug stores. The defendant contended that it was invalid on the ground that Rev. 2836, forbidding work
in ordinary callings on Sunday, had preempted the field. In order to
uphold the ordinance the court looked to decisions construing the statute
as confined in its operation to "manual, visible, or noisy labor" and
found neither conflict nor duplication. The court pointed out that public sentiment on the matter varies in different localities. Therefore,
power to make such local regulations is wisely vested in the towns by
N. C. GEN. STAT. §160-52 (1943) which takes notice of this diversity
of views. Only if the Sunday ordinance also involves an additional factor better left to state control, such as selling liquor, is an inconsistency
found.68
Gambling and prostitution. It might be thought that analogously
with the Sunday observance cases the court would treat with similar
liberality local regulation of other matters affecting the public morals
and decency. However, ordinances relating to gambling 0 and houses
"' Town of Ahoskie v. Moye, 200 N. C. 11, 156 S. E. 130 (1930) ; Lawrence v.

Nissen, 173 N. C. 359, 91 S. E. 1036 (1917); accord, Ex parte Lacey, 108 Cal.

362, 41 Pac. 411 (1895); see Shuford v. Town of Waynesville, 214 N. C. 135,
198 S. E. 585 (1938).
0" State v. Moore, 166 N. C. 371, 81 S. E. 693 (1914) ; State v. Sherrard, 117
N. C. 717, 23 S.E. 157 (1895); State v. Debnam, 98 N. C. 712, 3 S. E. 742
(1887) ; State v. Cainan, 94 N. C. 880 (1886). But cf. State v. Home, 115 N. C.
739, 20 S.E. 443 (1894).
"' State v. McNinch, 87 N. C. 567 (1882).
",Cases collected in note, 29 A. L. R. 397, 409 (1924).
"5State v. Ray, 131 N. C. 814, 42 S.E. 960 (1902) ; cf. State v. Thomas, 118
N. C. 1221, 24 S.E. 535 (1896).
" State v. Burbage, 172 N. C. 876, 89 S.E. 795 (1916).
.7 170 N. C. 682, 86 S. E. 597 (1915).
"State v. Langston, 88 N. C.692 (1883).
"State v. McCoy, 116 N. C. 1059, 21 S.E. 690 (1895).
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of prostitution" have been held void as unauthorized or not in harmony
with the state law. Perhaps it is felt that there is no room for a reasonable difference of opinion on such matters in different localities.
Intoxicating liquor. As has already been indicated 7' the sale of
liquor is a field said to have been preempted by the state. The cases are
practically unanimous in holding municipal regulation on the subject
unauthorized by N. C. GEN. STAT. §160-52 (1943) .72 The lone dissenting voice is that of Mr. justice Burwell speaking for the majority of
the court in the Austin case. In a well reasoned opinion he resisted
the "common right" and "preempt" arguments and looked to the purpose of the statute to prevent the sale of liquor to minors. The ordinance in the case was upheld as not inconsistent with but further
effectuating this purpose by forbidding such minors to enter barrooms
73
and thus preventing exposure to temptation.
Motor vehicles.74 In this field there is a lack of uniformity in the
decisions throughout the country. 75 The North Carolina position, however, is clearly opposed to local regulation.7" The court is not inclined
to state any reason for its holdings except that an ordinance must yield
to the state law. It may be that due to the mobility and great number
of automobiles, our court feels that control should be centralized and
uniform and not subject to local variations. It would seem, however,
that in the matter of speed and traffic regulations, at least, different local
situations would render uniform legislation unsatisfactory. The fact
that the legislature has provided certain limitations on speed and traffic
for the good of the state as a whole should "not prevent further restrictions by the city if the same are reasonable and are made necessary by
special conditions and circumstances that are plainly not considered by
7" State v. Webber, 107 N. C. 962, 12 S.E. 598 (1890) ; see State v. Black, 150
N. C.
866, 867, 64 S. E. 778 (1909).
1 See note 41 supra.
2

State v. Dannenberg, 150 N. C. 799, 63 S.E. 946 (1909) ; State v." Thomas,

118 N. C. 1221, 24 S. E. 535 (1896); State v. Brittain, 89 N. C. 524 (1883);
State v. Langston, 88 N. C. 692 (1883). But cf. State v. Stevens, 114 N. C. 873,
19 S. E. 861 (1894) (under express authority to tax the retailing of liquor a city
may punish selling without a city license, the ordinance providing that if the sale
be without a state license also, the seller be bound over to the Superior Court).
"2Cf. Ex parte Boswell, 86 Cal. 232, 233, 24 Pac. 1060 (1890): "It may be
said that one cannot well bet at a gambling game unless he is a visitor thereat."
" Cases collected in notes, 147 A. L. R. 522 (1943), 64 A. L. R. 993 (1929)
and 21 A. L. R_ 1186 (1922).
7 3 McQmuILIN, op. cit. supra §924, n. 27.
70 State v. Sasseen, 206 N. C. 644, 175 S. E. 142 (1934)
(requiring taxi cab
companies to file indemnity bonds with the city) ; State v. Gulledge, 208 N. C.
204, 179 S. E. 883 (1935). Contra: Willis v. City of Fort Smith, 121 Ark. 606,
182 S. W. 275 (1916); City of Dallas v. Gill (Tex. Civ. App.), 199 S. W. 1144
(1918); Ex parte Dicky, 76 W. Va. 576, 85 S. E. 781 (1915).
See notes, 13
N. C. L. REV. 222 (1935) and 14 N. C. L. Rav. 104 (1935) criticizing Sasseen and
Gulledge cases, respectively.
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the legislature." 77 On the contrary it seems that additional local regulation is necessary in order to afford equal protection to the people of
congested areas. As said by Mr. justice Cardozo in reversing a
lower New York court which had held a local speed regulation invalid
as in conflict with the state law: "We think the power of the local
authorities has been too narrowly construed. A speed that is safe in
the open country may be dangerous in cities and villages. The purpose
of the Legislature, in its delegation of the ordinance power was not to
relax in such localities the rules of the road. It was to make them more
rigid. We should be slow to construe the statute as making excessive
speed a misdemeanor in districts where the danger is slight, and in
denying it a like quality where the danger is great. Its language does
78
not force us to a construction so unreasonable."
Such considerations will not prevail in North Carolina, however;
0
nor are they even discussed in the opinions. In State v. Stallings"
the
statute required everyone to reduce his speed to not more than ten miles
per hour when approaching any intersection. An ordinance requiring
automobiles to be stopped completely before entering certain named
streets was held void as depriving operators of their right to cross all
intersections at ten miles per hour. It seems likely, however, that the
legislature was probably less concerned with creating such a right than
with preventing accidents at street intersections.8 " The ordinance was
designed to achieve this same purpose by requiring more care at particular danger spots. Again in State v. Freshwater1 an ordinance
purporting to reduce the speed of motor vehicles below the maximum
fixed by the general assembly was tersely dismissed as "plainly in conflict" with the statute. But the two regulations were not necessarily
inconsistent in either language or policy. The statute merely provided
that a speed in excess of ten miles per hour anywhere in the business
portion of a city should be deemed a violation ;82 the ordinance further
reduced the permissible speed within designated "fire limits." The reverse situation has been considered in some states and an ordinance
upheld which establishes a higher maximum speed limit than that provided by statute.8 3 There seems to be no North Carolina case in point,
but there is no reason to believe that our court would view this situation
in any more favorable light.
Christensen v. Tate, 87 Neb. 848, 853, 128 N. W. 622, 624 (1910).
Chapman v. Selover, 225 N. Y. 417, 420, 122 N. E. 206 (1919).
189 N. C. 104, 126 S. E. 187 (1924). Contra: Lamar & Smith v. Stroud
(Tex. Civ. App.), 5 S. W. 2d 824 (1928); cf. Mann v. Scott, 180 Cal. 550, 182

Pac. 281 (1919).
" But see Schneiderman

v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 86, 167 N. E. 158, 160
(1929),
82
1183 N. C.762, 111 S.E. 161 (1922).
N. C.C. S.§2618 (1922).
"'Exparte Snowden, 12 Cal. App. 521, 107 Pac. 724 (1910).
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North Carolina's strict attitude toward municipal regulation of automobiles has been embodied in the Motor Vehicle Act as N. C. GEN.
STAT. §20-19 (1943) : "Local authorities, except as expressly authorized
.. . shall have no power or authority to alter any speed limitations
declared in this article or to enact or enforce any rule or regulations
contrary to the provisions of this article." 8 4 This statute and its predecessors in content may, indeed, account for the position taken by the
Supreme Court. However, the court in the Freshwater case construed a
former statute (N. C. C. S. §2601 (1922)) prohibiting ordinances contrary to the provisions of the chapter on motor vehicles, and said that
the same result would follow without regard to the statutory inhibition.
. Summary and conclusion. Ordinances are not permitted either to
contradict or duplicate a state law in express terms. Where there is
room for the court to go either way on the question of inconsistency
the test should be the purpose behind the general law and how best to
achieve the most effective regulation. The North Carolina decisions for
the most part seem to give effect to this practical side of the problem.
In the written opinions, however, the main issue is too often obscured
by talk about "preempting the field," "lack of authority," and "conflict."
JAMES T. PRITCHETT, JR.
Railroads-Right-of-Way-Statutory Limitation Barring
Recovery Therefor
In a recent North Carolina case,' the plaintiff railroad sought an
injunction to require defendant to allow additional tracks to be built
parallel to and within fifty feet of the original track. The charter of
the railroad gave it the right to take land of "not more than one hundred feet from the center of tlae road ' 2 by condemnation proceedings,
and in 1884 the railroad had entered and laid its track on the original
roadbed without bringing condemnation proceedings and without any
conveyance from the owner. The defendant, or his predecessors in
title, has been in possession of the land adjoining the roadbed ever since
it was built and is the owner of the fee. In this case no action for
compensation has ever been brought against the railroad. N. C. GEN.
STAT. §1-51(1) bars any suit against a railroad for compensation for
land taken unless brought within five years after the land has been
"See City of Fremont v. Keating, 96 Ohio St. 468, 118 N. E. 114 (1917)
holding a similar statute unconstitutional as violating OHIo CoNsT. Art. XVIII
§3 giving municipalities authority to adopt police regulations not in conflict with
the general laws.
,
'Carolina & N. W. Ry. v. Piedmont Wagon & Mfg. Co., 229 N. C. 695 51
S. E. 2d 301 (1949).
IN. C. Pub. Laws 1871-2, c. 130, §7.
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entered or within two years after the road is in operation. The court
held that this statute entitled the plaintiff, upon passage of the statutory
time without action by the owner, to a right-of-way of the maximum
width which its charter allowed it to condemn.3
It was early decided in North Carolina that a railroad could enter
upon land and build its road without bringing condemnation proceedings. 4 When a railroad does thus enter and build its road, the owner
cannot bring an action of ejectment or trespass, but can only bring the
statutory action for compensation for the land taken.5 In this proceeding either party may request that the width of the right-of-way to be
acquired and paid for by the railroad be limited, 6 but unless this is
done the railroad acquires a right-of-way of the maximum width allowed
to be condemned by its charter 7 or by the general law if the charter is
silent as to width.8
Many charters9 after giving the railroad the right to condemn land
for railroad purposes, provide that in the absence of a contract with
the owner it shall be presumed that the land on which the road is constructed and 100 feet on either side has been granted to the railroad by
the owner. The owner is given two years to bring an action to have
his damages assessed and if not brought within that time his action is
'Under the wording of the statute it is possible that a right-of-way of 100
feet on either side of the road was acquired, but, for the purposes of this suit, the
plaintiff only contended for a right-of-way of 50 feet on either side.
'Raleigh & Gaston R. R. v. Davis, 19 N. C. 451 (1837); McIntire v. Western
N. C. R. R., 67 N. C. 278 (1872) (at page 280 the court says that the railroad
"is not obliged to know that the owner claims damages, until he claims them in
the 3mode provided.")
Dargan v. Carolina Central R. R., 131 N. C_. 623, 42 S. E. 979 (1902); Holloway v. University R. R., 85 N. C. 452 (1881); McIntire v. Western N. C.
R. R., 67 N. C. 278 (1872) ; see Carolina Central R. R. v. MeCaskill, 94 N. C. 746,
751 (1886).
'See Beal v. Durham & Charlotte R. R., 136 N. C. 298, 300, 48 S. E. 674
(1904) ; Hickory v. Southern Ry., 137 N. C. 189, 199, 49 S. E. 202, 204 (1904).
'Beal v. Durham & Charlotte R. R., 136 N. C. 298, 48 S. E. 674 (1904) ; cf.
Liverman v. Roanoke & T. R. R. R., 114 N. C. 692, 19 S. E. 64 (1894) (here the
charter was similar to that of the instant case and the plaintiff landowner was
allowed to recover only for the value of the land "taken and occupied" plus the
damage to the other land. However, the judgment of the trial court gave the
railroad a right-of-way "as allowed by its charter"); Hanes v. North Carolina
R. R., 109 N. C. 490, 13 S. E. 896 (1891) ; see Tighe v. Seaboard A. L. R. R., 176
N. C. 239, 244, 97 S. E. 164, 166 (1918).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §40-29(1) (1943) ("The width of the land condemned for
any railroad shall not be less than eighty feet nor more than one hundred
feet...

.").

If the charter prescribes no maximum or minimum width then this

section applies; see Griffith v. Southern Ry., 191 N. C. 84, 88, 131 S. E. 413, 415
(1926); Tighe v. Seaboard A. L. R. R., 176 N. C. 239, 244, 97 S. E. 164, 166
(1918). But cf. Dowling v. Southern Ry., 194 N. C. 488, 140 S. E. 213 (1927)
(statute not applicable because charter of railroad restricted right of way to only
so much
as was "wanted or necessary").
9
E.g., N. C. Pub. Laws 1848-9, c. 82 (North Carolina R. R.); N. C. Pub.
Laws 1872-3, c. 75 (Carolina Central R. R.); N. C. Priv. Laws 1862-3, c. 26
(Chatham R. R.); N. C. Priv. Laws 1854-5, c. 225 (Wilmington, Charlotte &
Rutherford R R.) ; N. C. Priv. Laws 1854-5, c. 228 (Western N. C. R. R.).
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barred. It has long been settled that the railroads with this type of
charter acquire a right-of-way of 200 feet by statutory presumption
merely by entering and building its road plus two years lapse of time
without action by the owner.' 0
However, many railroad charters contain no such two-year bar."
These charters contain a specified maximum width which it may condemn or, if silent, are governed by N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-29 allowing
the railroad to condemn a maximum of 100 feet. In 1890 it was held
that if a railroad with this type of charter entered upon land and built
its road the owner was not barred by the three-year statute of limitations on actions created by statute. 12 N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-51 was
passed in 1893 placing a limitation on the owner's action; and the instant
case is the first to hold that a railroad with this type of charter, by
virtue of this statute, acquires a right-of-way of the maximum width
which it could condemn rather than merely a right-of-way over the land
14
actually occupied,'3 though previous decisions had indicated this result.
10 Southern Ry. v. Lissenbee, 219 N. C. 318, 13 S. E. 2d 561 (1941) ; Earnhardt
v. Southern Ry., 157 N. C. 385, 72 S. E. 1056 (1911) ; Seaboard A. L. R. R. v.

Olive, 142 N. C. 257, 55 S. E. 263 (1906) ; Dargan v. Carolina Central R. R., 131
N. C. 623, 42 S. E. 979 (1902); Carolina Central R. R. v. McCaskill, 94 N. C.
746 (1886); Vinson v. North Carolina R. R., 74 N. C. 510 (1876); Norfolk
Southern R. R. v. Stricklin, 264 F. 546 (E. D. N. C. 1920); cf. Atlantic &
N. C. R. R. v. New Bern, 147 N. C. 176, 50 S. E. 925 (1908).
The statutory presumption applies only to the owner across whose land the
road was built and not to an owner of adjoining land within the 100 foot limit.
Wearn v. North Carolina R. R., 191 N. C. 575, 132 S. E. 576 (1926).
" E.g., N. C. Priv. Laws 1893, c. 185 (Durham & Charlotte R. R.); N. C.
Pub. Laws 1870-1, c. 172 (Kinston & Kenansville R. R.); N. C. Pub. Laws
1868-9, c. 226 (Scotland Neck & Weldon R. R.) ; N. C. Priv. Laws 1858-9, c. 163
(Washington & Leaksville R. R.); N. C. Pub. Laws 1835, c. 25 (Raleigh & Gaston R. R.).
J"Land v. Wilmington & Weldon R. R., 107 N. C. 72, 12 S. E. 125 (1890)
(the court held that CODE §155(2) (1883), now N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-52(2) (1943),
was not applicable because the action was created by the Constitution and only
regulated by statute).
1" Though the railroad has a wider right-of-way, it is entitled to use only so
much as is needed for railroad purposes. The rest may be used by the owner in
any manner which does not interfere with the railroad's use. Hodges v. Atlantic
C. L. R. R., 196 N. C. 66, 144 S. E. 528 (1928) ; Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Bunting,
168 N. C. 579, 84 S. E. 1009 (1915); Coit v. Owenby-Wefford Co., 166 N. C.
136, 81 S. E. 1067 (1914); Raleigh & A. A. L. R. R. v. Sturgeon, 120 N. C. 225,
26 S. E. 779 (1897); Ward v. Wilmington & Weldon R. R., 109 N. C. 358, 13
S. E. 926 (1891).
1, Griffith v. Southern Ry., 191 N. C. 84, 131 S. E. 413 (1926)
(The railroad
entered and built more than 5 years before this action without bringing condemnation proceedings. Its charter gave it only such rights as it had in Tennessee
and there its charter gave it the right to condemn so much as "may be necessary
for the said road." The court said that N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-29(1) 1943 (see
note 8 supra) would apply giving the railroad 100 feet except that it would not
apply in Tennessee.); Narron v. Wilmington & Weldon R. R., 122 N. C. 856, 29
S. E. 256 (1897) (The railroad entered and built more than 5 years before this
action. Its charter gave it the right to condemn 130 feet. The lower court held
that it had a right-of-way of 130 feet. The Supreme Court reversed, saying
that N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-51 (1) would bar the owner's action for damages, except
that, at that time, the statute exempted railroads chartered before 1868 and this
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The result of the instant case and the similar cases involving railroads with charters containing the two-year bar' 5 seems unduly harsh on
the landowner. For an understanding of why the legislature and the
court have so favored the railroad in acquiring its right-of-way, it is
necessary to look to the history and development of the railroad industry."' During the years 1830-1900 when most of the charters were
granted and the roads built, the population was sparse, land cheap, and
railroads greatly in demand. To induce investment of capital and construction of railroads the legislature granted the companies large privileges.1 7 It was with this in mind that the legislature granted charters
containing the two-year bar and passed N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-51. As
stated by the North Carolina Supreme Court, "when the road has been
constructed and the benefits enjoyed, although new and unexpected conditions have arisen, the rights granted may not be withdrawn, although
the long-deferred assertion of their full extent may work hardships."18
WILLIAm T. JOYNER, JR.
Taxation-Duplication-North Carolina Policy Against
Double taxation, as that term is used by the courts, denotes two
distinct concepts, and an understanding of the distinction between them
is necessary to comprehend the nature of the problems arising on the
subject. To constitute true double taxation two or more taxes must be
imposed on the same property by the same governmental unit, during
the same taxing period, and for the same purpose.' Taxation by two
or more governmental units of the same income to the same person does
railroad was chartered before 1868.); see Tighe v. Seaboard A. L. R. R., 176
N. C. 239, 244, 97 S. E. 164, 167 (1918).

Similar cases involving the width of a right-of-way have arisen where the
owner has given the railroad a deed containing an indefinite description as to the
width of the right-of-way. In these cases the rule is that the deed conveys the
maximum width which the railroad would be allowed to condemn. Seaboard A. L.
R. R. v. Olive, 142 N. C. 257, 55 S. E. 263 (1906); Hendrix v. Southern Ry.,
162 N. C. 9, 77 S.E. 1001 (1913) ; Heaton v. Kilpatrick, 195 N. C. 708, 143 S.E.
644 (1928). For cases recognizing the rule, but holding that the deed restricted
the width see, Wearn v. North Carolina R. R., 191 N. C. 575, 132 S. E. 576
(1926) ; Tighe v. Seaboard A. L. R. R., 176 N. C. 239, 97 S.E. 164 (1918).
'
16

17

See note 10 supra.
See CONNOR's HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA, Chap. 28, The Railroad Era.
See Seaboard A. L. R. R. v. Olive, 142 N. C. 257, 273, 55 S. E. 263, 269

(1906).

18 Seaboard A. L. R. R. v. Olive, 142 N. C. 257, 274, 55 S. E. 263, 269 (1906).
See Parks v. Southern Ry., 143 N. C. 289, 297, 55 S. E. 701, 704 (1906) where
the court, after commenting on the policy of the state when the railroads were
being built, said, "Conditions have changed, lands have increased in value and
rights deemed of little value when the roads were built have become of importance.
The courts, while endeavoring to have the law work out substantial justice, cannot change their decisions to meet these conditions."

' COOLEY, TAXATION §223 (4th ed. 1924) ; 61 C. J., Taxation §69.
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not fall within the strict definition, since the tax by another unit is not
a tax for the purposes of the unit whose tax is objected to. 2 However,
the latter situation is sometimes referred to as double taxation, and to
distinguish the two, it is frequently called "double taxation in the loose
sense." 3 Some courts speak of such taxation as duplicate taxation and
this use seems to make the distinction clear. Even using the term in
its strict sense, although universally condemned as contrary to the policy
4
of the law, such a tax is not prohibited by the Federal Constitution
5
nor by the state Constitution. It follows that "double taxation in its
loose sense" or duplicate taxation is not unconstitutional.
Constitutionally a state might levy a tax on the income of all residents irrespective of the source of this income. 6 It has also been held
within the power of the states to levy an income tax on all income
derived from property located in the state, as well as income from any
business, trade, or profession carried on therein.7 From these principles
it can readily be seen that when business interests transcend state lines,
a person can be subjected to a tax by two states with respect to the
same income.
The basic provisions of the income tax law of North Carolina make
full use of constitutional allowances, and thus would clearly lead to
excessive duplicate taxation." However, the legislature has seen fit to
9
modify these basic provisions, so that gross injustices will not arise.
-'Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576 (1914); Middlekauf v. Galloway, 163 Or.
671, 99 P. 2d 24 (1940); West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166
P. 2d 861 (1946), aff'd, 328 U. S.823 (1946) ; see also cases collected, 61 C. J.,
Taxation §73.
' 1 CoorY, op. cit. supra, note 1 §223.

But courts not uniform in use of

phraseology, see Vol. 13, WoRDs AND PHRASES, PERm. ED. "Double Taxation" and
"Duplicate Taxation" (1940).
'Illinois Central R. R. v. Minnesota, 309 U. S. 157 (1940) ; Baker v. Druesedow, 263 U. S. 137 (1923) ; Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37 (1920) ; see St. Louis
Southwestern Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 250, 267 (1914); Sabine v. Gill, 229
N. C. 599, 603, 51 S. E. 2d 1, 3 (1948) ; Kenilworth v. Hyder, 197 N. C. 85, 93,
147 S. E. 736, 740 (1929).
'Kenilworth v. Hyder, 197 N. C. 85, 147 S. E. 736 (1929); Person v. Watts,
184 N. C. 499, 115 S. E. 336 (1922) ; State v. Wheeler, 141 N. C. 773, 53 S. E.
358 (1906) ; Comm'rs of Durham County v. Blackwell Durham Tobacco Co., 116
N. C. 441, 21 S. E. 423 (1895).
' Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U. S. 19 (1938); New York ex rel.
Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308 (1937); Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286
U. S. 276 (1932) ; Note, 87 A. L. R. 380 (1933).
" International Harvester Co. v. Dep't of Taxation, 322 U. S. 435 (1944);
Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U. S. 60 (1920) ; Shaffer v. Carter, 252
U. S. 37 (1920) ; see McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 428 (1819); Note,
156 A. L. R. 1373 (1945).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-131 (1943) (Purpose of Article 4, Schedule D, chapter
105 is to impose tax on net income of every resident and of every non-resident
having a business or agency in this state or income from property owned, and
from every business, trade, profession or occupation carried on in this state.);
N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-133 (1943) (imposes tax in accord with purpose); 29
Ops. Att'y Gen. 192 (1947).
° N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-147(5) (1945 Supp.) (dividends from stock in a cor-
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The purpose of this note is to determine the extent of this modification. 10
When a resident of this state performs services or has income from
property in another state, North Carolina recognizes the right of the
state wherein the income is earned to levy a tax. If such state levies
a tax, this state does not impose a similar tax."1 But if the other state
does not tax the income thus earned, the person is required to pay a
tax thereon here.1 2 Non-residents who earn income from a business
or agency in this state or from a trade, profession, or occupation carried
on here, although taxable under the general rule, are given a credit
against such tax for any tax paid to their home state.' 3 However, this
policy is limited by a reciprocal provision, and in order for a non-resident
to be entitled to such credit he must be a resident of a state which
allows a similar credit to residents of this state, or which follows a
policy of exempting from taxation the income of non-residents earned
within the state.' 4 Therefore, (1) if the other state levies no income
tax or follows a policy similar to North Carolina, the individual is
required to pay a tax to only one state; (2) if the other state, while
having a reciprocal provision for non-residents, follows a policy of taxing its residents on their total income, the individual must pay only the
amount of the higher of the two taxes, although parts of that amount
may actually be paid to two states; but (3) if the other state does not
follow a relaxed tax policy, but taxes its residents on their entire income
and allows no reciprocal credit to residents of other states, the individual
must pay the full amount of the tax to both states, thus resulting in
duplicate taxation.
Generally, a partnership is not considered a separate taxable entity
and is required to file only an information return. 15 When all the partners are residents of North Carolina, the individual partners are required to report their share of the partnership income on their individual return.'0 But when one of the partners is a non-resident a
poration which has paid tax on income to state) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-147(10)
(1945 Supp.) (resident individuals having established business 'or investment in
real or tangible property in another state which is taxed by other state) ; N. C.
GEN. STAT. §105-151(1) (1943) (resident taxed by another state on income from
services performed therein) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-151(2) (1943) (credit allowed
non-resident taxpayer).
"0The scope of this note does not include double or duplicate taxation as it
may arise due to taxation other than income, nor to Federal Income Taxation, nor
to Federal and state taxation of corporations.
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-147(10) (b) (1945 Supp.) (property); N. C. GEN.
STAT. §105-151(1) (1943) (services).
"N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-147(10)(b) (1945 Supp.); cf. N. C. GEN. STAT.

§105-151(1) (1943).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-151(2) (1943); 29 Ops. Att'y Gen. 663 (1947); 26
Ops. Att'y Gen. 203 (1942) ; 25 Ops. Atey Gen. 118 (1939).
"N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-151(2) (1943) ; 29 Ops. Att'y Gen. 663 (1947).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-154(2) (1945 Supp.).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-142(3) (1943); see 29 Ops. Att'y Gen. 219 (1947).
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different rule applies. North Carolina requires the partnership to file a
17
return for this partner's distributive share and pay a tax thereon.
Although it is the partnership through its manager that must file the
return, the statute allows the amount of the tax paid to be deducted
from the non-resident's distributive share of the income. Logically it
would seem that since this tax is assessed on the individual basis the
non-resident, in accordance with the policy towards non-residents with
a business or agency in this state, ought to be allowed a credit. However, the statute in express terms excludes this possibility. Thus if
duplicate taxation is to be avoided, the state of the partner's residence
must make provision therefor. On the other hand where a partner
of a foreign partnership is a resident of this state, he is entitled to
deduct his distributive share of the income if the state wherein the
income was earned and the partnership located imposed a tax thereon.' 8
Insofar as resident partners are concerned North Carolina has eliminated duplication of taxes.
Trust relationships, although they give rise to several taxable entities, are usually taxed but once when both the trustee and beneficiary
are residents. 19 But when either the trustee or beneficiary is a nonresident and the other a resident, the problem of duplicate taxation again
arises.2 0 Here again the North Carolina policy seems to be to tax the
income but once. Thus if income, regardless of its source, is distributed to a resident beneficiary within the income year, he is taxed
thereon; but he is given the same credits and allowances as if the trustee
were not involved. 21 The tax policy towards him is the same as that
pointed out as applicable to individuals, and when income was earned
and taxed in another state, the same allowances are made. If the income is held by a non-resident trustee for the benefit of a resident
beneficiary, and is not distributed within the income year in which it
is earned, a tax is imposed on the trustee.22 But again such trustee is
entitled to all credits and allowances as if the income were earned by
an individual. When income is distributed to a non-resident beneficiary
by a resident trustee, taxation by North Carolina depends 'on the source
1
N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-142(3) (1943).
18 N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-47(10) (b) (1945 Supp.); 29 Ops. Att'y Gen. 219
(1947).
20 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§105-139, 142(4), (1943) ; Maxwell v. Waddell, 212 N. C.
572, 194 S. E. 315 (1937); 29 Ops. Att'y Gen. 662 (1947). If income is distributed within income year, taxable to beneficiaries; if not distributed, taxable
to fiduciary.
"0Instances arising when settlor may also be subject to tax, as in case of a
revocable trust, are not considered herein.
' N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-142(4) (1943); see Maxwell v. Waddell, 212 N. C.
572, 574, 194 S. E. 315, 317 (1937) ; 29 Ops. Att'y Gen. 662 (1947).
11 N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-139 (1943) (applies whether the fiduciary is resident
or non-resident and regardless of source of income).
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of the income. 23 If such income was earned in North Carolina a tax
is imposed, but against such tax a credit would be allowed as in the
case of other non-resident individuals earning income in this state. 24
Also if the undistributed income is held for the benefit of a nonresident no tax is imposed on the resident trustee when the income is
earned outside the state, but if it is earned in the state then there is a
tax.25 This practice is logically consistent since the income was earned
within the state, and although it might subsequently be taxed elsewhere,
such a tax would not be during the same taxing period.
The above policy toward trusts seems to be limited to the case in
which the trustee does not have active discretionary and investment
duties to perform. In a recent case before the North Carolina Supreme
Court, 26 income derived from a testamentary trust whose corpus consisted of an operating business in Virginia managed by trustees as partners was distributed, first, to the resident estate of the settlor, which
was managed by a co-trustee and executor, and then by such executor
to a resident beneficiary under the will. The income thus received was
taxed to the beneficiary. Payment was made under protest and it was
contended that the income so derived was deductible under the income
exemption statute, 2T since the tax had been paid thereon by the trustees
to the State of Virginia. Held, the estate and not the beneficiary has
the equitable interest in the business and therefore the beneficiary does
not come within the provisions of the statute. In the course of the
opinion the court distinguishes this situation from those in which the
trustee is a passive agent or conduit and is therefore sometimes disregarded in determining who has the real taxable interest. 28 The decision in this case, although justifiable on the wording of the statute,
does sanction duplicate taxation. Had the taxpayer been a partner in
the operation of the business, no tax would have been levied by this
state.29 Also had the income been non-distributable within the current
income year, the trustee and co-executor would not have been liable for
a tax to North Carolina.30 Yet when the income is distributable a tax is
"Sabine v. Gill, 229 N. C. 599, 51 S. E. 2d 1 (1948) ; 29 Ops. Att'y Gen. 111
(1946) (if earned within the state, taxable) ; 27 Ops. Att'y Gen. 112 (1942) (if
earned without, not taxable).
'IN.
C. GEN. STAT. §105-142(4) (1943) ; 29 Ops. Att'y Gen. 111 (1946).
2
N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-139 (1943).
20 Sabine v. Gill, 229 N. C. 599, 51 S. E. 2d 1 (1948).
27N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-147(10) (1943) "Resident individuals and domestic
corporations having an established business in another state, or investment in property in another state, may deduct the net income from such business or investment
if such business or investment is in a state that levies a tax upon such net income. . . ."). Subsequently amended, but no significant changes made. N. C.
Sess. L., c. 708, s. 4 (1945).
Ops. Att'y Gen. 662 (1947); cf. 27 Ops. Att'y Gen. 112 (1942).
2 See Note 18 supra.
'IN.

C. GEN. STAT. §105-139 (1943); N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-147(10)(b)

(1945 Supp.) ; 29 Ops. Att'y Gen. 219 (1947).
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imposed on the beneficiary. This result seems to be inconsistent with the
principles applicable in other cases.
Although the taxing of corporations is beyond the scope of this
note, it should be considered to some extent to give a complete picture
of the tax policy toward the individual. There is no question but that
a state has the power to tax a corporation on its net income since it is
a separate entity for the purposes of taxation, 31 yet the policy of North
Carolina in this respect is to tax the income of the corporation only
once. Thus when the income upon which a corporation has paid a tax
to the state is paid out in dividends to residents, the individual is not
required to pay a tax thereon. 32 The same is true of a foreign corporation which earns part of its income in this state. It pays the state
a tax on the proportionate part of its income earned here and its dividends paid to residents of the state are exempt from income tax to this
extent.3 3 However, this policy of exemption is not carried to the same
extent as that toward individually earned income. Thus income earned
within this state is taxed by other states when paid out in dividends to
residents of those states and likewise North Carolina taxes dividends
received by its residents from corporations which have paid taxes else-,
where, but not to this state. 34
North Carolina, through legislative enactment, has expressed a definite policy to avoid duplicate taxation. In almost every instance this
policy has been perfected. However, the decision in the Sabine case
clearly points out that here is a situation which is inconsistent. The
taxpayer in that case was a resident of this state and yet was required
to pay a tax when a similar tax had already been paid to another state.
In other cases of residents, whether it be one having property or performing services in another state, a partner in a foreign partnership,
or a beneficiary of a simple trust, duplicate taxation has been avoided
by this state. A modification in the terms of the applicable statute
could eliminate this single instance of duplication.
EMERY B.

DENNY, JR.

C. GEN. STAT. §§105-131, 134 (1943).
S2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-147(5) (1945 Supp.) ; 29 Ops. Att'y Gen. 662 (1947).
"IN.

A policy otherwise would be constitutional. Welch v. Henry, 305 U. S. 134
(1938).
C. GEN. STAT. §105-135 (1943); N. C. GEr. STAT. §105-147(5) (1945
3N.
Supp.).
11 N. C.

Supp.).

GEN. STAT.

§105-135 (1943); cf. N. C.

GEN. STAT.

§105-147(5) (1945
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Taxation-Ships, Boats and Watercraft-Application of
Mileage Apportionment Doctrine
Taxation of ships, boats, and various watercraft has had some rather
peculiar twists over the years. Steamships running between New York,
New Orleans, Galveston, and Havana were allowed to be taxed by the
state of Kentucky,' notwithstanding the fact that none had ever been
in the state, nor ever were likely to be. This result was accomplished
because none of the vessels had ever acquired a tax situs elsewhere,
and Kentucky was the domicil of the owner. This has been the general
rule, with the exception being the case where a vessel engaged in interstate commerce had acquired an actual situs in a state other than the
place of the domicil of the owner ;2 and in order to have acquired a new
tax situs other than the domicil of the owner, the vessels must have
spent their time wholly within the new jurisdiction. 3 The rule, with
the exception, has been applied to vessels trading in interstate4 commerce
on the navigable rivers and waterways of the United States.
Recently a new tax pattern affecting transportation on inland waterways was enunciated. The United States Supreme Court has decided
that the principle of mileage apportionment heretofore used in taxing
railroads or railroad cars 5 and telephone, telegraph and express companies6 may be used to tax watercraft engaged in transportation on
inland waters.

7

The state of Louisiana and the city of New Orleans levied ad valorem
taxes on tugs and barges belonging to foreign corporations engaged in
carrying freight up and down the Mississippi and Ohio rivers, stopping
only for unloading, reloading, and necessary repairs in New Orleans.
Of the total time spent in interstate commerce for preceding years the
amount spent by these vessels in Louisiana ranged from 2.2% to a
maximum of 17.5%. The tax was apportioned on the ratio between
the total number of miles of the corporations' lines in Louisiana to the
total number of miles of the entire line. The Supreme Court reversed
decisions of the district court s and the circuit court of appeals0 whose
ISouthern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63 (1911).
'Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409 (1905).
'Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299 (1905).
'Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409 (1905).
'Pullman's Palace-Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 (1890) ; Pittsburgh
C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421 (1893). In addition to the mileage
apportionment doctrine, the Supreme Court has held that railroad cars may be
taxed according to the average number of cars which are found to be physically
present within a state. Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U. S. 158
(1943).
'Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194 (1896).
'Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line, 69 S. Ct. 432 (1949).
'American Barge Line v. Cave, 69 F. Supp. 30 (E. D. La. 1946).
'Ott v. De Bardeleben Coal Corp., 166 F. 2d 509 (C. C. A. 5th 1948).
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decisions that the tax was invalid under the due process clause of the
14th amendment were based upon the finding that the taxed boats and
barges had never acquired a tax"situs in Louisiana.
The rulings of the lower courts are bolstered by the argument in
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota,'° where Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority said: "But the doctrine of apportionment has neither in theory nor in practice been applied to tax units of
interstate commerce visiting for fractional periods of the taxing year....
The continuous protection by a state other than the domiciliary statethat is, protection throughout the tax year-has furnished the constitutional basis for tax apportionment in these interstate commerce situations,
and it is on that basis that the tax laws have been framed and
administered."
The Supreme Court in the principal case distinguished the cases
stating the general rule, saying the element of apportionment was not
involved or considered in those earlier cases.-' On the element of employment of the vessels in Louisiana for the whole of the taxable year,
the court said it would not stop to resolve the question, as the AttorneyGeneral for Louisiana stated in his brief that the Louisiana tax statute
was intended to cover and actually covered an average portion of property permanently within the state, and by permanently was meant
throughout the taxing year. Thus the decision overruled nothing, but
it certainly makes available a new tax formula whereby states along an
inland waterway may tax commerce which was heretofore taxable only
at the owner's domicil or at an actual tax situs.
The meaning of the language used by the court, "an average portion
of property permanently within the state," is not clear. It obviously
cannot mean that in order for Louisiana to tax a tug or barge, that the
tug or barge must be at all times within the borders of Louisiana. If
a tug or barge remains in Louisiana throughout the taxing year, no2
problem arises, for automatically a tax situs in Louisiana is acquired,'
and the state of Louisiana has full taxing power.
If the language means that Louisiana must determine the average
number of vessels within the state in a given year, give that average
10322 U. S. 292, 297 (1943).

And again at page 298: "But no judicial restric-

tion has been applied against the domiciliary state except when property (or a

portion of fungible units) is permanently situated in a state other than the
domiciliary state, and permanently means continuously throughout the year, not a
fraction thereof, whether days or weeks. Such was the unanimous decision in the
Miller case (N. Y. Central & H. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 202 U. S. 584 (1906)) or

the Miller
case decided nothing."
1

" Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 17 How. 596 (1854); City of St. Louis v.
Wiggins Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423 (1870); Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471
(1872); Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U. S. 409 (1905); Southern
Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63 (1911).
'2 Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U. S. 299 (1905).
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number a valuation, and then superimpose the mileage apportionment
doctrine before determining the tax, the state is unduly restricted in
the assessment valuation. It is the view of the writer that if the words
of the court are construed literally, such an interpretation will result.
However, the probable meaning is otherwise, and if interpreted with
a common sense view, this decision permits a just apportionment of tax
among states affected by inland water transportation. The court was
not attempting to lay down any detailed formula for a tax system, but
only the broad principle that inland water vessels engaged in interstate
commerce may be taxed on the same basis as railroad cars.
The difficulty in applying this broad principle lies in the fact that
while railroads operate on daily schedules, sending a large number of
cars through a state on a day-to-day basis, tugs and barges are irregularly operated, and the number of units, if any at all, inside the borders
of any given state at a particular time will vary widely. Consequently,
the words continuous protection must either be omitted from expressions
of the constitutional basis for tax apportionment referring to inland
water commerce, or else be interpreted to mean continuous protection
to the right to carry on business within a state.
In working out a tax method which will fit within the framework
of this decision, one must consider first of all, that if vessels only incidentally and sporadically visit a port or ports within a state, that state
cannot'3 and should not tax such vessels. Assuming a degree of regularity and continuity of visits, what is an equitable tax basis which
allows a reasonable source of revenue to the state and which will not
be a burden on commerce because of a cumulative effect of several states
imposing such a tax? A logical and fair system, and one within a reasonable interpretation of this case, would be: (1) a determination of
the value of all tugs and barges belonging to a company doing a regular
business in a state, and then excepting from that valuation all tugs and
barges used exclusively outside the state; (2) apply to the remaining
valuation the fraction obtained by putting the total number of miles of
the company's lines within the state over the total number of miles of
the company's entire line;14 (3) apply the appropriate property tax
figure to the result.
For example, assume a company owns 20 tugs and 100 barges,
whose total value is $1,000,000. Ten tugs and 50 barges never enter
the state proposing to tax. If the tugs and barges never entering the
state were one-half of the total value, then the taxing state has left
$500,000 in step (1). If the tugs and barges run 100 miles into the
3

Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 17 How. 596 (1854).

" Or as an alternative, if the average number doctrine is used in a state as a

tax basis, the mileage apportionment should be omitted.
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state, and the total miles of their entire run is 500 miles, then a figure
of 100 over 500, or 1 over 5 is the figure for step (2). Applying onefifth to $500,000, the state has a valuation of $100,000 which it can tax.
If the tax rate is one dollar on $100 valuation, then the tax to be
assessed against the company results as $1,000 in step (3).
Since 1905, North Carolina has had a statute 15 providing for taxing
of canal and steamboat companies in the same manner as provided for
railroads, and so would seem to be in line with this latest decision of
the United States Supreme Court on the point. No cases seem to have
arisen under the North Carolina statute.
Only one North Carolina case dealing with the tax situs of boats
has been found. In Texas Co. v. Elizabeth City' boats were employed
by the Texas Co., a Delaware corporation, to haul oil products on North
Carolina rivers and sounds and into Virginia. Elizabeth City was allowed
by our court to levy an ad valorem tax on the boats on a finding by the
jury in the lower court that for tax purposes the situs of the boats was
in Elizabeth City. That this decision failed to square with prior federal
decisions is pointed out in a prior note in this REVIEW.' 7
BASIL SHERRILL.

Trusts-Chatritable Bequests-Application of Cy Pres Doctrine
The testator, Ackland, willed the bulk of his fortune to his executors
as trustees for the purpose of building and maintaining a memorial art
museum on the campus of Duke University. Duke declined the "benefits, burdens and responsibilities" of the trust and the heirs sued the
trustees, claiming the fortune resulted to them, but the trust was upheld
by the invocation of the cy pres doctrine.' The court ordered the trustees to investigate to see whether the University of North Carolina or
2
Rollins College or either of them should be selected as the new site.
The trustees, after two years of investigation, recommended North
Carolina because of its similarity to Duke in size, financial status, location, cultural influende, faculty and curricula. The trial court, however,
selected Rollins as the site because of evidence of its more prominent
art department and Rollins' contention that the University of North
11 N. C. GEN. STAT. §105-371 (1943).
18210
N. C. 454, 187 S. E. 551 (1936).
17.15 N. C. L. REv. 217 (1937).
1 Noel v. Olds, 138 F. 2d 581 (App. D. C. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U. S. 773
(1944). The court found that the testator's primary purpose was to benefit art
education in the South. The fact that a previous will had named Duke, University of North Carolina and Rollins, in that order, tended to show that he had no
special interest in Duke nor any intent to benefit it exclusively.
' See note 1 supra.
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Carolina had been eliminated from consideration by the testator.8' The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed 4 and awarded
the art gallery to North Carolina, holding that even if Rollins had a
better art department, this was irrelevant ;5that the contention that the
testator had excluded North Carolina from consideration was not well
founded;8 that the trustees' findings should have been binding on the
court;7 and that North Carolina more nearly met the test that "some
great university as nearly similar to Duke in all respects as could be
found" should be chosen.
The cy pres doctrine is "the principle that equity will make specific
a general intent of a settlor, and will, whefi an original specific intent
becomes impossible or impracticable of fulfillment, substitute another
plan of administration which is believed to approach the original scheme
as closely as possible. It is the theory that equity has the power to mould
the charitable trust to meet emergencies."
It is an intent-enforcing
doctrine; that is, to apply it the court must find that the testator would
not have intended the trust to fail because the mode of carrying it out
failed. If the testator intended to benefit only a particular institution
or purpose, then the doctrine is not applicable. Having determined that
the settlor had a more general charitable intent, the court must frame
a new scheme for giving effect to it. What should be the basis for this
selection? Scott states that the court in applying the doctrine should
look to what the settlor would have intended at the time he created the
trust, if he had known the particular purpose would fail.9 Rollins
' Rollins contended that it was the original choice but that testator was induced
by President Few of Duke to change his mind and name Duke instead. Rollins
further contended that testator's choice had been narrowed to these two schools,
and that North Carolina had been eliminated from consideration. See note 6 infra.
'Olds v. Rollins College, 173 F. 2d 639 (App. D. C. 1949); University of
North Carolina v. Rollins College, 173 F. 2d 639 (App. D. C. 1949).
"The testator did not compare the art facilities of Duke and Rollins, and
decide that Duke had the better of it. He based his choice on Duke's greater
financial strength, and the fact that its geographical area is better established as
one of extensive educational and cultural advantages. The consideration just mentioned make it, in our view, inapposite to compare the art departments of Rollins
and North Carolina. . . ." Id. at 643.
'The previous will of 1936 remained in effect until the one naming Duke was
executed in 1938; hence North Carolina legally remained testator's second choice
until he picked Duke, at which time he excluded North Carolina and Rollins at
the same time. Id. at 644.
' Ordinarily a master is appointed to frame a scheme for the court's consideration, but the trustees were appointed instead. A master's finding of fact is conclusive on the court; hence the District Court had to accept the findings of fact
and did so expressly. In holding that these facts did not control the basis of the
selection, the trial court in effect misapplied the cy pres doctrine.
82 BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §431 at 1287 (1935).
'3 Scowr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §399.2 (1939). This language which Rollins
cited does not appear in the author's section on framing a scheme, but on determining if a general charitable intent existed. Bogert in the section on framing a
scheme suggests looking to what the settlor would have intended but cites no
cases. 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 8, §441. The Restatement also uses intention

language.

RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS

§399, comment c (1935).
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strongly relied on this language, claiming that it was second choice and
testator would have picked it had he known that Duke would reject. On
the other hand, the University of North Carolina argued that in applying
cy pres the court should look to the specification of the settlor as expressed in the trust instrument and should approximate that choice as
nearly as possible. In practice, the court decisions have followed the
latter view ° and state statutes embodying cy pres have adopted it as
the basis for selection.'
No cy pres case has been found involving such
evidence of previous alternative choices as existed here.' 2 The courts,
having only the general intent of the settlor and his chosen mode of
effectuating that intent to guide them, have therefore approximated what
the settlor said, rather than presumed what he might have said. It
would seem that the principal case stands for the proposition that this
basis should be adhered to, in the absence of clear evidence that the
object most closely resembling the one stated would have been excluded.
It is well settled that if cy pres is applied, the court frames the
scheme, and although the trustees, attorney general or others may'make
recommendations, the court is not'bound to accept them.' 3 The doctrine
is not applicable at all if the trust instrument has special provisions
giving the trustees the power to select substitute schemes. The instant
case states that the court on previous appeal, Noel v. Olds,'4 had construed the will as having such provisions giving the trustees the right
to select a new site,' 5 and that therefore the lower court had no right
to reject their selection. This is clearly an error in the interpretation
of the language of the Noel case.' 0 Had the court so construed the
10 Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla. 782, 128 So. 258 (1930); Ford v. Thomas, 111
Ga. 493, 36 S.E. 841 (1900) ; Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 539, 580 (Mass. 1867)
("as near the testator's particular directions as possible . . ."); In re Williams'

Estate, 353 Pa. 638, 643, 46 A. 2d 237, 239 (1946) ; Philadelphia v. Girard's Heirs,
45 Pa. 9, 28 (1863) ("as close approximation to that scheme [settlor's] as reasonably practicable . . .") ; First Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Racine College, 225 Wis.

34, 272 N. W. 464 (1937).
"'GA. Crv. CODE §4604 (1926); Ford v. Thomas, supra note 10; Wis.

STAT.

§231.11 (1945).
12 Cf. Johnson v. Wagner, 219 N. C. 235, 13 S. E. 2d 419 (1941), notes 31-33

infra.
2

" E.g., Ford v. Thomas, 111 Ga. 493, 36 S.E. 841 (1900) (court rejected plan
proposed by trustee) ; 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 8, §435, §440 at 1335.
' 138 F. 2d 581 (App. D. C. 1943).
1 "We adhere to our decision in Noel v. Olds, where we construed the will as

envisaging the possibility of Duke's refusal, and as giving the trustees the right,
in that event, to select another site." Olds v. Rollins College, 173 F. 2d 639
(App. D. C. 1949).
1" That case relied on the provisions of the will giving the trustees discretion in
administration and also those directing them to carry out the trust according to

the spirit of his intentions, as a basis for finding that the testator had a general
intent, and would not have wanted his trust to fail. That case did state that "here
was prevision of the possibility which actually eventuated and provision for the
course to be followed by his trustees if it did." This language did not recognize
the right of the trustees to select the site, but only the duty to take such steps as
necessary to see that the trust was carried out, including the duty to apply to the
court for cy pres application. Noel v. Olds, 138 F. 2d 581, 588 (App. D. C. 1943).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

will, it could not have held that the case called for the cy pres power,
as that power would have been unnecessary. The instant case should
have decided only that the trial court judge misapplied the cy pres doctrine as a matter of law, or that he abused his discretion in not approxi7
mating testator's scheme as nearly as possible.1
Although the North Carolina court has stated that the doctrine is
contrary to the public policy of the state, in this case a former governor
of North Carolina' 8 and the attorney general, acting for a board of
trustees headed by the present governor of the state, argued for its
application so that the state university might benefit. It therefore seems
advisable to review the North Carolina cases and statutes and see if the
doctrine is iww unacceptable.
The cases in which cy pres has been discussed by American courts
fall into three broad classes. The first is that where a trust is set up
for indefinite objects, such as "to the poor." In England, cy pres was
applied if the trustee refused to act,19 but if he was willing to make the
selection he could do so and cy pres relief was unnecessary. So in
America, where such trusts have been held valid, the trustees have had
either the express or implied power of selection.20 In those states holding such trusts as invalid because too vague for enforcement, it has
been said that cy pres would not be applied to make the general intent
specific and thus save the trust.2 1 North Carolina now has a statute
validating such trusts and giving the trustees the power to select the
22
objects.
"7A cy pres case may be appealed on the grounds of the lower court's abuse
of discretion in applying the doctrine. Sherman v. Richmond Hose Co., 230 N. Y.
462, 473, 130 N. E. 613, 616 (1921).
18 The late 0. Max Gardner was the instigator of the University's application
to intervene, and his law firm handled the case to its conclusion without charge to
the University.
"92 BoGEr, op. cit. supra note 8, §432.
20 3 ScoTr, op. cit. supra note 9, §396. If the trust instrument doesn't expressly
state the trustees should select the objects, apparently they have the right to do
so as a part of the administration of the trust. Cy pres is not mentioned in such
cases. See State v. Gerard, 37 N. C. 210 (1842) (for the poor of B county);
State v. McGowen, 37 N. C. 9 (1841) (for the establishment of schools for the
poor of X county) ; Whitsett v. Clapp, 200 N. C. 647, 158 S.E. 183 (1931) (for
"keeping up preaching in weak churches").
212 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 8, at 1304. Where a trust is held void for indefiniteness, the court will not apply cy pres to save it. Holland v. Peck, 37 N. C.
255 (1842) ; Bridges v. Pleasants, 39 N. C. 26 (1845) ; Taylor v. American Bible
Society, 42 N. C. 201 (1851); Thomas v. Clay, 187 N. C. 778, 122 S. E. 852
(1924). The North Carolina courts have seemed to think this situation involved
prerogative power, rather than the judicial. Holland v. Peck, supra at 260; see
Griffin v. Graham, 8 N. C. 96, 134 (1820). But the prerogative power in England
was exercised only where the object was illegal, or there was a direct gift for
charity generally without a trust created. 3 Scorr, loc. cit. supra note 9. In Holland v. Peck, supra, a trust was set up. For an explanation of the judicial confusion in America, see Comment, A Revaluation of Cy Pres, 49 YALE L. J. 303
(1939) ; 32 GEo. L. J. 427 (1944).
2'"No gift, grant, bequest or devise whether in trust or otherwise, to religious,
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In the second class of cases the objects of the trust are definite, as
in the instant case the trust is for an art museum at a particular site.
The doctrine is invoked when it becomes impossible to carry out the
trust exactly as stated-the site becomes unavailable, the purpose becomes impossible or the beneficiaries no longer exist. The great majority
of states will apply cy pres in such cases and execute the trust "as near
as may be."2 3 Under this general class, four types of cases have arisen
in North Carolina. (1) Thus where there was a surplus of funds after
the trust was carried out, the court refused to apply the surplus cy pres
to similar objects. 24 (2) Where the purpose of the trust became impossible the court refused to save it by applying cy pres.2 5 In the next two
types North Carolina actually applied cy pres, at the same time repeating
the rejection of the doctrine. (3) Where there was a deficit of funds
making impossible the exact execution of the trust, the court nevertheless upheld the trust as near as possible, saying it was merely applying
the fund to the very purpose named as far as it would go. 26 Regardless
of the court's statement that this type case did not call for cy pres, it is
27
generally accepted that this situation is one application of the doctrine.
(4) The last case in this class involved a sale of the trust property.
Ordinarily, a court of equity can order such a sale as incident to jurisdiction over the administration of the charitable trust. It is said that
this does not involve cy pres power as long as the specific purpose of
the trust remains unchanged ;28 but the line between the two theories is
not well defined. A typical case is one in which a residence is devised
educational, charitable, or benevolent uses . . . shall be invalid by reason of any
indefiniteness or uncertainty of the objects or beneficiaries of such trust, or because said instrument confers upon the trustee or trustees discretionary powers
in the selection and designation of the objects.... " N. C. GEN. STAT. §36-21
(1943). N. C. GEN. STAT. §36-23.1 (1947 Cum. Supp.) broadens the scope of the
1925 statute. See 25 N. C. L. REv. 476 (1947) to the effect that the later statute
was passed to overrule Woodcock v. Wachovia Bank, 214 N. C. 224, 199 S. E.
20 (1938). That case held that the 1925 act did not validate a trust in which
trustees were to pay to any corporation which would best promote the cause of
preventing cruelty to animals, because it left control not only in the trustees, but
in the trustees' donee.
" 2 BoGERT, op. cit. supra note 8, §433.
" Trustees of Davidson College v. Chambers, 56 N. C. 253 (1857).
" cAuley v. Wilson, 16 N. C. 276 (1828) ; see 1 N. C. L. REv. 41 (1922).
' Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Ogburn, 181 N. C. 324, 107 S. E. 238 (1921);
Paine v. Forney, 128 N. C. 237, 38 S. E. 885 (1901); University of North Carolina v. Gatling, 81 N. C. 508 (1879).
' 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 8, §438; Jones' Unknown Heirs v. Dorchester,
224 S. W. 596 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
"' 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 8, §392; 3 ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 9, §381; 6
ALA. LAW. 17 (1945).
This principle should apply when a mortgage is allowed.
or a sale of property incidental to the purposes of the trust. Where the purpose
of the trust is closely connected with the use of some specific piece of property,
the sale does defeat the specific intent of the settlor but the proceeds are applied
cy pres. See ZOLLMANN, THE AmERICAN LAW OF CHARITIES §161 (1924), and
note 29 infra.
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to be used as a parsonage. The property is in disrepair; the court
orders a sale, the proceeds to be used to build another parsonage. Many
courts say this is applying cy pres because the specific intent (using the
original residence as the, parsonage) is not feasible, but the general
intent is carried out.29 North Carolina will order a sale, saying that
this does not call for cy pres power because the purpose of the trust is
not changed.30 Tf these North Carolina, cases are on the borderline, then
Johnson v. Wagner3l is undoubtedly a cy pres case, as the sale in that
case necessarily involved a change in the purpose of the trust. The
testator devised property to individual trustees to be used by the Baptist
Church for an assembly ground, but the church refused the benefits.
The court allowed a sale and authorized the trustees to use the proceeds
for other religious purposes. 32 Here the funds were not applied to
the original purpose of an assembly ground, but were applied in accordance with the testator's general charitable intention. The court, while
not specifically- mentioning cy pres, said, "The general intent of the
testator must prevail over the particular mode prescribed," citing Zollmann on Charitiesfrom the chapter on cy pres 133
The third class is that in which no trust is created; for example, a
2
In re Emlen's Estate, 57 Pa. D. &' C. 404 (1946) (T willed residence as
convalescent home for girls; court allowed sale, applied cy pres, proceeds to be
used for convalescing. girls). In two Rhode Island cases on practically identical
facts, one coUrt applied cy pres, the other expressly said it was not applying it.
Town of South Kingstown v. Wakefield Trust, 48 R. I. 27, 134 A. 815 (1926) ;
City of Newport v. Sisson, 51 R. I. 481, 155 A. 576 (1931). The former is cited
in the text of Scott as authority that this is not' cy pres;j it would seem that the
latter case at least impliedly overrules it. See 3 Scorr, op. cit. supra note 9, at
2046. Weeden Home v. Weeden's Heirs, 73 R. I. 22, 53 A. 2d 476 (1947) (cy
pres applicable). And the sale of realty held in trust is called the doctrine of
approximation in Alabama, and incorporated into statute. ALA. CODE ANN., tit. 58,
§57 (1940); Heustess v. Huntington College, 242 Ala. 272, 5 So. 2d 777 (1942)
see Thurlow v. Berry, 247 Ala. 631, 636, 25 So. 2d 726, 730 (1946) ("The distinction between that [approximation] and cy pres is sometimes shadowy.").
ZOLLMANN, loc. cit. supra note 28 ("The sale of property donated to charitable
purposes affords one of the best illustrations of the doctrine ....
The incidental
purpose of the donor that the particular real estate given by him be used as the
seat of the charity will be disregarded in order to carry out his primary purpose.
The proceeds realized must, of course, be reinvested in similar property for the
same uses and trusts, or at least must be used for the same purposes.") ; 2 BOGERT,
op cit. supra note 8, §437 at 1316.
3' Holton v. Elliott, 193 N. C. 708, 138 S. E. 3 (1927) ; Ex parte Wilds, 182
N. C. 705, 110 S. E. 57 (1921); Church v. Ange, 161 N. C. 314, 77 S. E. 239
(1913) ; accord, Page v. Covington, 187 N. C. 621, 122 S. E. 481 (1924).
219 N. C. 235, 13 S. E. 2d 419 (1941).
"A portion of the'residuary fund was to be used by the trustees for the
assembly ground or "For such other religious purposes as said Board of Trustees
may determine as worthy." Court found the general intent was to donate to
charity under the control of the religious organizations named. This case seems
to have gone farther than the cases it cites for authority. E.g., Church v. Ange,
161 N. C. 314, 77 S. E. 239 (1913) ; Holton v. Elliott, 193 N. C. 708, 138 S. E. 3
(1927).
3s219 N. C. 235, 239, 13 S. E. 2d 419, 422 (1941) citing ZOLLMANN, Op. Cit.
supra note 28, §137.
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testator bequeaths the residue of his estate directly "for charity" without
naming a trustee. In England the king exercised prerogative cy pres
34
power and picked a charity without regard to the testator's intent.
The abuses of this power resulted in the unpopularity of the judicial
cy pres doctrine in the early American decisions. 35 The American courts
now will not let the trust fail, but will appoint a trustee and allow him
to select the objects,3 6 and the North Carolina statute on charitable
trusts seems broad enough to allow this.3 7

If the testator makes a direct

bequest to a charitable organization which for some reason cannot take,
the courts will imply a trust for the corporate purposes38 and appoint
a new trustee. Some say they are applying cy pres;39 others say they
are proceeding on the theory that equity will not allow a trust to fail
for want of a trustee. 40 North Carolina has upheld such a gift by
appointing a new trustee on the latter theory.41
On analysis it may be seen that North Carolina, while refusing to
apply cy pres, has used various other methods to accomplish the same
result as is accomplished by that doctrine in other states. The decisions
have taken care to repeat such refusal, even in cases not concerned with
the doctrine. 42 In an early cy pres case, Holland v. Peck, the North
Carolina court assigned two reasons for this state's refusal to apply the
"In England two types of cy pres existed, and later both were exercised by the

chancellor: one, the prerogative, was exercised for the king; the other, judicial,
was an equitable doctrine. The American courts have felt they could exercise
only the judicial power; if a case would have called for the prerogative in England, the American courts would not apply the doctrine. These distinctions are
disappearing. See notes 21 supra and 49 .fra.
"See Klumpert v. Vrieland, 142 Iowa 434, 437-8, 121 N. W. 34, 35 (1909);
3 ScoTn, op. cit. supra note 9, §399.1..
" Klumpert v. Vrieland, supra note 35; Jordan's Estate, 329 Pa. 427, 197 At.
150 (1938); see RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §397, comment f (1935).
.1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §36-21 (1943); N. C. GEN. STAT. §36-23.1 (1947 Cum.
Supp.).
"Sherman v. Richmond Hose Co., 230 -N. Y. 462, 130 N. E. 613 (1921).
" Osgood v. Rogers, 186 Mass. 238, 71 N. E. 306 (1904) (court implied trust
and then applied cy pres to pick new trustee) ; Powers v. Home for Aged Women,
58 R. I. 323, 192 Atl. 770 (1937).
40 Sherman v. Richmond Hose Co., 230 N. Y. 462, 130 N. E. 613 (1921) ; In re
Clendenin's Estate, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 875 (Surr. Ct. 1939) ; In re Shand's Estate, 275
Pa. 77, 118 AtI. 623 (1922) ; In re Gilchrist's Estate, 50 Wy. 153, 58 P. 2d 431
(1936).
" Keith v. Scales, 124 N. C. 497, 32 S.E. 809 (1899) ; see Holland v. Peck, 37
N. C. 255, 258 (1842) (bequest to a church is charitable trust, and where trustee
cannot take, court will supply one; trust not upheld because purposes indefinite) ;
Lassiter v.Jones, 215 N. C. 298, 1 S.E. 2d 845 (1939) (to a lodge for use of an
Academy; lodge no longer existed, court appointed new trustee; ignored fact that
beneficiary had also ceased to exist).
" Lemmond v. Peoples, 41 N. C. 137 (1848) (private trust for certain slaves);
Faribault v. Taylor, 58 N. C. 219 (1859) (if G wants to remain with mother,
house should be enlarged-too indefinite to be a trust, and won't apply cy pres
to make it definite) ; Board of Education v. Wilson, 215 N. C. 216, 1 S.E. 2d 544
(1939) (town attempts to collect taxes to be refunded for school purposes; town
has no school and won't be allowed to use for something else, as this would
be cy pres).
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doctrine: (1) it is not the law in any of the other states; (2) to exercise
it would be to make a new will for the testator. 43 Cy pres is now
recognized in all but five states, 44 and in some of these, as in North
Carolina, the words and actions have not been consistent. 45 Moreover,
the application of the doctrine no more makes a will for the testator
than where he wills his property outright to one charitable organization
40
The only justifiable
and the court awards it to a similar organization.
of the
reason left for failure to adopt the doctrine is the precedent
47
earlier decisions, and the policy behind these has changed.
It would now be desirable for North Carolina to adopt cy pres by
incorporating the doctrine into a statute48 to cover any case in which it
might be applied, without regard to historical distinction or the resulting
49
judicial confusion.
KATHERINE S. WRIGHT.

Holland v. Peck, 37 N. C. 255, 261-62 (1842).
"Bogert listed seven stated in 1935, 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 8, §433.
Since then four of these have adopted the doctrine: Alabama, ALA. CODE ANN., tit.
47, §145 (1940); District of Columbia, Noel v. Olds, 138 F. 2d 581 (App. D. C.
1943); Kentucky, Citizens Fidelity Bank v. Berheim Foundation, 305 Ky. 802,

205 S. W. 2d 1003 (1947); Delaware, Delaware Trust Co. v. Graham, , 61 A. 2d 113 (1948). Also, Virginia incorporated the doctrine into
Dela. statute. VA. CoDE ANN. §587-a (Cum. Supp. 1946). This left North Carolina,
South Carolina and Tennessee. Arizona by dictum in In re Hayward's Estate, 65
Ariz. 228, 235, 178 P. 2d 547, 551 (1947) repudiated the doctrine. Mississippi
has the doctrine of approximation. National Bank of Greece v. Savarika, 167
Miss. 571, 148 So. 649 (1933).
" The Tennessee situation is much like the North Carolina law. Johnson v.
Johnson, 92 Tenn. 559, 23 S. W. 114 (1893) (if void for indefiniteness, cy pres
won't save) ; Milligan v. Greeneville College, 156 Tenn. 495, 2 S. W. 2d 90 (1928)
(if gift to charitable organization, treats as a trust) ; King College v. Anderson,
148 Tenn. 328, 255 S. W. 374 (1923) (changed site for college by sale-in effect
applied cy pres by "varying details of administration") ; Garner v. Home Bank &
Trust Co., 171 Tenn. 652, 107 S. W. 2d 223 (1937) (bequest to college lapsed;
court found no general intent; cy pres not mentioned) ; see 16 TENN. L. REv. 38
(1939). South Carolina has the "doctrine of liberal construction." This amounted
to cy pres in Mars v. Gilbert, 93 S. C. 455, 77 S. E. 131 (1913). See 2 BOGERT,
op. cit. supra note 8, §433. South Carolina still talks as if cy pres is prerogative;
see Porcher v. Cappelmann, 187 S. C. 491, 198 S. E. 8 (1938) ; City of Columbia
v. Monteith, 139 S. C. 262, 137 S. E. 727 (1927).
"See note 41 supra.
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state of North Carolina that
gifts, transfers, grants, bequests and devises for religious, educational, charitable
or benevolent uses or purposes . . . are and shall be valid, notwithstanding the
fact that any such gift . . . shall be in general terms, and this section shall be
construed liberally to effect the policy herein declared. . . ." N. C. GEN. STAT.
§36-23.1 (1947 Cum. Supp.). Thus the state has reversed its policy toward charities since McAuley v. Wilsm was decided in 1828.
"E.g., GA. Civ. CoDE §4604 (1926); MINN. (L. 1927, c. 180); Wis STAT.
§231.11 (1945). For other statutes see 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 8, §433 n. 40
and 2 BOGERT, op. cit. supra, §433 n. 40 (1948 Cum. Supp.).
4
'See 32 Gio. L. J. 425 at 432 criticizing the Noel case for distinguishing
judicial and prerogative cy pres, as these distinctions are disappearing in practice
and should in courts' language; Comment, A Revaluation of Cy Pres, 49 YALE
L J.303 at 308 (1939).
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Workmen's Compensation-Accidental Result-Sufficiency
for Recovery
A truck driver for the defendant ice cream company, while lifting a
100-pound table as usual to move it into position to load packages of
ice cream onto his truck, suffered a hernia and died after an operation.
Although the only unusual event was the injury itself, recovery was
awarded under the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act.1
The courts are in agreement that where an accidental means is followed by an accidental result compensation will be awarded ;2 but where
there is an accidental result alone, with no separate distinguishable accidental means, there is a diversity of opinion as to the compensability of
the injury.3
The majority decisions are to the effect that the injury itself should
be considered the compensable accident. 4 These decisions are based
upon the English case of Fenton v. Thorley,5 where the court adopted a
purely subjective test, holding that it is only necessary that the harm or
injury be unexpected. Most American courts say that this view effectuates the liberal construction of the act; and that where, as here, the
meaning isplain, the words "injury by accident" should be given their
popular and ordinary interpretationO including an injury which is itself
the accident without necessity for an unusual effort or strain. 7 "If a
'Derby v. Swift and Co., 49 S. E. 2d 417 (Va. 1948). The applicable statutes
are: VA. CODE ANN., §1887 (2d), "'Injury' and 'personal injury' shall mean only
injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment." As to
hernia: VA. CODE ANN., §1887 (2e), "That the hernia immediately followed an
accident." The comparable North Carolina statutes are N. C. GEN. STAT., §97-2(f)
and §97-2(r) (1943). The construction of "accident" in the personal injury and
hernia statutes is the same. Derby v. Swift and Co., supra; Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. v. Sprayberry, 195 Ga. 393, 24 S. E. 2d 315 (1943).
- Gabriel v. Town of Newton, 227 N. C. 314, 42 S.E. 2d 96 (1947) (police
officer, who arrested a violently resisting drunk weighing 180 pounds, had to carry
him up three flights of steps since the jail elevator was out of order and collapsed
at the top from dilation of the heart) ; Fields v. Tompkins-Johnston Plumbing Co.,
224 N. C. 841, 32 S.E. 2d 623 (1944) (work of caulking pipe joints with hot lead
increased the outside temperature of 104 degrees from /2 degree to 10 degrees
more. Held: this is "the straw that breaks the camel's back."); Moore v. Engineering and Sales Co., 214 N. C. 424, 199 S.E. 605 (1938) (had not lifted pipes
of this weight before) ; Bates v. Spruce Pine Store, 9615 (1941) N. C. W. C. A.
Ann. (1947), p. 25 (while cranking a tractor on a particularly cold morning claimant bursted a blood vessel) ; Crowell v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 9871 (1940)
N. C. W. C. A. Ann. (1947), p. 25 (lifted especially heavy weight).
4 SCHNEIDER, WORICMEN'S ComPENsATIo

LAW 384 (3rd ed. 1946).

' Ibid.
L. R. App. Cas. 443 (1903). Followed in Clover, Clayton and Co. v. Hughes,
1910 A. C. 242 (tightening nut in usual manner resulted in a ruptured blood vessel) ; and Walker v. Bairds and Dalmellington, Ltd., 153 L. T. 322 (1935). Note,
47 JURID. Ray. 418-9 (1935).

' E.g., Sloss-Sheffield Steel and Iron Co. v. Brown, 228 Ala. 460, 153 So. 642
(1934); Connelly v. Hunt Furniture Co., 240 N. Y. 83, 147 N. E. 366 (1925);
Giguere v. Whiting Co., 107 Vt. 151, 177 Atl. 313 (1935). See Conrad v. CookLewis Foundry Co., 198 N. C. 723, 153 S.E. 266 (1930).
"Duff Dotel Co. v. Ficara, 150 Fla. 442, 7 So. 2d 790 (1942) (usual lifting of
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workman's physical structure... gives way under the stress of his usual
labor, his death is an accident which arises out of his employment."
On the other hand, a minority of the courts say that this view would
make the act provide for insurance against disease and injury rather
than against accident.9 Those following this view, which England followed before Fenton v. Thorley,1° hold that it is not enough that the
result be unusual, unexpected, or unforeseen, but that the means also
must be accidental."1
The North Carolina decisions are not in accord among themselves
as to the proper interpretation to be accorded the act. 12
There is one line of decisions following the majority view. In
Smith v. Cabarrus Creamery Co.,13 where a milk deliveryman suffered a hernia while lifting a smaller ice box out of a larger one as he
"usually did every day," it was expressly held that an accidental result
alone is sufficient on which to base an award for compensation. Justice
Seawell there said that "If the influences, often complex and minute,
which bring it (an accident) about were capable of exact analysis, it
would lose its character as an accident."'1 4 There are dicta in other
opinions to support this view,"5 as well as at least two decisions of the
pot of meat); Brown v. Lumberman's Mut. Casualty Co., 49 Ga. App. 99, 174
S. E. 359 (1934) (stooped over to pick up a tool, knee injury, no slip or outside

physical force); Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. v. Sprayberry, 195 Ga. 393, 24
S. E. 2d 315 (1943) (no slipping or unusual lift) ; Roehl v. Graw, 161 Tenn. 461,
32 S. W. 2d 1049 (1930) (hernia from pushing concrete mixer as usual); McCormick Lumber Co. v. Department of Labor, 7 Wash. 2d 40, 108 P. 2d 807
(1941) (injured while cutting trees, no unusual effort or strain). For more cases
see Horovitz, Current Trends it Workmen's Compensation 12 L. Soc'y J. 499-501
(1947); HoaovrTz, INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS
88 (1944).
'Peterson v. Safeway Stores, 158 Kan. 271, 275, 146 P. 2d 657, 659 (1944)
(lifted freight caused acute coronary thrombosis). Accord: Carroll v. Industrial
Commission, 69 Colo. 473, 195 Pac. 1097 (1921) ; Brown's Case, 123 Me. 424, 123
Atl. 421 (1924) (shoveling snow from roof with dilation of heart resulting) ; Patrick v. Ham, 119 Me. 517, 111 AtI. 912 (1921) (lifting 100 pound sack of grain
as usual caused cerebral hemorrhage).
'State ex rel. Hussman-Ligonier Co. v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 319, 153 S. W. 2d
40 (1941) (suffered stroke when he picked up a 45 pound bucket of water).
"0L. R. App. Cas. 443 (1903). Bohlen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 25 HARv. L. REv. 328, 339 (1912).
" Pierce v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 42 Ariz. 436, 26 P. 2d 1017 (1933) ; Marlow
v. Huron Mountain Club, 271 Mich. 107, 260 N. W. 130 1935) (apoplexy from
lifting mail sacks as usual) ; Guthrie v. Detroit Shipbuilding Co., 200 Mich. 355,
167 N. W. 37 (1918); Gottfried v. State Industrial Comm'n, 168 Ore. 65, 120 P.
2d 970 (1942) (stooped over quickly to pick up a fallen bun, recovery denied).
2 See KEEcH, WORICMEN'S COMPENSATION IN NORTH CAROLINA, C. 2 (1942)
for a general legislative history of the Workmen's Compensation Act in North
Carolina.
12217 N. C. 468, 8 S. E. 2d 231 (1940).
Cf. Buchanan v. State Highway and
Public Works Comm'n, 217 N. C. 173, 7 S. E. 2d 382 (1940).
14 Smith case, supra, at 472, 8 S. E. 2d 231, 233.
15 Love v. Town of Lumberton, 215 N. C. 28, 30, 1 S. E.
2d 121, 122 (1939)
("the words 'undesigned' or 'unforeseen' refer to the result produced, and not to
its cause") ; Brown v. Aluminum Co., 224 N. C. 766, 767, 32 S. E. 2d 320, 322
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Industrial Commission.' 6 In an extensive concurring opinion in Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing Co.,' 7 Justice Seawell reiterates the same
views.
But there are also decisions pointing in the direction of the minority
holding. Compensation was denied in Slade v. Willis Hosiery Mills 8
where deceased, wearing special clothing in cleaning and scouring
machines, got wet, and being hot, died from pneumonia after going
outside to empty ashes. Chief Justice Stacy said that the conditions
were not unusal and unexpected and that the deceased was doing his
usual work in his usual and customary way. In Neely v. City of Statesville,"' where a fire chief died of a heart attack from the heat, smoke,
excitement, and physical exertion at a fire, Justice Winborne said that
since there must be an accident followed by an injury and since deceased
was doing his usual work in the expected surrounding conditions recovery should be denied. 20 The majority in Edwards v. Piedmont Publishing Co.2s apparently base their decision on similar grounds. The
22
Industrial Commission has also reached like results.
Since the employee is contributing as much to his employer's benefit
when he is injured while doing his usual work in the usual and ordinary
way as when he slips or lifis a heavy weight, there appears no good
reason why the court should not follow the majority view of the main
case. Further, there appears to be no clear line of demarcation between accidental means and accidental result, with cases probably being
decided against the injured because this distinction is not made. To
placate the fears of the minority that the majority view provides in(1944) (an accident is "an unlooked for and untoward event which is not expected
or designed by the person who suffers the injury"). Both these cases are distinguishable from the main case on the facts.
" Caple v. Woodal and Woodal, 8271 (1938) N. C. W. C. A. Ann. (1947),

p. 26 (head of biceps pulled loose from the shoulder when claimant lifted plaster

weighing 111 pounds in the ordinary manner); Newton v. Wilmington, 6615

(1937) N. C. W. C. A. Ann. (1947), p. 26 (officer in prior good health had a

heart attack while subduing a criminal, no showing of unusual exertion).
17227 N. C. 184, 41 S. E. 2d 592 (1947)
(employee had picked up a 40-50

pound plate and was turning in a twisting manner to hand it to another when he
ruptured a vertebral disc).
' 209 N. C. 823, 184 S. E. 844 (1936).
" 212 N. C. 365, 193 S. E. 664 (1937).
" In Smith v. Cabarrus Creamery Co., 217 N. C. 468, 8 S. E. 2d 231 (1940),
Justice Seawell makes an attempt, apparently futile, to distinguish that case from
the Slade and Neely cases by saying that in the two latter cases the injuries were
a natural and probable result of the work being done.
227 N. C. 184, 41 S. E. 2d 592 (1947) (Justice Seawell concurring, said the

facts showed claimant was doing his usual work in the usual way, yet compensation should be given).
2Woods v. Construction Dept. of Duke Univ., 8832 (1939) N. C. W. C. A.
Ann. (1947), p. 25.
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surance against injury,23 there is still a ,requirement that the accident
arise out of and be in the course of the employment.
It is believed that it will be to the best interests of all concerned
for North Carolina to align itself definitely with the majority and hold
that the accidental result alone is to be considered the compensable
accident.
KIRBY SULLIVAN.
Insurance against injury seems to be a very desirable goal, but such an
enactment should be left to the legislature, or the employer could voluntarily adopt
such a plan.

